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ABSTRACT
Thai patent law was amended to comply with the Trade-Related Aspects o f  
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreementin 1992, eight years before the 
effective date required. Some 15 years later, during 2006-2008, Thailand issued 
compulsory licenses (CL) for seven medicines.Although this was allowed under 
TRIPS flexibilities, it has generated debate, both within Thailand and internationally, 
concerning whether, on balance, Thailand has benefitted from the restricted patent 
legislation resulting from TRIPS, or the unrestricting o f it through CL. The debate 
arises because those concerned principally with health consider patents to lead to 
reduced access to essential medicines, and hence reduced health, whereas those 
principally concerned with trade see patents as the means to secure development and 
availability o f  new medicines and foreign investment. This thesis aims to understand 
better the implications o f  strengthening or weakening patent protection through 
systematically examining the relationships between price, access to current 
medicines, access to future medicines (through market entry o f  new medicines) and 
foreign investment in a more holistic fashion, both within the pharmaceutical 
industry specifically and the economy more generally.
To address this overall aim, four objectives were set. The first was to assess the 
impact o f  patents on pharmaceutical prices. The debate hinges on the relationship 
between price and patents, and hence it is imperative to first establish this 
relationship in Thailand. Ordinary least squares regression was employed to estimate 
the impact o f  patent upon price, while controlling for market and medicine factors. 
The findings show that patents are associated with a price increase o f  approximately 
200%.Second, as price is argued to be the main restriction on access to medicines, it 
is important to assess the role o f  price in  determining access to medicines. A  probit 
model indicated that price is not a significant determinant o f  a medicine being listed 
on the National List o f  Essential M edicines (NLEM); however, price impedes access 
to non-NLEM medicines significantly.
Third, patent legislation will also affect the process for the launch o f  new medicines 
within a country. A Cox proportional hazard model was used to analyze the launch 
experience o f  new medicines to Thailand during 1982-2009.The empirical results
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show that policy related to patent law has a significant and positive impact on the 
rapidity o f  the launch o f new products in Thailand. M ost importantly, CL is shown 
to have a significant and adverse effect on the speed o f  new medicine launches in 
Thailand.
The last objective is to examine the impact o f  stronger patent protection on foreign 
investment, both in  the pharmaceutical industry specifically, and the wider economy 
more generally. The empirical estimation suggests that there is no significant change 
in foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows after the patent law amendment in 1992 
and that weakening pharmaceutical patent protection using CL does not necessarily 
keep away foreign investors.
In conclusion, from this thesis there is little evidence o f  benefit from patent law 
change. Therefore, stronger patent protection should not be accepted. The evidence 
from this thesis highlights that the critical issue in determining whether the Thai 
population has gained from stringent patent protection or not is the tension between 
current and future access. Patents increase the price o f  medicines and impede current 
access. However, patients benefit from greater access to new medicines. These 
findings suggest that the price o f  patented medicines should be monitored closely to 
avoid undesirable effect on access, together with work on a system to more 
effectively stimulate local R&D activity.
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CHAPTER 1 OVRVIEW OF THE THESIS
1.1 Introduction
International policies relating to patent protection have seen profound changes over 
the past two decades. During the Uruguay Round o f  multilateral trade negotiations, 
where the W orld Trade Organization (WTO) was established as a global body to 
promote liberalization o f  trade in  goods and services, one o f  the main outcomes was 
the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects o f  Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). 
TRIPS Agreement is the comprehensive international agreement on intellectual 
property rights (IPRs) which established minimum universal standards concerning 
patents, copyrights, trademarks, industrial designs, geographical indications, 
integrated circuits and undisclosed information (i.e. trade secrets). Under the TRIPS 
Agreement all member states o f  the WTO are bound to amend their IPRs legislation 
in order to align them with the same standards o f  protection for intellectual property 
specified by TRIPS.
At its most basic, patenting is the legal system established to provide short-term 
exclusivity over the right to produce and sell the specific product patented; 
effectively granting the firm a short-term monopoly. Patenting was developed to 
achieve two objectives: (i) encourage innovation in the development o f  new products 
through guaranteeing a return on investment; and (ii) allowing widespread 
consumption o f  these products through alleviating concerns that the developer may 
have that other firms may replicate the product. The patent system allows the firm to 
sell the product at a price higher than that which would result from market forces in 
the absence o f  patenting. This is used in order to recoup the costs o f  research and 
development, since the competitive equilibrium price, reflecting marginal cost o f 
production, would not encompass these earlier ‘capital’ costs (Love 2005).
However, there is concern that the patent price is not set to merely cover research 
and development costs, but set higher than this and thus used to achieve ‘super­
normal’ profits (profits in excess o f  those required to recoup research and 
development costs and thus keep the firm in the market) at the detriment o f  wider 
access to patented products, resulting in a deadweight social welfare loss (W oodward
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D and Smith 2003). It can be seen from the HIV/AIDS crisis in low income 
countries in  2000s and the majority o f  people lack access to available patented 
treatments due to their high cost (UNAIDS 2011).
In pharmaceutical industry, interest in patenting has climbed the global agenda since 
the establishment o f  TRIPS Agreement, which expanded the W estern tradition o f 
patenting to all members o f  the WTO, imposing patent protection for at least 20 
years without discrimination as to place o f  invention or origin o f  product, and 
applied to both products and processes (Smith, Correa et al. 2009). This has 
generated especially heated debate within the health community concerning the 
implications that patent strengthening may have on the price of, and hence access to, 
medicines, affecting both availability and affordability.
The implications o f  patenting spread further, as innovation, technology and 
knowledge development are crucial drivers o f  economic development and o f  
technology transfers resulting from international trade and investment and thus are 
significant drivers o f the global economy. Recently, developing countries have 
initiated bilateral trade agreement with high income countries. To trade-off with 
trade and investment benefits offering from higher income countries, developing 
countries have to abide with more stringent intellectual property obligations than 
those required by the WTO TRIPS Agreement, as known as TRIPS-Plus (Frankel 
2009). Arguments concerning patenting tend to take one o f two sides: that patenting 
should be continually strengthened in the belief that this will encourage greater 
research and development, bringing new products to market, and enhancing trade 
and investment; or that patenting should be weakened to ensure that medicines are as 
cheap as possible in the belief that this will ensure greatest access by those in need o f 
them.
Yet, although national policy makers need to judge evidence from both sides o f  the 
argument in order to strike a balance between affordable medicines, both now and in 
the future, and national trade and investment, seldom, i f  ever, do studies look at both 
sides. For instance, while continually strengthening patenting will likely lead to 
higher prices, further reducing affordability, weakening patenting may stifle future 
long-term access, since pharmaceutical companies might be reluctant to introduce 
new medicines into the market, and foreign investors may find other countries to
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invest in where there is better protection o f  their products. In order to determine the 
appropriate balance in policy (such as the use o f  TRIPS-flexibilities), it is important 
to establish: (i) the impact that patent protection actually has on price (compared 
with other factors), since i f  price is unresponsive to patents than tackling patents will 
not affect price; (ii) what impact price has on current and future access (compared 
with other determinants o f  access), since i f  access is unresponsive to price (perhaps it 
responds more to physical location o f  chemists, for instance) then tackling 
patent/price will not affect access; and (iii) what impact patents have on foreign 
investment and innovation in national and international settings, since patenting may 
influence investment in local pharmaceutical industry, and also be subject to 
associated activities in the general economy.
This thesis addresses these issues together for the first time, through an empirical 
case-study concerning these areas, focused on Thailand. Thailand is an interesting 
case study as its experience with patent protection, patent challenges, using 
compulsory licenses (CL) for instance, and access to medicines under the universal 
coverage scheme, has been significant. Thailand changed its patent law to comply 
with TRIPS eight years before the agreement came in to effect, and some 13 years 
before the deadline for developing countries. There is no direct price control 
exercised for medicine price. The Thai medicine market depends heavily on 
imported medicines and Thailand perhaps pays more than it should when compared 
internationally; the public sector procured generics at 1.46 times their international 
reference prices, and innovator brands at 3.3 times their international reference 
prices (The Office o f  Food and Drug Administration 2007). Some cancer medicines 
were marketed in Thailand at very high prices compared with generics available 
elsewhere; for example, the original letrozole was sold at 30 times its generic price 
(M inistry o f  Public Health 2008). This has caused some to attempt to challenge and 
weaken the patent system as applied to medicines.
In  this introductory chapter, section 2 first sets the stage by describing what a patent 
is and the implications o f patents, including the important o f  patent for 
pharmaceutical industry. Section 3 briefly outlines the international agreements and 
their histories related to patent and their implications. The context o f  access to 
medicines, current health problems and IPR issues in Thailand are explained in
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section 4 . Section 5 summarizes the key conclusions o f  previous studies focused on 
IPRs policies, which provides the basis for the research framework and thesis 
objectives as outlined in  section 6. The final section provides a brief summary o f 
each chapter and how this thesis is organized.
1.2 Public goods, knowledge and the role of patents
Most goods tend to be private in nature: their consumption can be restricted until a 
payment is made in exchange (they are ‘excludable’), and consumption by one 
individual limits consumption o f that same good by others (they are ‘rival’ in 
consumption) (Woodward and Smith 2003). For example, a private car seller can 
prevent other people from driving the car until a price has been paid to do so, and 
hence the car is excludable, and once the car is used by a buyer the same car cannot 
simultaneously be used by someone else, and hence it is rival in consumption.
Conversely, at the other end o f  the spectrum o f  goods, are public goods which are 
non-rival— the consumption by one individual does not detract from consumption by 
another— and non-excludable— it is not possible to exclude an individual from 
consuming the good. Often textbooks quote the example of lighthouses, where a ship 
cannot be excluded from the benefits o f the warning it gives, and one ship 
benefitting does not prevent another from doing so. However, such properties are 
often subject to change. For example, television and radio signals which are non­
rival (anyone with a receiver can use the signal without detriment to others using it) 
used to be non-excludable (anyone with a receiver could use them), but with 
advances in encryption technology it is now possible to exclude someone from using 
the signal, and hence charge a price. In this case, the good is excludable but remains 
non-rival and hence is what is termed a ‘club good’. Cases where the good is non­
excludable but rival, such as logging a forest, are termed ‘common-pool goods’ 
(Comes R and  Sandler T 1996).
Recently, the concept o f global public goods (GPGs) has been gaining increasing 
attention in many areas, including health (Smith and M acKellar 2007). GPGs are 
considered to be goods exhibiting a significant degree o f  publicness (i.e. non­
excludability and non-rivalry) but across time and space. They are public goods that 
are not limited geographically to a particular country, or to specific generations and
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points in time, but are global in scope. For example, reductions in carbon dioxide 
emissions will slow global warming. It will be impossible to exclude any country 
from benefiting from this, and each country will benefit without preventing another 
from doing so. Similarly, the eradication o f  infectious diseases o f  global scope, such 
as smallpox or polio, provides a benefit from which no country is excluded, and 
from which all countries will benefit without detriment to others (Smith 2003).
Knowledge is arguably the archetypal public good (Stieglitz 1999). For example, 
once a new mathematical theorem is discovered then it is non-rival -  anyone can use 
that theorem without disadvantaging others from using it -  and non-excludable, 
since the information is not embodied in, or dependent upon, a product. Most 
knowledge tends to be a global public good: a mathematical theorem is consistent 
and true everywhere in the world, and is available and non-rival across all countries 
and across generations. However, the discovery and generation o f knowledge is not 
costless, even though its subsequent dissemination may be at zero or a very small 
marginal cost. For instance, the time and effort involved in developing the 
mathematical theorem is borne by someone, yet publishing it in a journal, on the 
internet or even as a book makes it available for others to use at very low cost. This 
illustrates the economic problem concerning public goods -  they generate a 
significant level o f  social welfare, but there is no incentive for one to be involved in 
producing them. W hen goods are non-excludable, individuals (or nations in the case 
o f  GPG) may free-ride (that is, may consume the good, and benefit from it, without 
reciprocation in contributing to the production o f  that good). This leads to under­
supply, or non-supply, o f  the good and thus a societal loss o f  welfare. Thus, an 
individual firm or country has little motivation to generate new knowledge i f  the 
results o f  that investment can be cheaply imitated or used by others.
The implication o f  this is that the state must play some role in the provision o f  public 
goods (such as lighthouses, defence and street lighting). In the case o f  knowledge, 
the patent system was developed to ensure that knowledge is made legally 
excludable, and thus provide an incentive for individuals and firms to invest in 
knowledge creation (Smith, Thorsteinsdottir et al. 2004). Patents present a legal 
system to provide short-term exclusivity (or monopoly rights) over the production 
and sale o f  a specific product resulting from R&D, thus turning a public good in to a 
private good (or at least a common-pool good). Patenting thus provides an incentive
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to bring a new product to market by giving legal authority for short-term exclusivity 
over the right to produce and sell the products. It is built around a fundamental 
tension: ideas are public but creators need private returns. The benefits that have 
accrued from the development o f  the transistor, the laser or the mathematical 
algorithms that underlay the m odem  computer have been enormous, extending well 
beyond the benefits accruing to those who made or financed these innovations and 
discoveries. However, without the premium that the patent allows it is argued that 
these advances would never have been produced. Thus, there is an understanding 
that patents m ay generate some short-term reduction in social welfare, but generate 
much larger longer-term social welfare from ensuring that products are discovered in 
the first place.
1.2.1 Pharmaceutical patent
There is much knowledge creation within health care, the most high-profile o f which 
is that which goes into the creation o f  medicines. Patents for pharmaceuticals are 
considered vital as invention and innovation involve many risky, timely and costly 
processes. It is reported to take an average o f  13 years for a new medicine to move 
from the initial discovery into the marketplace as a final product, and the cost for the 
development o f  a new drug could be as high as USDS884 million cash and USDS1.8 
billion capitalized (Paul, M ytelka et al. 2010; Morgan, Grootendorst et al. 2011). Out 
o f  5,000 compounds that are discovered, only five will perform well enough to move 
into human testing, and only one o f  these five compounds will be approved by the 
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) (Colvin and M aravelias 2008). No firm will 
invest this time, effort and resources, if  the final product may then be cheaply copied 
and sold by rival firms.
Figure 1 shows a stylized "critical path" that encompasses the medicine development 
processes (U.S. Department o f  Health and Human Services 2004). At the far left, 
ideas coming out o f  basic scientific research, which is the fundamental 
understanding o f  biology and disease processes, enter into an evaluation process 
(prototype design or discovery). The "discovery" process seeks to select or create a 
molecule with specific desired biological activities. They then undergo a sequence o f  
protocols including preclinical development, clinical development and filing for 
approval to be ready to launch. Preclinical evaluation seeks to examine the safety
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and effectiveness of medicine within animals, while clinical development involves 
human trials in three phases: phase I, II and III. Phase I concerns safety and how the 
medicine is absorbed, phase II is concerned with optimal dosage in order to 
maximize beneficial effect and minimize harmful side effects, and phase III, 
involving a very large participant group who have the relevant disease, determines if 
the drug's benefits outweigh the risks in a larger patient group, and also compares 
the new potential drug with commonly used treatments that are already on the 
market.
F ig u rc l.l  The C ritical Path fo r M edical P roduct Development
|-----------------------------  Critical Path ----------------------------- -------
Source: US FDA, Innovation or stagnation: challenge and opportunity on the critical 
path to new medical products
From the “discovery" process moving from left to right along the path, the new 
knowledge related to that medicine, new molecule, new process or new use, can be 
discovered. The patent system is designed to provide one patent for one invention. 
Therefore, if company X invents a new chemical compound, company X may be 
entitled to a single patent to protect the newly invented compound and how it is 
manufactured. If company X then also discovers new forms of the compound, or 
invents new ways to deliver or manufacture the compound, they may be entitled to a 
separate patent for each invention. As a result, a single medicine may be covered by 
many separate patents claiming the chemical compound (the active ingredient or 
base compound), polymorphic forms of the compound, salts, and formulations, one 
or more for the medicines or processes and methods for manufacturing the active 
ingredient. It is worth noting that although a patent grants monopoly rights for 20 
years, by the time the medicine is ready to launch there may only be around 11 years
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o f  the patent left to run. This is because a new molecule or new compound is 
patented once it is discovered, and thus starting the patent time-clock running at a 
very early stage, prior to the various stages o f  clinical trails and final medicine 
registration process (Dickson and Gagnon 2004).
The pharmaceutical industry is facing challenges on several fronts. There is 
increasing demand from  healthcare systems for new high-efficacy products, provided 
they are appropriately priced, and especially those associated with ‘personalised 
medicine’ which are seen as conferring the maximum efficacy on the target 
population. However, trends in R&D productivity show the opposite. The last two 
decades has witnessed a declining trend in new chemical entities (NCEs). In the 
1990s, on average, 34 NCEs were introduced while 25 NCEs were introduced 
annually during 2000s. In  1997, the lowest NCEs introduction was observed, as only 
18 NCEs were approved by the US Food and Drug Administration, while 44 NCEs 
were approved in 1997 (The President’s Council o f  Advisors on Science and 
Technology 2012).
Moreover, it is taking longer to get new drugs to market (Thomson Reuters 2011). 
Since a lower percentage o f candidates entering preclinical development survive to 
the market application stage, it is imperative for pharmaceutical companies to be 
secured the exclusive right to ensure that, i f  it passes all trials and it then enters the 
market, profits are significantly larger than development costs. O f course, it is the 
ability to set this initial, patented, price at high levels that creates the controversy 
highlighted earlier, which this thesis intends to explore. Critical in this is the change 
in patent law that has happened at the global level over recent years, to which we 
now turn.
1.3 International agreements related to patent law
This section focuses on the political economic forces driving W TO provisions, 
inbilateral and regional trade and investment agreements, and the implications for 
multilateralism and access to medicines in developing countries.
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1.3.1 TRIPS
By the 1990s variance between countries in the protection and enforcement o f  IPRs 
was a growing source o f tension in international economic relations (W orld Trade 
Organization). The ad hoc system in place had resulted from a combination o f 
unilateral pressure and pressure from bilateral agreements. It possessed little order or 
predictability, and weak systems to implement patent legislation and to resolve 
disputes. Throughout the 1980s, but gaining significant momentum in the 1990s with 
the increased importance o f  the digital environment, intellectual property became an 
important business tool,and new internationally-agreed trade rules for intellectual 
property rights were seen as a way to to cope with the international economic 
tension. Based on intense lobbying by industrialized countries, led by the US and 
supported by the European Union, Japan and other developed nations, as well as 
campaigns o f unilateral economic encouragement under the Generalized System o f  
Preferences (GSP) and coercion under Section 301 o f the Trade Act favouring 
developing countries, the TRIPS Agreement was bom  during the Uruguay Round 
trade negotiations o f  the GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade). The 
Uruguay Round took place from 1986 to 1994, and aim ed to link trade policy to 
intellectual property standards (Braithwaite and Drahos 2000).Key provisions o f  the 
TRIPS agreement are addressed in Box 1.1.
The main aim  o f  the TRIPS agreement is to strengthen and harmonize certain aspects 
o f  the intellectual property protection at the global level. It covers both categories o f 
intellectual property: industrial property (patents, trademarks, geographical 
denominations, industrial designs and models and unpatented know-how) and 
literary and artistic property (copyright and neighbouring rights). It sets out 
minimum levels o f  protection that each government has to give to the intellectual 
property o f  all W TO members, without discrimination as to place o f  invention or 
origin o f  product. It seeks to strike a balance between the long term benefits and 
possible short term  costs to society. Society benefits in the long term when 
intellectual property protection encourages creation and invention, especially when 
the period o f  protection expires and the creations and inventions enter the public 
domain. The W TO’s dispute settlement system is available when there are trade 
disputes over intellectual property rights. To achieve this standard, W TO members
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are required to modify their intellectual property laws to make them consistent with 
the new W TO standards. For instance, the TRIPS Agreement states that all patents 
shall be available for at least 20 years from the filing date, whereas before TRIPS the 
patent term varied greatly among countries (7, 10, 17 or 20 years). All WTO 
Members have to incorporate this 20-year patent term  in their own patent law.
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Objectives'. The protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights should contribute 
to the promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer and dissemination of 
technology, to the mutual advantage of producers and users of technological knowledge and 
in a manner conducive to social and economic welfare, and to a balance of rights and 
obligations.
Minimum standards: The TRIPS Agreement establishes minimum standards for the 
protection of IP. States are free to introduce systems of protection not referred to in the 
Agreement, for example, to protect informal knowledge, or the rights of indigenous 
communities. They are also free to set higher standards of protection for existing rights. 
Enforcement: The Agreement establishes general principles that are applicable to IPR 
enforcement procedures so that IPR holders can effectively enforce their rights. In addition, 
it contains provisions on court procedures, court orders, suspension of custom clearances for 
goods and criminal penalties.
Dispute settlement-. The WTO includes a procedure for settling disputes between Members. 
Any Member can bring proceedings against another Member. A panel of specially appointed 
trade experts interprets the various agreements of the WTO, including the TRIPS 
Agreement. Once the panel issues its report, it is adopted unless one of the parties to the 
dispute appeals the decision or there is a consensus by WTO Members not to adopt the 
decision. If a party to a dispute fails to abide by a decision of either a Panel or the Appellate 
Body, the other party can impose trade sanctions on that Member.
Developing countries’ transitional periods: While developed countries should have 
complied with the obligations under the TRIPS Agreement by 1 January 1996, developing 
countries and countries with economies in transition had until 1 January 2000. Least 
developed countries had until 2006 to implement the Agreement.
Built-in agenda: The TRIPS Agreement includes a built-in agenda of review. Specifically, 
Article 27(3)(b) provided for the review in 1999 of certain provisions relating to the 
patentability of plants and animals, and the protection of plant varieties. In the area of 
geographical indications, Article 23(4) provides that, in order to facilitate the protection of 
geographical indications for wines and spirits, negotiations shall be undertaken in the TRIPS 
Council on the establishment of a multilateral system of notification and registration. 
Preliminary work in this area has already begun. Article 71(1) provides that the TRIPS 
Council shall review implementation of the whole Agreement from 1 Januaiy 2000 and 
every two years after that.
Source: (Walker 2001)
Box 1.1 Major characteristics of the TRIPS Agreement
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In the pharmaceutical sector, prior to the TRIPS Agreement, pharmaceutical patents 
were not widely recognized in many developing countries. As there were no 
international standards on the scope o f  patent protection, countries had very different 
regulations on IP protection according to their own needs. Some 40 countries did not 
provide patent protection for pharmaceutical products at all (Boulet, Perriens et al. 
2000). Many countries provided only process patent. Product patents provide for 
absolute protection o f  the product, whereas process patents provide protection in 
respect o f  the technology and the process or method o f  manufacture (WHO/EDM 
1999). Critically, protection for process patents do not prevent the manufacture o f 
patented products by a process o f  reverse engineering, where a different process or 
method from that which has been invented (and patented) is used but the final 
product is the same. For example, manufacturers in certain countries are able to 
make generic versions o f  patented medicines since national legislation only permits 
process patent protection (WHO 2005).
Therefore, copies o f  medicines protected by a patent in other countries were widely 
available, usually at a lower price than the original patented drug. The copies were 
either manufactured by local companies or imported, without the permission o f  the 
patent holders. This practice ended following the TRIPS Agreement. All WTO 
members have to make patents covering both products and processes available for 
pharmaceutical inventions in their countries. A company that has invented a new 
pharmaceutical product or process, since 1 January 1995, is able to apply for at least 
a 20-year patent protection in any W TO member country.
1.3.2 TRIPS flexibilities
The inclusion o f  pharmaceutical patents in the WTO TRIPS agreement brought 
concern to many that it would exacerbate the problem o f  access to medicines in 
developing countries, as it sought to limit, or even disable, direct competition 
(generics) to new medicines until the relevant patents expire (unless licences are 
granted). However, as concessions to these concerns, TRIPS was amended to contain 
provisions that allow a degree o f  flexibility and sufficient room for countries to 
safeguard the social benefit o f  access to medicine. These ‘flexibilities’ including 
transition periods, CL, public or non-commercial use o f  patents, parallel importation, 
exceptions to patent rights and exemption from patentability, and limits on data
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protection (Musungu and Oh 2005). A short description o f these categories is 
provided in Box 1.2. This means that countries have a certain amount o f freedom in 
modifying their regulations and various options exist for them in formulating their 
national legislation to ensure an appropriate balance between the goal o f  providing 
incentives for future invention o f  new drugs and the goal o f  affordable access to 
existing medicines.
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Compulsory licences: These are mechanisms used by public authorities to authorize use of a 
patent-protected invention by the government or third parties without the consent of the 
patent-holder. Patent-holders are to receive adequate compensation, usually in the form of a 
royalty. WTO Members are free to determine the grounds upon which compulsory licences 
may be granted. Practice shows that they may be issued on various grounds of general 
interest, such as public health, and are a common feature of patent law in both developed 
and developing countries.
Parallel imports: Companies often charge lower prices for a medicine in one country than in 
another, taking into account a range of market factors. This means that a country with 
limited resources can sometimes afford more of a patented medicine by purchasing it abroad 
at a lower price and importing it, rather than buying it directly in its domestic market at the 
higher price. In legal terms, the patent owner has “exhausted” its property rights in the 
product actually sold -  it maintains the exclusive right to manufacture the product, but it 
cannot use its intellectual property rights to prevent resale of those units it sells.
Bolar provision/regular exception: This permits the use of a patented invention without 
authorization from the patent owner in order to obtain marketing approval of a generic 
product before the patent expires. This allows a generic product to enter the market more 
quickly after patent expiry, which in turn facilitates access to cheaper medicines.
Transition period: This allows developing and least-developed countries extra time in the 
implementation of their TRIPS obligations. Three transition periods provided for in the 
Agreement were: 1) the 1995-2000 period, at the end of which developing countries were 
obliged to implement the TRIPS Agreement; 2) the 2000-2005 period, which provided an 
additional period of 5 years to put in place product patent protection pharmaceuticals or 
agro-chemicals for those countries without such protection; 3) the 1995-2006 period for 
least-developed countries, later change to until 1 January 2016 according to paragraph 7 of 
the Doha Declaration.
Sources: (1) UNAIDS, WHO and UNDP (2011)(UNAIDS 2011)
(2) (Musungu and Oh 2005)
Box 1.2: Important TRIPS flexibilities
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In practice, however, only a few developing countries have made use o f these 
‘flexibilities’ (Commission on Intellectual Property Rights Innovation and Public 
Health 2006). The lack o f  IPR management capacity at the national level and o f  
appropriate institutional mechanisms are some o f  the reasons the TRIPS flexibilities 
have been infrequently used (Correa 2001). Although flexibilities such as CL are 
written into the TRIPS Agreement, some countries were unsure o f  how these would 
be interpreted, and how far their rights to use them would be respected (Oliveira, 
Bermudez et al. 2004). The debate culminated at the Doha W orld Trade 
Organization M inisterial Conference (9-14 November 2001), where WTO Members 
expressed their agreement that the TRIPS Agreement should be interpreted and 
implemented so as to protect public health and promote access to medicines for all. 
This marked a watershed in international trade demonstrating that a rules-based 
trading system should be compatible with public health interests.
The Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, adopted by the 
W TO Ministerial Conference in November 2001, affirms and clarifies the right o f  
W TO Members to make frill use o f  the safeguard provisions o f  the TRIPS 
Agreement to protect public health and enhance access to medicines (WTO 2001). 
The confirmation that the TRIPS Agreement has provided room  for flexibilities at 
the national level has important political and legal implications (Correa 2002). It 
indicates that the pressure to impede the use o f  available flexibilities run counter to 
the purposes o f  the TRIPS Agreement. In legal terms, it means that individual 
M embers are able to adopt laws and regulations to  implement it in  light o f public 
health needs. In addition to other provisions clarifying the nature o f  TRIPS 
flexibilities, the Doha Declaration extended the transition period for least developed 
countries to implement protection o f  patents and undisclosed information, as well as 
their enforcement for pharmaceutical products until January 2016 (World Trade 
Organization 2003).
1.3.3 TRIPS-Plus
Clearly these flexibilities are not in the interests o f  the pharmaceutical industry, as 
they weaken the legal right to temporary monopolies, and hence to charging higher 
prices in the short-term. W hile a tension remains between fostering patent protection, 
as required by the W TO-TRIPS Agreement, and providing access to medicines that
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may be out o f reach for many people in various countries, more recently ‘TRIPS- 
Plus’ model, which requires stronger protection o f IPR than that agreed on in TRIPS, 
has been coined to describe what is happening in bilateral trade negotiations. The 
TRIPS-Plus concept covers both increasing the level o f  protection for right holders 
beyond that which is given in the TRIPS Agreement, and reducing the scope or 
effectiveness o f  exceptions and limitations to rights. These practices have the effect 
o f reducing the ability o f developing countries to protect the public interest and may 
be adopted at the multilateral, plurilateral, regional and/or national level (Musungu 
and Dutfield 2003). Free Trade negotiations are being used as forums to promote 
trade and investment between trade partners while simultaneously enhancing the 
protection o f  IPR beyond the levels agreed on in the TRIPS agreement (Sell 2007). 
As part o f  trade agreements with the United States or the European Union, some 
countries such as Brazil, China and several Central American states have been 
required to adopt stronger IPR protection (MSF 2011).
Common examples o f  ‘TRIPS-plus’ provisions include extending the term o f  a 
patent longer than the 20 year minimum, or introducing provisions that limit the use 
o f  compulsory licences or that restrict generic competition. M ore generally, 10 areas 
o f  negotiation relating to the pharmaceutical sector that go beyond TRIPS have been 
noted: (1) protection for test data exclusivity; (2) linkages between medicine 
registration and patents; (3) patent term compensation for granting delays; (4) patent 
term compensation for delays in marketing approval; (5) strengthening intellectual 
property law enforcement; (6) restricting CL to public non-commercial use in  
national emergencies; (7) limitations on parallel importing through contracts with the 
patent holders; (8) prohibition o f  the revocation o f  patents on the grounds o f  public 
interest; (9) the ability to patent new uses o f  products; and (10) the ability to patent 
animals and plants (natural sources o f  medicines) (Fink C 2005; Correa 2006).
These have an impact on access to medicines. For example, data exclusivity 
protection refers to exclusive rights granted over pharmaceutical test data submitted 
by companies to regulatory authorities to obtain market authorisation. This 
information has to be kept confidential for a period o f  time determined through 
negotiations. I f  a generic manufacturer wants to register a drug in that country, it is 
not allowed to merely show that their product is therapeutically equivalent to the
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originator product. Instead, it must either wait until the exclusivity period has 
expired, or repeat lengthy clinical trials in order to demonstrate the safety and 
efficacy o f  the medicine. Data exclusivity and the other TRIPS-plus provisions are 
frequently pushed as a part o f  free trade agreements between developed and 
developing countries (Smith, Correa et al. 2009)
In conclusion, most countries that have had different rules in the past are now 
harmonizing their minimum levels o f  IPRs protection, as required by the TRIPS 
agreement. M easures to safeguard a country’s access to medicines exist under this 
Agreement and the rights to exercise these measures have been affirmed at the global 
level. However, many countries that trade with the US or the EU m ay enter into 
bilateral trade agreements that commit them to more stringent IPRs rules than the 
TRIPS Agreement (TRIPS-Plus) in exchange for concessions in other areas o f  
trade— often access to the US market for agricultural or manufactured goods. This is 
a crucial area for the health community to influence the trade agenda and for 
decision-makers to be aware o f the consequences o f  signing these FT As and trying 
to implement the safeguards in the TRIPS flexibilities. This is especially true for 
Thailand, which has a history o f  early compliance with TRIPS, using flexibilities to 
enable its universal coverage system to be affordable and feasible, and o f 
experiencing trade repercussions from enacting such flexibilities.
1.4 TRIPS, trade and access to medicines: Thailand as a case study
1.4.1 Access to medicine system in Thailand
Thailand is a lower-middle-income economy in Southeast Asia with a 2011 per 
capita GNI o f  US$4,440 and total population o f  64 million (M inistry o f  Interior) 
(World Bank 2012). Medicine cost is the most significant proportion o f  total health 
expenditure; 46% o f  overall health expenditure and 3% o f  GDP in  2008 (Ministry o f  
Public Health 2011). Medicine price setting is generally not regulated in Thailand; 
although there is a consumer protection law under the Prices o f Goods and Services 
Act B.E. 2542, this Act only applies when the product owners sell at prices higher 
than the labelled price.
At present, universal health care is delivered through three schemes: Civil Service 
Medical Benefits Scheme (CSMBS) for government employees and their
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dependents; Social Security Scheme (SSS) for private business employees; and the 
Universal Coverage Scheme (UC) for any persons not covered by CSMBS or SSS. 
UC is the largest insurance program covering approximately 75% o f the population 
while CSMBS and SSS cover 25%  o f  the population (Patcharanarumol 2008).These 
three public health schemes provide medicines at zero cost to the patient provided 
that they are on the National List o f Essential M edicines (NLEM) (National Drug 
Committee 2008).
The NLEM  was adopted from the WHO concept o f  essential medicines in 1981. The 
current NLEM  version was issued in 2008 and consists o f  637 medicines, with 17 
therapeutic groups, which aim to treat and prevent all major health problems among 
the Thai population. The main objective o f  the NLEM  is to provide medicines that 
are necessary, effective and safe at an affordable level through government hospitals 
and other health stations (National Drug Committee 2008). Payment for prescribed 
medicines outside the NLEM is the responsibility o f  individuals under the SSS and 
UC schemes, but not the CSMBS, which allows three medical doctors to co-endorse 
the use o f  medicines outside the NLEM (Tangcharoensathien 2003).
A scoring system has been used to select medicines for inclusion on the NLEM since 
2004 (Sripiroj A, Tantivess S et al. 2000). The members o f  working groups 
representing each therapeutic group acquire information concerning each medicine 
from secondary data sources (e.g., Pubmed, BMJ clinical evidence, Cochrane library, 
Micromedex Drugdex Drug Evaluation, Medscape Druginfo Database, or Gold 
Media Clinical Pharmacology 2004 CD ROM). They then use four criteria as the 
basis for a scoring calculation: Information (quantity and quality o f  evidence), 
Efficacy, Safety (precautions, severe adverse effects and medicine interaction) and 
Ease o f  use (administration restriction score and frequency o f  medicine 
administration). The scoring system is known as ISafE -  the acronym o f  all the 
criteria used in this method. Each criteria is scored from 0 to 1, where 0 represents 
unreliable evidence, least efficacy and unsafe profile and 1 represents high quality 
and rich evidence, high efficacy and safe profile. The ISafE score is then the product 
o f  a simple multiplication o f  the four criteria divided by 4. The maximum score 
using this method is 1 and the minimum score is 0. At this point the price o f  the 
medicine is excluded from the criteria to make sure that the NLEM  considers all 
possible medicines. Medicines in  the same therapeutic area are sorted by the ISafE
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scores, with half o f  the medicines chosen for further processing. Next, the Essential 
Medicine Cost Index (EMCI) is calculated, which is the treatment cost for a 
medicine divided by the ISaffi score. The medicines with the lowest EMCI are 
recommended for inclusion in  the NLEM; deemed to be providing acceptable quality 
at low cost. Procurement regulations in the public sector attempt to then encourage 
the use o f  the NLEM medicines; the National Essential Medicine Policy requires that 
public hospitals spend at least 60-80%  o f  their government medicine budget on 
medicines that are on the NLEM.
In addition, it is required that at least 80% o f  the medicine budget allocated to all 
government health facilities must purchase medicines from the Government 
Pharmaceutical Organisation (GPO), except where the GPO ’s price is 3 %  or more 
expensive than private suppliers. I f  the GPO cannot provide the needed medicines, 
the lowest price o f  the maximum procurement will be used as a reference with the 
exception o f  monopoly medicines which can use a higher price (Lerttiendamrong, 
Tangcharoensathien et al. 1998). As a result, patented medicines have always been 
excluded with this indirect price control policy.
Also, although public facilities are required to procure medicines from the NLEM, 
the specific medicine lists in public hospitals m ay differ from the NLEM list 
according to the size o f  hospital, where smaller hospitals have a medicine list 
typically smaller than the NLEM  while the bigger hospitals not only have the NLEM 
medicines but also have a more extensive list o f  medicines since their role as tertiary 
care facilities means that they have to deal with complex medications necessary for 
uncommon diseases. Typically, rural, general, central and university hospitals have a 
proportionate split between medicines from NLEM  and medicines not on NLEM o f  
82:18, 81:19, 71:29 and 57:43 respectively (Sripiroj, Tantivess et al. 2000).
Each hospital also has the authority to negotiate directly with the seller, thus 
providing the potential for further differences in price between institutions for the 
same medicine. Several efforts have been made to rem ove this anomaly, such as 
reference pricing and bulk purchasing at the provincial level for generic medicine 
procurement to get the minimum price; generally 4-21%  less expensive (W aning 
2009).Tiered pricing and co- payment systems have not been introduced in Thailand 
yet. Two -thirds o f  medicine consumption follows the advice o f  health professionals
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(W ibulpolprasert 2007). Access to the medicine is thus mainly through the hospitals 
accounting for 70%, with relatively little through clinics (7%) and drugstores (15%) 
(IMS Health 2010). There are a limited number o f  studies that examine in detail the 
supply chain system o f  medicine distribution, in terms o f  lead-time or inventory 
management. Medicine distribution in Thailand is through manufacturers or agents. 
The distributors for multinational firms are logistics companies, and there is 
therefore no information o f  lead-time or inventory management; however public 
hospitals are generally recognised to keep a 2-3 m onth supply in stock (Pitaknetinan, 
Tangcharoensathien et al. 1999).
1.4.2 TR IPS , tra d e  and  access to m edicines: T hailand  as a case study
In 1979 Thailand's Patent Act (B.E.2522) established the first legal protection for 
inventions in the country. This Act only allowed process patents for pharmaceuticals. 
As mentioned, Thailand, as officially a developing country, was not required to 
provide patent protection before 2000. However, during the mid-1980s, many 
developing countries, such as Thailand and Brazil, were subject to trade pressure 
from the US government for increased IPRs protection (Wilson, Cawthom e et al. 
1999). In contrast with Brazil, the Thai government was not able to resist the 
pressure from the US Trade Representative after a complaint by the US 
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association claimed that the patent protection for 
pharmaceutical products in Thailand was inadequate (von Schoen-Angerer and 
Limpananont 2001). As a result, Thai patent law was amended to include protection 
for pharmaceutical products in 1992, eight years ahead o f  the requirement in the 
TRIPS Agreement and 13 years ahead o f the end o f  the transitional flexible period 
for developing countries (Markandya 2001).
The 1992 Patent Act, however, included a provision intended to protect consumers 
from the impact o f  high prices by establishing a Committee on Pharmaceutical 
Patent to monitor and compare medicine prices, and dispense corrective measures 
where inappropriate price behaviour was found. Thai patent law was revised again in 
1999, and again in response to US economic pressure (Sweeney 2000). The major 
changes were the dismantling o f  the Committee on Pharmaceutical Patent, and 
amendments to allow for the protection o f  petty patents for six years, which allows 
simple inventions with industrial applicability, but which is not necessarily o f  a
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groundbreaking nature, to enjoy the benefits o f  patent protection. The intuition 
behind these amendments was that they would offer a key incentive to promote the 
foreign investment needed for technology and knowledge transfers.
Thailand is a lower-middle-income economy with a 2007 per capita Gross National 
Income (GNI) o f  US$3,400 and total population o f 63.3 million (W orldbank 2007). 
Prior to 2002, around 30% o f  the Thai population were uninsured and had to pay 
their own medical bills (Tangcharoensathien 2007). Universal Coverage (UC) was 
achieved in  Thailand in early 2002, meaning that all Thai people are insured under 
one o f three national health insurance schemes which are the Civil Service Medical 
Benefits Scheme (CSMBS) for government employees and their dependents, the 
Social Health Insurance (SHI) for private business employees and the UC scheme for 
any persons who are not covered by CSMBS and SHI.
During the past decade, the overall pattern o f morbidity in terms o f disability- 
adjusted life year (DALY) loss has been dominated by Non-Communicable Diseases 
(NCDs) (The Thai Working Group on Burden o f Disease and Injuries 2002). 
Although NCDs are preventable or mitigatable by reversing lifestyle trends, 
medicines also play a significant role in reducing the damage caused by premature ill 
health. Given universal coverage, a holistic health system to provide adequate access 
to NCD medicines is vital for the Thai government. All Thai people are able to 
access medicines on the National List o f Essential Medicine (NLEM) free o f charge. 
However, some essential medicines are not selected for this list, and it has been 
argued that price is a major barrier to NLEM medicine selection (Ministry o f Public 
Health 2008). Therefore, for non-NLEM medicines, patients are responsible for 
meeting the full price.
The Thai medicine market, as in most developing countries, depends heavily on 
imports. The proportion o f  imports rose with an accelerating rate during the period o f 
high economic growth in the mid-1990s. Notably, this increase coincided with the 
amendment to the Thai Patent Act which effectively introduced patents for 
pharmaceuticals products. From 1992, when the new Patent Act went into effect, the 
rate o f  growth in  the share o f  imported medicines in the Thai market increased by 
approximately 30% to 60%.The prices o f  medicines in  Thailand are set mainly by 
the manufacturer, with no policy related to price regulation (Sooksriwong C 2009).
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Therefore, the price o f  medicine is relatively high compared with other countries at 
similar levels o f  economic development. A survey by the World Health Organization 
(WHO) and Health Action International (HAI) found that, on average, Thai patients 
pay 2.5 times more for generic medicine and 4.4 times more for branded medicines 
than 36 other similar developing countries (Sooksriwong C, Yoongthong W et al. 
2009). Patenting has always been highlighted by those in public health as a major 
factor contributing to the high price o f  medicines, and therefore as a significant 
barrier to access to medicines (Love 1999; Songkhla 2009; Kessomboon, 
Limpananont et al. 2010).
The debate over patent implications on access to medicine reached a peak in 2005 
when the rise o f  HIV/AIDS as a major health problem, and concern over the rising 
costs o f  anti-retrovirals (ARV), coincided. HIV/AIDS was a major health problem 
during the period from 1994 to 2004. There were 25,000 new cases and 5,000 AIDS 
deaths per year in this period. A comparison o f  anti-retroviral prices in January 2005 
showed that patented medicine prices in Thailand were much higher than generic 
prices from Indian manufacturers. For example, original EFV(200 mg) 100 capsules 
sold in 2006 at 3,192 baht per bottle, while a generic equivalent sold at 1,292 baht 
(Médecins Sans Frontières 2006). Similarly, Lopinavir/Ritonavir (LPV/r) (180 
capsules) from Abbott was sold at 17,762 baht per bottle, whereas Hetero sold at 
5,930 baht or 33% of patented price (Médecins Sans Frontières 2006).
Yet, although HIV/AIDS is a focus o f attention, it is cancer that is the major cause o f 
death in Thailand, with nearly 30,000 deaths annually and more than 100,000 new 
cases reported each year (Wibulpolprasert 2007). The number o f cancer patients 
under the universal coverage scheme has increased from around 18,600 in 2004 to 
341,000 in 2010. Most new anti-cancer medicines are patented, costly, and 
inaccessible to the middle class as well as the poor in Thailand. They are neither 
included in the NLEM nor covered by the National Health Insurance system. 
Therefore, patients have to pay for these medicines out o f  their own pockets. As a 
result many patients drop out o f  treatment when they cannot continue to afford the 
medicine (Ministry o f Public Health 2008). Since the government failed to meet the 
goal o f  full access (Ministry o f Public Health and National Health Security Office 
2007), the Sub-committee on selecting essential medicines under the National Health 
Insurance scheme proposed measures to increase access, including CL for seven
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patented medicines; two ARVs, EFV and LPV/r, one cardiovascular, clopidogrel, 
and four anti-cancer medicines, letrozole, docetaxel, erlotinib and imatinib, during 
2006-2008 (Ministry o f Public Health 2008).
The seven CL issued by the Thai government for these medicines provoked 
particularly strong reactions from pharmaceutical companies. For instance, Abbott 
Laboratories withdrew its registration application for seven new medicines in protest 
o f  the government use license on the LPV/r combination. Strong reactions were also 
forthcoming from the US and European governments since Thailand was the first 
developing country to issue CL for medicines not only for the treatment o f  
HIV/AIDS but also other diseases, including heart disease and cancer (Tantivess, 
Kessomboon et al. 2008).The implications o f  CLs are also not confined to the 
pharmaceutical industry. In 2007 the Office o f  the United States Trade 
Representative elevated Thailand’s ranking from the W atch List (WL) to Priority 
W atch List (PWL), indicating concerns over deficiencies in IPR protection and 
enforcement (USTR 2007), and announced that privileges under the Generalized 
System o f  Preferences would be removed for three Thai products: gold jewellery 
accessories, polyethylene terephthalate, and flat screen television sets.
In 2003, during the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Summit in 
Bangkok, the governments o f Thailand and the United States initiated negotiation on 
a Thai-U S FT A, to conclude in 2006. Like other FTAs, one o f  the 23 negotiation 
issues was TRIPS-Plus, which requires higher level o f intellectual property 
protection than those agreed to in the TRIPS agreement: for example, protection for 
test data exclusivity, linkages between medicine registration and patents, the 
strengthening o f  intellectual property law enforcement, and restricting CL to public 
non-commercial use during national emergencies (Rossi 2005; Correa 2006).
This negotiation still has not been concluded, due to unstable political conditions, 
although it is expected that Thailand would benefit both economically and politically 
from the FTA. In economic terms, Thailand is very concerned that its exports to the 
United States have been losing market share in  recent years to other countries, such 
as M exico and China. Eliminating US tariff and non-tariff barriers to Thai exports 
through the FTA could increase the competitiveness and market share o f Thai 
products in  the US market. In addition, Thailand would receive greater US
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investment as has occurred in other countries that have entered into similar 
agreements. Modernization and the diffusion o f higher levels o f  technology are 
essential for the Thai economy to remain competitive in the face o f  competition from 
other lower-wage, emerging market economies such as China, Vietnam, and Laos. In 
addition, a closer political and economic relationship with the United States would 
bestow political and economic leverage to Thailand in Southeast Asia (Aheam  and 
Morrison 2006).
Given the experience o f  pharmaceutical patent protection in Thailand during 1992- 
2008, patent protection combines both health and trade issues. Product patent 
protection for pharmaceuticals was enforced in Thailand prior to the introduction o f  
TRIPS to the WTO, which represents one o f  the longest experiments in setting high 
patent standard protection for pharmaceuticals in the developing world. Stronger 
patent laws might attract trade flows and foreign investors. However, their 
drawbacks for health are significant. Making use o f  the available safeguards to 
protect the health o f  the Thai people could make the country worse o ff in other ways, 
in terms o f  access to new medicines and reduced levels o f  foreign investment and 
access to export markets. In order to support the development o f  national policies 
which respond to international initiatives that affect patent laws (notably future 
government use license or FTA negotiations, including TRIPS-Plus) it is necessary 
to consider the impact that the level o f  patent protection has on the country as a 
whole.
1.5 What have we learned from past research?
Policy makers struggle to balance health with trade policy objectives, in the 
pharmaceutical sector as elsewhere (Smith, Lee et al. 2009). Tensions arise over 
medicine pricing in particular. W hat those in health view as necessary to maintaining 
equitable and wide access to medicines, industry views as inimical to R&D and 
innovation. Empirical evidence concerning the static and dynamic impacts o f  pricing 
is therefore essential since the net social welfare effect o f  any patent policy 
innovation may be either positive or negative. Patent policy not only has a direct 
effect on the current uses o f existing technology but it m ay also have an effect on 
incentives to develop new technologies in the future. For example, with stringent 
patent protection, people may have less access to medicine due to higher monopoly
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prices. However, overall social welfare may benefit in the long-term from being able 
to access a higher “quality” product (i.e.increased social marginal benefit or 
decreased social marginal cost).
Though it has been 20 years since the Thai Patent Act was amended to comply with 
TRIPS in 1992, there has been little emphasis on assessing the implications o f  the 
Agreement, or the subsequent use o f  flexibilities, on health or trade; which is the aim 
o f  this thesis. The purpose o f  this section is to outline the context for this in terms o f 
the existing empirical evidence concerning patent protection, both in Thailand and 
internationally. This evidence will be explained in more detail in the appropriate 
chapters.
W ith respect to patent implications in general, the economic literature has focused on 
the implications o f patent policy on static and dynamic welfare effects, since one of 
the basic justifications o f a patent protection is to foster dynamic innovation as 
compensation to the static losses caused by granting temporary monopoly rights. 
There is a level o f  consensus among economists that developing countries will suffer 
a loss in static welfare in the short run with reinforcement o f IPRs (Chin and 
Grossman 1988; Nogués 1993; Zuniga and Combe 2002). Contrary to the consensus 
regarding negative static effects, the assessment o f the dynamic effects o f  strong 
patent protection is less clear. Some hypothetical studies predict that an increase in 
patent protection unambiguously promotes innovation (Kamien and Schwartz 1974; 
Diwan and Rodrik 1991). However, a number o f empirical studies suggest that there 
is a significant probability that stronger IPR protection may slow down technological 
progress in the long run (Chin and Grossman 1990; Deardorff 1992).
Empirical studies in Thailand, and other similar countries, are rare. The findings 
illustrate the role o f  patent protection in four areas: price, present access, future 
access, and international trade and investment. Overall, patent protection appears to 
increase price by around 26%-277% depending on which o f  three estimation 
approaches is used: demand estimation before the patent came to effect, regression 
during the time the patent is active, and observation from before and after the patent 
expires (Watal 2000; Fink 2004; Magazzini, Pammolli et al. 2004; Boersma and et 
al. 2005; Borrell 2007). With respect to price and access, m ost studies describe how 
patenting increases price (as above) and then ‘assum e’ that price affects access; there
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is no study looking at the direct association between the extent o f price increase and 
the extent o f  changes in access, controlling for other influences. W hile the specific 
analysis o f the seven medicines for which Thailand implemented CLs showed that 
the generic equivalent price increased utilization rates by around three times 
(Yamabhai, Mohara et al. 2009), another study demonstrated that switching all 
medicines under a patent system to a no patent system would have increased the 
percentage o f  AIDS patients with access to new medicines only from 0.88% to 
1.18%, due to other factors (Borrell and Watal 2003). This supports Attaran (2004) 
who suggests that the m ain obstacles to access are associated with the country’s 
socio-economic status such as the lack o f  manufacturing capacity or a poor health 
care system (Attaran 2004).
W ith respect to the effect o f  price on future access, Lanjouw (2005) determined the 
effects o f  patent policy and price control policy on market entry, and showed that 
extensive price control and process-only patent protection lowers the probability o f  
having a new medicine launched to market in lower-income countries by 30% 
(Lanjouw 2005). An implication o f  removing patent protection to gain increased 
current access is that this might result in patients foregoing the opportunity to get a 
new medicine in the future, as it would not be discovered (at the extreme this would 
be true globally, due to an overall reduction in industry income) or not marketed in a 
country (or, more likely, at the local level) (NOGUES 1993). This clearly generates 
trade-offs between benefits now and in the future (Grootendorst and Matteo 2007). 
Indeed, one study estimated that for every dollar in consumer benefit realized from 
providing greater access to current medicines, future consumers would suffer at a 
rate o f  three dollars in present value terms from reduced future innovation (Hughes, 
M oore et al. 2002). However, such studies lack a direct link between profitability 
and actual investment in R&D. They illustrate the effect o f  patents on profit and, 
again, ‘assum e’ that this translates directly to R&D.
W ith respect to the broader impact, five studies which looked at the impact o f 
patents on trade were found. Based on a Computable General Equilibrium model, it 
was estimated that the Thai-US FT A would increase the export and import levels for 
Thailand by 3.4% and 4.7% respectively (Thailand Development Research Institute 
Foundation 2003). Other studies suggest that IPR protection more generally has a
44
positive influence on overall trade flows in both small and large developing 
economies (Ferrantino 1993; Maskus and Penubarti 1995; Fink and Braga 1999). 
These results are in line with results that patent protection had a positive impact on 
Indian pharmaceutical exports (Pradhan 2007).
However, the impact o f  patents on foreign direct investment (FDI) is less categorical. 
M ost studies here use regression to analyze the effect o f IPRs on FDI. Additional 
variables are included in the regression to control for different country-specific 
factors, although all compare IPR risk with proxy indicators for ‘economic risk’ 
and/or ‘political risk’. Most studies focus on the role o f national patent protection 
policy to attract US investors. Ferrantino (1993), M arkus and Penubarti (1995), 
Kondo (1995) and Primo Braga and Fink (1999) find that the protection o f  patent 
rights does not influence the location choices o f  foreign investors (Ferrantino 1993; 
Kondo 1995; Maskus and Penubarti 1995; Fink and Braga 1999).However, other 
studies suggest that the volume o f  FDI in a country tends to be inversely related to 
the weakness o f  IPR protection (Maskus 1998; Nunnenkamp and Spatz 2004; An, 
M askus et al. 2008).
In terms o f  pharmaceutical FDI, a strong patent system was found to have caused a 
considerable flow o f  investment into the American pharmaceutical industry (Lehman 
2003). However, some studies show a negative correlation between the levels o f  
protection and foreign investment. This is supported by conclusions elsewhere that 
the exclusion o f  pharmaceuticals from patent protection was a significant factor 
leading Italy to become a base for export-oriented production o f  generic medicines 
(Weisburst and Scherer 1995). Supakankunti (2001) showed for Thailand that there 
had been little foreign investment in the pharmaceutical sector since the strengthened 
patent law in 1992 (Supakankunti, Janjaroen et al. 2001). From 1992 to 1998, only 
around $60 million was invested in new pharmaceutical companies in Thailand. It 
has been suggested that this is because foreign investors consider Thailand an 
unsuitable destination due to the insufficiency o f  well-trained human resources, 
technology and equipment, and the inadequacy o f  the registration system for new 
medicines (Kuanpoth 2007).
In sum, patenting does increase price, although the effect differs according to 
methodology and country, and weakening patent rights could increase present access
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to medicine for Thailand. However, international evidence reveals that patenting 
may benefit future access, although this is based on complex assumptions and 
estimations. Patent protection appears to have a positive impact on trade flow. 
However, the implication for FDI is equivocal.
The preceding review reveals that the link between strong patent protection and the 
social welfare impact o f pharmaceuticals in developing countries has not been well 
established. While it is less contentious that patent protection leads to static 
inefficiency (i.e. increased price in the short-term), the dynamic benefits associated 
with stronger patent protection seem uncertain. Specifically, some weaknesses can 
be identified in the existing studies. Studies o f the impact o f patents on prices and 
innovative activity focus almost exclusively on developed economies, and empirical 
evidence regarding the impact o f  the TRIPS Agreement is rather limited. Arguments 
concerning the effect o f patenting on trade and investment tend to be considered in 
the economics literature, and arguments concerning access tend to be the focus o f 
health literature. Clearly the impact o f patenting is o f interest to both audiences, and 
for national policy the key is to compare the issues and evidence for both sides: 
current and future access, and trade and investment. While continually strengthening 
patenting will likely lead to higher current prices, further reducing current access, 
weakening patenting may stifle long-term access, since pharmaceutical companies 
might be reluctant to introduce new medicine into the market, and foreign investors 
may find other countries to invest in where there is better protection o f their 
products. Without patents products would be imitated and sold on the local market.
1.6 Framework and thesis objectives
This thesis studies the effects o f IPRs, in particular pharmaceutical patent protection, 
on medicine prices and access to medicines both currently and in the future, and 
considers holistically the economic implications for trade and FDI. A case study o f 
Thailand will be employed since Thailand has a unique history o f IPRs law and 
implementation o f CL to safeguard public health. This thesis further focuses on 
cancer medicines, in the health context. This is because cancer is currently one o f  the 
leading health problems in Thailand, and also because cancer medicines are 
expensive and subject to numerous patents.
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It is apparent that patent protection has both health and economic consequences. A 
conceptual framework developed to illustrate the broad implications o f patent 
protection is provided in figure 1. Patent protection affects the price o f 
pharmaceuticals, where price is a component in determining affordability and 
affordability is then a component in  determining access to existing medicines. Price 
is also a component in determining industry investment in introducing or developing 
new medicines. A higher price is likely to reduce current access, but stimulate the 
development o f  new medicines through a higher R&D budget enabling patients to 
benefit from access to new medicines in the future. Patent protection is also 
accompanied by foreign investment in domestic facilities for the production o f  
pharmaceuticals. Finally, as indicated in the literature above, there are wider trade 
relationships that may be affected by patent decisions, which are not related to 
medicines a t all.
However, the patent is only one determinant o f  the price o f  medicine. There are a 
range o f  supply and demand conditions that affect price. There is also, within health 
care, the added issue that most recipients o f medicine do not directly pay the full 
price. For instance, in the Thai context, 97% o f  the population is covered under the 
public insurance schemes and can therefore access medicines on the NLEM  without 
payment. Stronger patent protection could have the effect o f  amplifying FD1. A 
significant amount o f  such investment may stimulate the growth o f  local drug 
manufacturers or public institutes through technology and skill transfers.
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F ig u r e  1.2 C o n c e p tu a l fr a m e w o r k
The 1992 Thai patent law changes caused issues around the price of patented 
medicines, access to those medicines and its effect on the national economy. On the 
one hand, the government is concerned about drug expenditure since Thailand 
depends on imported medicines and 97% of the population is covered by national 
insurance. TRIPS-plus obligations would make this worse. On the other hand, the 
national economy also depends upon exports and foreign investment, which is 
expected to benefit from trade agreements. The specific objectives of this study are 
to:
1. assess the impact of patents on pharmaceutical prices;
2. assess the role of price in determining access to medicines;
3. assess the role of patents and price in determining future access to medicines 
not yet introduced in to Thailand; and
4. assess the role of patents on FDI (in the pharmaceutical sector specifically 
and in the economy as a whole).
Each chapter of the thesis focuses upon one of these objectives. They were designed 
and written as stand-alone papers, each encompassing an introduction, literature 
review, methods, results and discussion sections. The evidence gained from these 
four component studies will then be used, together with the conceptual model above, 
to comment upon the overall implications of patent policy for Thailand in the final 
chapter.
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1.6.1 Thesis outline
Before these empirical chapters, however, chapter 2 firstly describes how to conduct 
a patent search from various sources o f  information, including local patent office, 
international patent databases and pharmaceutical companies. This is required as 
there is no updated patent information system linking medicines and patents in 
Thailand, despite the importance o f  the patent information system, which is 
fondamental to assessing the implications o f  a patent and also underpins effective 
procurement systems. Based on this core data, chapter 3 will then investigate the 
effect o f  patents on the retail prices o f  oncology medicines available in Thailand in 
the year 2008. Ordinary least squares regression was employed to estimate the 
explanatory power o f  patents on price, while controlling for market and medicine 
factors. The main finding o f  the model will show how much prices may be inflated 
by patents, and if  there are other influential factors affecting price.
Universal coverage allows Thai people to access medicines on the NLEM  free o f 
charge. Chapter 4 presents a probit model to assess the role o f  patent and price in 
determining NLEM medicine selection. It also considers the affordability o f  non- 
NLEM medicines. The model employed includes those aspects o f  the market and 
medicine characteristics that are regarded as important factors in medicine selection. 
This chapter also estimates the number o f  medicines that would have been selected if  
generic prices were available.
Patent protection can encourage pharmaceutical companies to introduce their 
products to Thailand quickly. CL might therefore discourage companies from 
launching new products in the market and thus reduce future accessibility. Chapter 5 
focuses on the impact o f  strengthening or weakening pharmaceutical patent policy 
on the availability o f new medicines. This chapter employs a Cox proportional 
hazard model to analyze the launch experience o f 86 active ingredients, with 248 
trade names, treating cancer in Thailand covering the years 1982-2009.
The role o f  patents on FDI is presented in Chapter 6. The purpose o f  this chapter is 
to address what happens i f  a country decides to strengthen the patent system by 
allowing product patent protection earlier than the TRIPS Agreement requires, or to 
weaken the patent system by implementing CL. It also considers the role o f stronger
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patent protection on FDI, both in  the pharmaceutical industry and the wider 
economy, and on innovation. A structural break, time series analysis and error 
correction model were employed to test if  there is evidence o f the impact o f 
pharmaceutical patent related policy on FDI. This chapter also considers if  there is a 
dramatic change in the rate o f  innovation in Thailand after the patent law change in 
1992. A  brief discussion regarding R&D in the pharmaceutical industry is also 
presented in this chapter.
Finally, chapter 7 summaries the findings from these four research sub-questions to 
address the broad research question o f the thesis, which is whether Thailand is better 
o ff strengthening or weakening its patent policy concerning pharmaceuticals. This 
chapter discusses the main contributions o f  the thesis to knowledge and policy, as 
well as the study’s limitations. Areas o f  fiirther research which could extend the 
findings o f  this thesis are also mentioned in this chapter.
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CHAPTER 2 BALANCING THE RIGHT TO KNOW AND THE PRIVACY 
OF THE PATENT SYSTEM: A CASE STUDY OF ONCOLOGY MEDICINES
IN THAILAND
2.1 Introduction
According to the TRIPS Agreement, developing counties which are member states o f 
the W orld Trade Organization required to provide patent protection on medicines by 
1 January 2000 (World Trade Organization 2002). A patent aims to promote 
innovation by rewarding inventors with the exclusive right to produce and sell a 
good, for a limited time, to prevent others from making, using, selling, or 
distributing the patented invention without permission. Social benefit is derived not 
only from being able to access a new technology as it comes to market, but also from 
access to the information disclosed within the patent system, which is a source o f 
valuable technical knowledge that can be reproducible without unnecessary burden. 
These aims coincide with the objectives o f  the TRIPS Agreement to promote 
technological innovation and to transfer and disseminate technology; a balance o f 
rights and obligations.
Patent information, whether it has been filed, granted, is pending or has expired, is 
important to public health in a number o f  ways. Local health authorities and 
procurement bodies need to have patent information to help them choose cheaper 
medicines from alternative sources without the risk o f  patent infringement (World 
Health Organization 2004). Research institutions and originator and generic 
pharmaceutical firms, need to know about the patent information o f  specific 
products in specific countries in order to determine their freedom to operate in 
research and development, manufacturing and procurement without infringing upon 
patents, and to understand which licenses might have to be negotiated (Yancey and 
Stewart 2007). In addition, this information enables an overview o f  trends over time 
in term s o f  medical research and development, the changing directions o f  established 
players, and the growing role o f  new players in medical research and development 
(Liu and Shyu 1997; Ernst 2003).
However, given the critical nature o f  this information, identifying thepatent for each 
medicine is surprisingly difficult, even in countries with a high level o f  technology
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(World Health Organization 2008). First, a single medicine can be protected by a 
large num ber o f separate patents. Each patent can be related to an invention 
concerning the product (e.g. a specific molecule), a process (e.g. the process to 
manufacture this molecule), a medical indication (e.g. the effect o f  this molecule on 
a human body), or a combination o f  products (e.g. a fixed dose combination o f two 
molecules). This is because patents protect the invention, not the medicine as such. 
Second, patents on medical products commonly involve very technical claims that 
are comprehensible only to those with substantial scientific training. Third, the fact 
that searching for a patent by the active ingredient name yields no results does not 
mean there is no patent related to that medicine, since patent specifications typically 
do not reference end products, in significant part because the invention was 
discovered before the product name was known.
In developing countries the problem is worse as there are substantial capacity and 
resource constraints in national patent offices, a lack o f  communication between the 
relevant authorities, and language barriers (W orld Health Organization 2011). As a 
result, developing countries usually buy patented products instead o f  seeking a 
generic equivalent version, since they assume that a medicine patented in the USA is 
also patented in their country. The avian flu pandemic in late 2005 is a good example 
which shows that the governments in developing countries could have provided this 
medicine for their population faster and more cheaply i f  the patent information o f  
oseltamivir1 was prepared and known. After the Philippines government planned to 
implement CL, the owner o f the medicine declared that there was actually no patent 
covering oseltamivir filed in the Philippines (Requejo 2005). Also, Thailand had 
been purchasing the original o f  sertraline, a depressive disorder treatment, and 
risperidone, a schizophrenia treatment, for many years until the use o f  CL for these 
medicines was considered and it was found that there were no patents for these 
medicines in Thailand (Thaipost 2009).
In light o f  this, the proposal o f  a global pharmaceutical patent database was 
considered by the World Health Organization’s Intergovernmental W orking Group 
on Public Health, Innovation and Intellectual Property (IGWG) at the 2008 World 
Health Assembly. The proposal was to create a user-friendly, public, global database
'W hose tradename is Tamiflu
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on the status o f  health-related patents in all countries which could meaningfully 
advance public health objectives, including efficient pharmaceutical procurement, in 
developing countries. However, at the time o f writing, the progress o f  this database 
cannot be found.
W ith regard to patent information related to medicines for specific diseases, some 
patent landscape reports on various topics have been published by different 
international organizations (W orld Health Organization 2004; World Intellectual 
Property Organization 2007). For example, the Médecins Sans Frontières initiated a 
project collaborating with selected national or regional patent offices to undertake 
the verification o f  the patent information o f  18 ARV treatment products in 29 
countries (Boulet, Perriens et al. 2000). Covering other diseases, a project 
determining the patent o f  the medicines on the W HO Model Lists o f  Essential 
M edicines is on-going (World Health Organization 2010). These projects aim to help 
developing countries obtain patent information, as undertaking a patent search is 
costly and time-consuming.
The patent landscapes mentioned are specific to communicable diseases. However, 
the burden o f  disease in low- and middle-income countries is now turning to non- 
communicable diseases, especially cancer (World Health Organization 2011). 
Cancer has been an important health problem in Thailand with more than 100,000 
new cases diagnosed and more than 30,000 deaths each year (Wibulpolprasert 2007). 
M edicines treating cancer are generally expensive. The prices o f  new-to-market 
treatments, targeted therapies and those with limited toxicity are set very high. It is 
claimed that most o f  the high price chemotherapy agents are patented and it is further 
argued that patents lead to unaffordable prices (Ministry o f  Public Health 2008). 
Surprisingly, this claim was made without knowing exactly which medicines are 
under patent protection.
At present, there is no literature determining the patent o f  oncology medicines in 
developing countries generally, or in  specific countries like Thailand. Numerous 
considerations come into play when discussing the impact o f  patents on public 
health. A  fundamental part o f  assessing the impacts o f  patents is to first discover 
which medicines are actually covered by patents. Only then it is possible to estimate 
the impact o f  patenting on access to those medicines. Identifying which medicines
53
are patented in one country, like Thailand, and then estimating patent impact on 
access may seem simple. However, it requires many processes. The number o f 
patented medicines may be less than one expected due to the misapprehension that 
monopoly medicines or those medicines patented in the US are also patented in the 
considered country. Patent information helps to inform procurement agencies in 
Thailand about whether to purchase or manufacture generic versions, or whether 
they must obtain voluntary or CLs to legally purchase or manufacture generic 
versions. As mentioned previously, Thailand has been slow to seek generic versions 
o f  some products because o f  the misunderstanding that they were patented in 
Thailand. This chapter aims to shed light on the processes to identify the patent o f 
oncology medicines in order to be able to estimate the likely impact o f  patents.
Following this introduction, the next section describes the pharmaceutical patent 
system, including medicine patent databases in USA, Canada and Thailand. This is 
followed by the method o f  patent search employed in this study. Part 4 presents the 
results and Part 5 concludes and discusses the patent information system in Thailand 
with lessons also for other developing countries.
2.2. P harm aceu tical pa ten t and  paten t search guideline
A patent is an  exclusive right granted to individuals who invest in the creation and 
dissemination o f  knowledge, providing them with an incentive to produce a new and 
useful product or a new way o f  doing something or o f solving a problem (W orld 
Intellectual Property Organization 2011). A  patent for a specific invention is national 
and the application for a patent is filed in the country where protection is desired; 
there is no worldwide protection. W hen a company invents a new product or process, 
the Paris Convention allows this company one year to file patent applications in any 
other M ember State o f  the Paris Convention (W orld Intellectual Property 
Organization). This one-year period is to preserve the novelty o f  the invention during 
the tim e the company decides in which countries it wants to seek patent protection. 
A pharmaceutical company will file patent protection in countries where potential 
competitors could replicate product development o f either its R&D or other research 
institutes(Bhat 2005).
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As mentioned in the introduction chapter, the pharmaceutical industry is inherently 
risky and costly since it faces a rapidly evolving science o f  discovery, as well as 
changing economic, legal and regulatory environments. Hundreds o f  millions o f 
dollars invested in  a new drug can take a decade or more to pay back, as scientific 
and technical barriers produce a high failure rate (DiMasi, Hansen et al. 2003). It is 
said that patents for the pharmaceutical industry are especially important compared 
with other industries, given that the actual manufacturing process is relatively easy to 
replicate and can be imitated with a fraction o f  investment o f  that required for the 
new entities investigation and effectiveness testing (Scherer 1993). Moreover, the 
pharmaceutical industry is demanded by government agencies for the safety and 
quality assurance o f  product before the product can be launched in to market. 
W ithout the degree o f financial protection patenting secures, many argue that the 
innovative good or process would never be created (N oguis 1993).
Since identifying patent information on each pharmaceutical product is very 
complicated, there are some manuals published by W HO and World Intellectual 
Property Organization (WIPO) which provide a guide on how to identify i f  relevant 
patents relating to a medicine exist in  the country o f  interest (W orld Intellectual 
Property Organization 2007; World Health Organization 2010). The manuals suggest 
using the US FDA Orange Book and the Health Canada Patent Register as a starting 
point, given the difficulties in  identifying and matching patents to relevant products, 
since US FDA and Health Canada also provide patent information for ‘approved for 
sale’ medicines. However, locating patents in developing countries through the 
extended searches described in Box 2.1, is not a straightforward process. One reason 
is that the patent family and national phase data available in esp@ cenet and 
Patentscope do not cover all countries where the patent may have been filed (W orld 
Health Organization 2010). Also, even where developing country patent offices offer 
an online searchable database key data may be omitted, incorrectly inputted or out o f  
date, all o f  which can lead to an unsuccessful search (Limpananont, Kuanpotch et al. 
2004). Finally, as complete specifications and claims for patents filed or granted in 
developing countries are rarely available online, in many cases they will have to be 
requested directly from the concerned national or regional patent office.
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Box 2.1: Summary of steps to search for patents on medicines 
Step 1
The first step is to identify patents that relate to marketed medicines. One efficient way of 
obtaining this information is through public databases made available online by the US 
FDA (the Orange Book) and Health Canada (Patent Register). These databases match 
some key US and Canadian patent numbers to medicines that are marketed in these 
countries, but that may also be sold in other countries.
Step 2
Once US and/or Canadian patent(s) number(s) relating to a medicine have been 
identified, the next step is to obtain the bibliographic details of the patent(s). It is also 
recommended to obtain the specification(s) of the US and/or Canadian patent(s) found. 
Having access to the bibliographic data and full details of the identified patents is not 
only useful for identifying priority data relevant to equivalent patents filed in other 
countries, but also for finding keywords that may be used to expand the search to other 
related patents. The EPO’s esp@cenet database is a source to obtain bibliographic data.
Step 3
As the Orange Book and Health Canada Patent Register do not provide information on all 
relevant patents relating to a particular medicine, further searches are necessary. It is 
recommended to expand patent searches using various techniques including keywords, 
applicant/assignee name, patent classification, citations and date range information. The 
WIPO public database and Patentscope offer more search fields than other public 
databases and provide information on international patent applications, as well as national 
phase data.
Step 4
Taking the techniques and information obtained through steps 1 to 3, the next step is to 
apply them to finding patents in the country of interest.
Source: WHO (2010)
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2.3 Thai patent database
Although this thesis aims to assess patent implications, the first important task is to 
know which medicines are actually patented in Thailand. The possible approach to 
obtaining information on patents in  Thailand is to establish the application date o f  
the first patent protecting the chemical entity o f  the patented medicine found from 
the US and Canada databases, then add one year to this date, since those patents for 
the same invention should have been filed within the one-year priority period 
referred to earlier. This allows one to get an approximate sketch o f  when the same 
patent granted for the same chemical entity in other countries will likely commence 
and expire. However, this applies only to countries where a patent has been filed and 
where the patent owner pays the maintenance fees to keep the patent active. 
Moreover, it depends on the specific patent and country, since patent owners 
themselves may not file or maintain all patents. In addition, one medicine is likely to 
be covered by more than one patent. It is possible that the patent owner will choose 
to file one o f the patent families. This then leads to an incorrect assumption o f  patent 
information and leads to risk o f  infringement. Patent analysis therefore should be 
done on a country specific basis.
In Thailand, there is no legal link between medicine registration and patent 
information. The patent database in Thailand is maintained by the Department o f 
Intellectual Property (DIP), under the M inistry o f  Commerce. DIP provides an open- 
access database to search for patent applications and documents that patent holders 
in all fields, including pharmaceuticals, may have filed. The patent documents are 
provided in the Thai language; with terms stemming from foreign languages 
translated into Thai, including technical terms and the names o f persons and 
organizations. However, searching for pharmaceutical patents with this database is 
not straightforward, since it is linked with name o f  the medicine, and often patents 
are filed under chemical name. Thus, searching for patents by active ingredient name 
is likely to yield no results. The inconsistency in translation o f  patent documents 
from English to Thai fiirther exacerbates the problem.
In an  attempt to resolve these problems, 2002 saw the launch o f  a Pharmaceutical 
Product Patent Database Development Project (PPDD) undertaken by the Social
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Pharmacy Research Unit,2 Chulalongkom University. This project examined the 
patent documents filed in Thailand in the international code o f  A61K (preparations 
for medical, dental, or toilet purposes (W orld Intellectual Property Organization), 
during the period 1992-2002 in order to develop a more consistent and 
comprehensive database o f  patented drugs. This database3 *5is user-friendly and may 
be searched either by active ingredient or trade name. Unfortunately, it has not been 
updated since the project finished and thus has no record o f  medicines since 2003. 
Moreover, in undertaking a patent search for oncology medicines, only two 
medicines were found to be covered by patents in Thailand compared with 47 
medicines found to be patented medicines from the US FDA and Health Canada 
databases. I f  this information is correct and up to date, it would be a great 
opportunity to procure the cheaper generic versions o f  45 medicines. However, some 
o f  these medicines were introduced in Thailand after 2003 and hence the patent 
information o f  these medicines will not be able to be found from this database.
Patent information is often inaccurate and incomplete. All patent databases always 
indicate that the information may not be complete. It is therefore suggested that 
patent owners be contacted in  order to verify medicine patent. As a result, an 
innovative method o f  cooperating with related authorities, patent offices and public 
health offices, as well as pharmaceutical companies to update patent information 
related to medicine is needed. In the next section, the process o f  identifying patented 
medicines undertaken for this thesis is outlined in more detail.
2.4. M ethods
As mentioned in the introduction chapter, this thesis focuses on cancer medicines. 
All cancer medicines marketed in Thailand in 2008, the year this study was 
conducted, were obtained from the Thai FDA. This resulted in 88 active ingredients 
to conduct patent searches for. Mixed methods were used as recommended by the 
W HO guideline and other sources available in Thailand. Figure 2.1 presents the 
process to search for medicine patent employed in this study. In short, all active
2 The Unit aims at conducting studies involving the social aspects of drug, health and pharmaceutical technology
in order to gain better understanding of, and to propose alternatives for solving social problems pertaining to
these topics. The research emphasizes the integration of knowledge from a multiplicity o f disciplines such as 
pharmaceutical science, economics, political science, law, ethics and behavioral sciences.
5 Available at http://wwwappl.fda.moph.go.th/patent/homepage.html.
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ingredients were initially searched for in the DIP public database and PPDD 
databases, as mentioned in the previous section. For the medicines with a status of 
‘not-found’, the patent status and information (patent number and filing date) o f their 
active ingredients were searched for in the U.S. FDA Orange Book and Health 
Canada databases. Further searches were conducted to identify the priority and 
family information for the Thai patent office to verify relevant patents in Thailand. 
Active ingredients that were found to be patented in USA or Canada, but where 
patent information was not found in DIP, were then confirmed with the relevant 
pharmaceutical companies and the NLEM committee. The next section describes 
each step in details.
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F ig u r e  2.1 P a ten t se a r c h  p r o c e ss
2.4.1 Identification of paten ted  m edicines by T hai pa ten t office
The critical information required to search for relevant patents of each medicine is 
identifying the ‘priority data'. The priority data are the application numbers and 
dates provided when the first patent application claiming an invention is filed (World 
Health Organization 2010). These numbers arc referred to when subsequent patents 
or related subject matter patents are filed. This “priority data’ can therefore be used 
to connect related patent documents across national or regional patent offices,
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through databases and computerized search systems. Hence, the priority application 
number functions as an identifying code in the world intellectual property system. 
WIPO considers the availability o f  correct priority application numbers to be 
extremely important and has requested that “the standard be implemented by 
industrial property offices as soon as possible” (World Intellectual Property 
Organization 2007). The Thai patent office is compliant with this standard and 
requests applicants to provide priority data o f  every patent filing at DIP. Therefore, 
by providing the priority number(s) for a patent relating to each medicine, a patent 
office may be able to match it to a patent filed in Thailand.
In theory, the priority application numbers can be used on their own to request 
applications and granted patents from the Thai patent office. However, in practive, a 
, ‘patent family’ searching step, which includes all related patents, can help make the 
patent search more comprehensive. A  ‘patent family’ is a list o f  similar patent 
documents linked by priority application numbers from throughout the world that 
derive their origin from the priority patent (Hingley and Park 2003). Identifying the 
patent family generates a group o f  hundreds o f  patents all originating to a specific 
priority application number. For this thesis, patent family information was retrieved 
through the European Patent Office’s (EPO) Esp@ ceNet.4 As a result, a family o f 
patent numbers and filing dates o f each patent is recored and used as another source 
o f  information to search for patents filed in Thailand.
In short, the first step is to identify patented medicines from the Orange book and/or 
Health Canada databases (Generic Pharmaceutical Industry and Intellectual Property 
Section 2008; World Health Organization 2010). These two databases also provide 
the patent(s) listed by the proprietor in relation to the market product. All patent 
numbers for each product were recorded. For each patent number, the priority data 
were retrieved from US and Canadian patent information through the online patent 
office databases: the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)5 and 
Canadian Intellectual Property Office (CIPO)6 for US and Canadian patents
4 Available at http://www.epo.org/searching/free/espacenet.html
^Available at http://patft.uspto.gov/
6 Available at http://brevets-patents.ic.gc.ca/opic-cipo/cpd/eng/introductinn html
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respectively. A search for the relevant patent families for each patent was then 
conducted.
Table 2.1 Example information used to search for patents of amifostine
1 2 3 4 5 6
P aten t
n u m b er
A p p lica tion
n u m b er
F ilin g  date P r iority  d a ta P aten t fam ily  
(filin g  n u m b er  and  d ate)
P riority  date  
o f  p a ten t  
fam iy
5424471 08 /099 ,298 Ju ly  2 9 ,1 9 9 3
U S 19930099298
19930729;
U S 19920922929
19920731
E P 0655917  (A 1 ) -  1995-06-07 
E P 0 6 5 5 9 17 (A 4) -  1995-08-02 
E P 0 6 5 5 9 17 (B 1 ) - 2004-03-17  
E P 12 43272  (A 2) -2 0 0 2 -0 9 -2 5  
EP12 43272  (A 3 )-2 0 0 3 -0 1 -2 2  
E P 1764103  ( A 2 ) - 2007-03-21 
U S5424471 (A ) -  1995-06-13 
U S5591731 (A ) - 1997-01-07
1992-07-31
5591731 08 /389 ,386 F ebruary  1 6 ,1 9 9 5
U S 19950389386  
19950216;
US 19930099298 
19930729; 
U S 19920922929  
19920731
E P 0 6 5 5 9 1 7 (A 1 ) - 1995-06-07 
E P 0655917  (A 4) - 1995-08-02 
E P 0655917  ( B l ) - 2004 -03 -17  
EP12 4 3 2 7 2  (A 2) - 2002 -09 -25  
E P 1243272  (A 3) - 2003 -01 -22  
E P 1764103  (A 2) - 2007-03-21 
US 5424471 (A ) - 1995-06-13 
U S5591731 (A ) - 1997-01-07
1992-07-31
5994409 08 /987 ,550 D ecem ber 9 ,1 9 9 7
U S 19970987550  
19971209
E P I0 3 9 8 8 7  ( A l )  -  2000 -10 -04  
E P 1039887  (A 4) - 2003-01-15  
E P 1039887  ( B l )  -2 0 0 6 -0 5 -2 4  
E P I537861  (A 2) - 2005-06-08  
E P I537861  (A 3 )-2 0 0 5 -0 6 -1 5  
U S 5994409  (A ) - 1999-11-30 
U S 6586476  ( B l)  -2 0 0 3 -0 7 -0 1  
U S 2 0 0 2 132795 ( A l ) - 2 0 0 2 -  
09-19
U S 7105575  (B 2) -2 0 0 6 -0 9 -1 2
1997-12-09
2120133 66440 Ju ly  3 0 ,1 9 9 3
U S 19930099298 
19930729;
US 19920922929  
19920731
H P 06 5 5 9 I7  CA1) - 1995-06-07 
E P 0655917  (A 4) - 1995-08-02 
E P 0 6 5 5 9 17 (B 1 ) -  2004 -03 -17  
EP12 4 3272  (A 2) - 2002-09-25  
E P 1243272  (A 3) - 2003 -01 -22  
E P 17 6 4103  ( A 2 ) - 2007-03-21 
U S5424471 (A ) - 1995-06-13 
U S5591731 (A ) - 1997-01-07 
U S 2 0 0 6040903 ( A l )  - 2006- 
02-23
1992-07-31
A n example o f  patent data retrival for one medicine, amifostine, is illustrated in 
Table 2.1. From Orange book and Health Canada databases, there are four patents 
reported. Each patent, application number and date and priority data were recorded 
as shown in column 2 to 4. Each patent number was then used to search for patent 
family in  Esp@ceNet to get the information in column 5. Thai patent database7
7 http://l 10.164.177.243/PIPSearch/PatentSearch/SearchCoiT)D]ex.aspx Data
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allows users to search with flexible fields such as by patent number, application date, 
priority patent number, priority patent date. Data in column 4, priority data, were 
used as priority to search in the DIP internal database. If  no patent information was 
found, the data from column 1 to 3 was used. The search was then finalised by 
searching by patent family data, column 5 and 6, respectively. To sum up, for one 
medicine, it could reach to a hundred o f  search terms.
In conclusion, verification was provided by the Thai patent offices by using key sets 
o f  information to identify i f  the medicine is pa ten ted , which are:
- US and/ or Canadian patent number, application number and date;
- the priority application data o f  each patent; and
- patent application numbers and dates identified through the patent family 
search.
2.4.2 Identification of patented medicines by other authorities
For those medicines found to have patent(s) in the US and/or Canada but not found 
by the Thai patent office, confirmation was sought directly from the relevant 
pharmaceutical companies on their patent status: examination process, 
advertisem ent process, granted patent or others. The names o f  companies selling 
suspected patented medicines (from Orange Book and/or from the monopoly 
medicine status from the FDA drug registration database) are listed in Appendix 1. A 
questionnaire was developed to survey medicine patent information from these 
companies, including application number, types o f  patents (product, process, or petty 
patent), date o f  the application, patent status (filing, examination, advertisement or 
granted) and patent expiry date. An example is shown in Appendix 2. Since the time 
available to collect information was limited, 14 weeks, the survey was done via the 
Association o f  Pharmaceutical Research & Manufacturers (PReMA) who cooperated 
and distributed the questionnaire from October 2010 to January 2011.
Pharmaceutical patent information may also be obtained from the NLEM  committee. 
The NLEM  is a list o f  medicines, vaccines, radioactive substances, and disinfection 
agents that are necessary for the prevention and control o f major health problems in 
Thailand. The NLEM  is referred to by the three public health schemes as the 
‘pharmaceutical reimbursement list’ (Teerawattananon, Tantivess et al. 2009).
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Applicants for pharmaceutical patents have to submit the “Por.Tor.Yor. 14 Form” to 
the NLEM committee. There is one section with regard to patent information. It 
requests product owners to provide patent information for the medicine concerned. 
However, submitting patent information is requested, not required, since there is no 
law or regulation to force the applicants to provide the patent information. Therefore, 
there is much missing patent data and some information is incorrect.
In parallel to questionnaires being administered to pharmaceutical companies, as 
outlined, a request was made to the NLEM committee to access the forms to retrieve 
the patent information part o f  the form submitted by pharmaceutical companies. Data 
were then cross-checked with the data provided by the pharmaceutical companies.
2.5. Results
Figure 2.2 shows the results from the patent verification process. From 88 active 
ingredients selling in Thailand in 2008, four patented medicines were found from 
PPDD and DIP. It was found that 47 medicines have been filed for patent protection 
in USA or Canada. All relevant data, including priority patent data and patent family 
data o f  each patented medicine were sent to the p a te n t  o f f i c e  in  Thailand to search 
for the patent application or patent granted to those 47 medicines. Twenty-one 
medicines were found to have patent protection from the DIP internal database and 
through verification by a patent officer. For the rest o f  the medicines, the 
Por.Tor.Yor. form was requested from the NLEM, in parallel with a survey o f  
pharmaceutical companies. Another six medicines were confirmed to have been 
subject to filed patents in Thailand; three o f  which were retrieved from the NLEM. A 
number o f  pharmaceutical companies refused to complete the questionnaire survey, 
claiming that they did not have the information or that it was company policy to keep 
the information requested confidential. Therefore, for eight medicines (Appendix 3) 
there is no information concerning patent status. Appendix 3 also shows non- 
patented medicines, o f  which twelve were confirmed as such by pharmaceutical 
companies.
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Figure 2.2 Step by step results of paten t sta tus verification
Search by active
ingredient name in No
Orange Book and
Canadian database
Yes 47
Collect the patent 
no, patent filing date and 
priority data
Searching for patent 
family
Verification by Thai 
Patent Office
Confirm with 
Pharmaceutical Yes
companies 1
/  Æ
ju Confirm with NLEM NoCommittee
2 patented
8 unknown
Table 2.2 shows patent information for 31 active ingredients that the patent owner 
filed for patent protection, either for product, process or new use protection, in 
Thailand over the period 1993-2008. It also provides their patent number, application 
number, filing date and expiry date. As can be seen from the table, most medicines 
are protected by product patents. Only two process patented medicines, docetaxel 
and gemcitabine, and one new use patented medicine, ondansetron, were found. 
There are some medicines that are still under the examination process. 14 medicines 
that have a patent status o f ‘examination' still have to await the examination process 
to be finished.
Patents of four medicines are under the ‘filing' status. The patent details of 
medicines that currently remain in the filing process are not known. DIP regulations 
state that “applications for patents which are not published or issued are not 
generally open to the public, and no information concerning them is released”.
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Therefore, the details o f patents filed for four medicines (dasatinib, etoposide, 
oxaliplatin and trastuzumab) cannot be obtained. For granisetron, ibandronic acid 
and sorafenib, there is no patent information available through the Por.Tor.Yor. 14 
Form o f NLEM or through information obtained from pharmaceutical companies.
Table 2.2 List of patented medicines
No. Active Patent information
ingredients Patent
number
Application
No.
Type Filing date Expiry date
1 Aprepitant 17690 9801002488 Product l-Jul-1998 l-Jul-2018
Examination 0201004524 Product 3-Dec*2002 •
2 Bevacizumab Examination 0501004920 Product 20-0ct-2005 ■
3 Bortezomib Examination 0501001443 Process 29-Mar-2005 “
4 Capecitabine 9441 9301002157 Product 26-Nov-1993 26-No v-2013
5 Cetuximab Examination 0201004785 Product 20-Dec-2002 -
Examination 0401004678 Product 25-NOV-2004 -
Examination 0401004701 Product 26-Nov-2004 -
6 Dasatinib Examination 0501005150 New use 2-NOV-2005
Filing process
7 Docetaxel 12332 9501001641 Process 7-Jul-1995 7-Jul-2015
8 Doxorubicin Filing process
9 Epoetin
beta***
Examination 101001782 10-May-2001
10 Erlotinib HC1 Examination 9601000814 Product 19-Mar-1996 -
11 Etoposide Filing process
12 Fludarabine
phosphate
Examination 0201004766 Product 19-Dec-2002
13 Gefitinib 27686 9601001252 Product 24-Apr-1996 24-Apr-2016
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No. Active
ingredients
Patent information
Patent
number
Application
No.
Type Filing date Expiry date
14 Gemcitabine* Examination 19307 Process 21-Jun-1993 -
10145 19308 Process 21-Jun-1993 21-Jun- 2013
15 Goserelin Examination 0101000493 Product 14-Feb-2001
16 Granisetron** No patent information disclosure
17 Ibandronic
acid**
No patent information disclosure
18 Ibritumomab 9595 9301002057 Product 12-NOV-1993 12-Nov-
2013
19 Imatinib Examination 9801002650 Product 13-Jul-l 998
20 Irinotecan Examination 0501002510 Product 31-May-2005 “
21 Lapatinib Examination 9901000064 Product 1 l-Jan-1999 “
22 Letrozole Examination 0801000497 Process 31-Jan-2008 "
23 Medroxyprog
esterone
9157 9501003476 Product 26-Dec-1995 26-Dec-2015
24 Nilotinib Examination 0301002355 Product 25-Jun-2003
25 Ondansetron * 9938 9401001016 New formula, 
New use
23-May-1994 23-May-2014
Examination 0501000228 Product 20/01/2005 -
26 Oxaliplatin Filing process
27 Paclitaxel* Examination 030658 Product 27-Mar-1996 -
Examination 034883 Product 20-Dec-1996 -
Examination 063343 Product 31-Jan-2001 -
Examination 072446 Product 20-Jan-2002
28 Rituximab 9595 9301002057 Product 12-Nov-1993 12-NOV-2013
29 Sorafenib*** No patent information disclosure
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No. Active
ingredients
Patent information
Patent
number
Application
No.
Type Filing date Expiry date
3 0  T ra s tu z u m a b *  
*
F il in g  p ro c e ss
31 T re tin o in E x a m in a tio n 1 0 0 3 9 5 3 N e w  u se  16-O ct-O O 1 6 -O c t-2 0
* from FDA patent database ,** from pharmaceutical companies, *** from NLEM
In conclusion, in figure 2.3, 35% of oncology medicines in Thailand in 2008 were 
patented, 57% were unpatented, and 8%were unknown. The list of unknown patent 
status and non-patented medicines are shown in Appendix 3. The pie chart below 
shows that DIP is the main source of patent information. Pharmaceutical companies 
are also an important source to confirm that the medicines are not patented in local 
markets.
Figure 2.3 Patent status and sources of pa ten t inform ation
■ patented
■ non-patented
■ unknown
■ DIP
■ PPDD
■ N IEM
■ Pharmaceuticals
Table 2.2 presents the list of 13 active ingredients that were found to be unpatented 
in the USA or Canada. Each medicine has only one seller marketing it in Thai 
market. The sales value of these medicines in the year 2008 was approximately 262 
million baht (8.7 million $US).
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Table 2.3 List o f monopoly sta tus medicines found to have no p a ten t in  US o r 
C anada  d rug  paten t database
No. Active ingredients No. Active ingredients No. Active ingredients
1 altretamine 6 Dactinomycin 11 ramosetron hydrochloride
2 asparaginase 7 hydroxycarbamide 12 tegafur + uracil
3 azacitidine 8 Idarubicin 13 thioguanine
4 buserelin 9 Lenograstim
5 chlorambucil 10 M elphalan
Three main sources o f  patent information have revealed that there are 31 medicines 
that product owners requested patent protection for in the Thai market. The number 
could be higher i f  the medicines with unknown patent status are included, which 
yields 39 medicines out o f 88 medicines, but this is still well under ha lf o f  medicines 
in the Thai market. W hen comparing this number with the figure o f  patented 
medicines either in the US or Canada, 49 o f these 88 medicines were found to have 
patent protection in the USA or Canada.
2.5. Conclusion and  discussion
This chapter provides information on the patent status for each oncology medicine 
marketed in Thailand in 2008. Given that there is no good system to identify whether 
a medicine is patented or not in  Thailand, this chapter shows how patent information 
can be searched for in Thailand. By tracing the medicine’s origin from the US, 
Canada and Espacenet patent databases, and continuing to investigate with the Thai 
patent office, the FDA and pharmaceutical companies, 31 medicines were found to 
have patent protection.
The national patent office is the most obvious source to identify patents. However, 
the process takes considerable time since their capacity to deal with requests is 
limited. Although the guidelines for assessing patents are veiy useful, patent 
information for some medicines were not able to be found using this process. There 
are three possible reasons for this. First, product owners may decide that the patent 
filed in Thailand will not be shown in the patent family as it may have subsequent
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patents granted later on to protect; for instance, an improved manufacturing process 
or improved formulation with fewer side-effects, which have not yet been linked 
together. Second, the applicant might submit the wrong priority data, for example 
instead o f  630.224, writing 630,224, which would mean that the electronic database 
would not be able to identify it. Third, it may be the case that pharmaceutical 
companies might choose not to file a patent in Thailand i f  they think the capability to 
produce that medicine is limited.
Aso, the decision to choose which patent will be filed in any country depends on its 
owner assessing the cost, scope o f  protection, law enforcement or any potential 
negative consequesnces (Borrell and W atal 2003; Pavento, Greene et al. 2003). Four 
medicines, bortezomib, docetaxel, gemcitabine and letrozole, were found to have 
process patent protection instead o f  product patent protection. Process patent means 
that local manufacturers or other suppliers can produce or find similar products that 
have a technically different production process without incurring patent 
infringement. This might be because a patent is typically filed when the invention is 
found and it takes considerable time to bring that product into the market. Since 
Thailand changed its patent law in 1992, the first product patent o f  a medicine filed 
elsewhere may already have expired by 1992, or it may not be possible to file a 
patent in  Thailand, i.e. it cannot be counted as ‘novelty’. Therefore, relatively 
important patents, that still have patent life, maybe considered filing in Thailand.
The USA and Canada account for a significant market share o f  world pharmaceutical 
sales (International Union Against Cancer 2008). Product owners will try to seek 
patent protection in these countries. There is an assumption that if  a medicine is 
patented in the US, it is likely to be patented in a developing country as well. This 
m ight not be the case since it depends on company’s decision to file a patent 
application in the country. This study confirms this argument since the results show 
that 15 active ingredients patented in the USA do not have a patent in Thailand. W ith 
lower technology capability and performance, pharmaceutical companies may not 
consider it worthwhile to protect their products with patents in some developing 
countries. Developing countries may therefore find that they pay more than they 
need to for some medicines simply due to this misinterpretation.
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Identifying patented medicines is very simple in developed countries like the US and 
Canada since there is a direct linkage between the FDA and patent office. Patent 
linkage refers to the communication process between the Health M inistry and the 
Patent Office to prevent marketing approval o f  generic drugs until after the 
expiration o f patents covering the drug product or approved use. This system 
requires product owners to file patent information related to medicine within 30 days 
o f  approval. Despite the fact that it helps in identifying patented medicines and opens 
the door to access to technical knowledge related to those medicines, it causes 
problems since it could delay entry o f  generic medicines to the market since the 
manufacturer o f  the generics must provide notice to the original manufacturer o f  its 
submission o f  an application, thereby allowing the patent owner the opportunity to 
seek enforcement o f its patent rights (MERCK 2011; Knowledge Ecology 
International 2011).
In many developing countries, however, this option is not available, and 
pharmaceutical patent information is effectively secret from all but the patent holder. 
Private services may not cover these countries, or may be prohibitively expensive for 
public organizations. As a result, many guidelines concerning how to conduct a 
pharmaceutical patent search have been published, although often systems cannot be 
navigated easily to work out precisely what is patented. Thus, international 
organizations have tried to provide examples o f  how to find a patented medicine in 
some countries (W orld Health Organization 2004; World Intellectual Property 
Organization 2011). These efforts have demonstrated the appropriate means to 
identify patent landscapes in developing countries.
Establishing a user friendly health related patent database for developing countries 
was proposed by the WHO's IGWG (World Health Organization 2008). However, 
although it is feasible, this establishment could consume huge effort and 
considerable time, expertise and funding to overcome the barriers. Some patent 
m apping in developing countries has been done but this can only focus on specific 
medicines, as this study focuses on oncology medicines. In addition, the patent 
review reports always state clearly that the patent information in the report may not 
be used as a comprehensive and an approved source o f  patent information. It is
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recommended to confirm with the patent office or pharmaceutical companies directly 
before medicine procurement is made.
This makes an obvious imbalance in the patent system visible. A government grants 
a monopoly right to exclude others from making, using or importing the invention 
throughout that country, in exchange for the disclosure o f  the invention to the public 
to meet the objective o f  the patent system to encourage inventive activity, as well as 
technology transfer. Yet the exclusive right protection is reached while the disclosure 
is still confidential in developing countries, impeding strategic procurement. This 
chapter reveals that a lack o f  patent information could lead to missed opportunities in 
the cost-effective procurement o f  generic medicines, since not every monopoly 
medicine is patented. The difficulties in obtaining such information make it very 
difficult to establish what price should be paid, and what the implication o f a patent 
on price is. It is impossible to estimate the impact o f patenting on price or other 
factors i f  the patent status itself is not known. Indeed, ironically, patenting might 
actually not hinder public health if, as is the case in Am ir’sstudy, only 2%  o f  
essential medicines listed on the W HO Essential Medicine List are patented (Am ir 
2004).
This study reveals the oncology medicine patent landscape in Thailand with the 
verification o f  patent statuses at the national level. The next level o f inquiry is 
whether granted patents cover inventions that affect the use o f  and access to some 
medicines. In this case, analysis o f  national patents is needed to determine the scope 
o f  the patent with respect to a commercial product made, used, sold or imported into 
Thailand. Further studies need to be done to answer this question.
72
CHAPTER 3 TO WHAT EXTENT DO PATENTS LEAD TO HIGHER 
PRICES: A CASE STUDY OF ONCOLOGY MEDICINES IN THAILAND
3.1. Introduction
Recent years have seen increasing attention being paid to the rising cost o f  health 
care in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs), where treatment prices are often 
especially high as a proportion o f  income (Niens, Cameron et al. 2010). This cost 
pressure is often linked to the increasing price o f  medicines faced by these countries. 
This is particularly true for the treatment o f  cancer, which has seen tremendous 
progress in prevention, treatment and palliation, albeit largely through technological 
developments which entail increasing costs o f  care, more than doubling over the past 
two decades in the US for example (Tangka, Trogdon et al. 2010), and nearly 
doubling in the UK over the past decade, from £3 billion to£5 billion (Sullivan, 
Peppercorn et al. 2011). Such expense is clearly a barrier to many, but is especially 
pronounced within LMICs, where two-thirds o f  the global burden o f  cancer mortality 
exists (International Agency for Research on Cancer 2008).
The increased stringent use o f  patents has been argued to be a key driver for this 
increased cost o f cancer care. A patent grants a temporary legal monopoly on a 
product to provide a return to expenditure on the research and development 
embodied in that product, as a form o f  payment for knowledge generation. Without 
this, the public good characteristics o f such knowledge would mean that the product 
could be easily replicated, and thus no market incentive would exist to produce it. 
The higher price that can be charged during the patent period is therefore supposed 
to reflect the incorporation o f  the high fixed costs related to the process o f research 
and development surrounding new chemotherapeutic compounds. The concern is 
that patents are used to generate a much larger gap between the actual medicine price 
and the price required to recoup these research and development costs, thus 
generating ‘super-normal profits.’ It is certainly true that patented medicines are 
priced several times higher than equivalent generic prices. For example, in China, 
some patented medicines are priced at 18 times that o f  the lowest generic price (Sun 
2004). Similarly, patented cancer medicines in  Thailand are between 3 and 35 times 
higher than generic equivalents sold in India (Ministry o f  Public Health 2008). In
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Kenya and Guatemala, the price o f  fluconazole is the same as in the US, at 
US$12.20, whereas the generic version produced in Thailand is only US$ 0.29 
(Perez-Casas, Chirac et al. 2000).
This concern over the impact o f  patents on price led the Thai M inistry o f Public 
Health (MOPH), in 2008, to issue CLs for four anti-cancer medicines: letrozole, 
docetaxel, erlotinib and imatinib (Ministry o f  Public Health 2008). However, this 
was criticised by pharmaceutical companies on the basis that, unlike HIV/AIDS 
where previous CLs were issued, cancer, as a non-communicable disease, was not 
seen to constitute a national emergency, as required under the TRIPS Agreement 
(Johnson 2011). From the survey o f  attitudes towards the CL, it was also found that 
Thai and international respondents who were decision makers, health workers, 
academia and activists agreed significantly less with the issuance o f  CL on anti­
cancer medicines than on HIV/AIDS medicines (Yamabhai, Mohara et al. 2009). It 
is also not clear to what extent the patent actually affects price (and hence the benefit 
to be derived from issuing a CL) since half o f  cancer medicines selling in Thailand 
in 2008 were not patented; despite this they remained expensive. As policy 
concerning medicines appears to be largely driven by an assumption that price is the 
m ajor determinant o f  access, and that price is largely determined by patent status, it 
is critical to determine the extent to which price is actually determined by patent 
status, as i f  it is not, then CL may be an inappropriate policy lever, possibly leading 
to more harm  than benefit. I f  it is the most significant determinant o f  price then this 
confirms the importance o f  measures focused on patents (subject to the discussion in 
chapter 5 on wider implications).
This chapter is organised as follows. An overview o f  the Thai medicine pricing 
system and the empirical evidence concerning the impact o f  patent on price is 
presented in sections 2 and 3 respectively. In  section 4, the methods used in this 
study are outlined, including the variables and model employed. The results o f  an 
estimation o f  patent and other market characteristics impact on price are provided in 
section 5, and section 6 concludes.
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3 .2 . T h e  T h a i m e d ic in e  p r ic e  s e tt in g  sy ste m
In 2006, the Thai pharmaceutical market was valued at USS 2.75 billion, accounting 
for 0.35% of the world pharmaceutical market,8 with a 10-13% annual growth rate 
(Hill and Chui 2009; IMS Health 2010). As shown in Figure 3.1, medicine 
expenditure accounted for 46% of overall health expenditure in Thailand in 2008, 
which is rather high compared with similar countries, or even developed countries, 
where medicine expenditure accounted for some 12% of total health expenditure in 
the United Kingdom, 14% in the USA and 21% in Japan (OECD. Stat 2011). 
Regarding sources of medicine expenditure, the greatest proportion was from the 
household sector (58%) (Wibulpolprasert 2011).
Figure 3.1 Overall health and medicine expenditures in proportion to GDP and 
proportion of medicine expenditure to health expenditure, 1995-2005
Source: Thailand Health Profile (2009)
The Thai medicine market depends heavily on imports. The proportion of imported 
medicines has been increasing gradually from 30% in 1992 to 60% in 2006
Valued at $ 7 7 3  billion in 2 0 0 8 .
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(W ibulpolprasert 2007). At present, a system o f patent linkage, linking patent status 
and the registration o f  medicines, has not been implemented in Thailand; as a result, 
it is difficult to estimate the proportion o f  patented medicines contained in imported 
medicines. W ith respect to oncology medicines more specifically, 99%  were 
imported in 2008, with a market value o f  US$342 million, which accounted for 
approximately 7% o f  the total value o f  medicines consumed in the Thai market.9 
Patent requests were made for around 64% o f  those oncology medicines that were 
already patented in the USA or C anada.10
Generally, medicine pricing in Thailand is freely set by product owners, with free 
competition among medicines under the same category. In setting this price on entry 
to the Thai market, three main factors are suggested as being involved in the decision 
(PReMA). First, the costs incurred in bringing the product to market, from 
production to marketing. Second, an analysis o f  the value o f  the new medicine in 
terms o f  its incremental effectiveness in comparison to other available therapies. 
Third, external price referencing defining the economic capacity o f  nations into 
sim ilar groupings, where Thailand would be compared with the price already set in 
other lower-middle-income economies.
Although price is free to be set by the market, mechanisms to protect medicine prices 
do exist under the Prices o f Goods and Services Act B.E.2542 (1999), but this only 
applies for over-the-counter (OTC) medicines to monitor i f  they are being sold for 
more than the labelled price. There is no direct price control for non-OTC medicines 
or medicines prescribed or sold through hospitals and clinics (Supakankunti, 
Janjaroen et al. 2001). A  Committee on Pharmaceutical Patent was established in  
1992 to monitor and compare medicine prices, and dispense corrective measures 
where inappropriate price behaviour was found, but was terminated in 1999. Thus 
the power to set prices, for both patented and non-patented medicines, rests mainly 
with the pharmaceutical companies themselves.
Strong guidance from the government for the purchasing o f  medicines, however, is 
found. For example, reference pricing systems and co-purchasing have been 
introduced to encourage generic medicine procurement and to ensure that medicines
* Authors’ calculation based on IMS data
10 Chapter 2 results
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are obtained for the minimum price (Lerttiendamrong, Tangcharoensathien et al. 
1998; Jirawattanapisal, Kingkaew et al. 2009). The MOPH also has policies to 
indirectly control medicine prices and expenditure in the public sector. The NLEM  
was developed and individual public hospitals in Thailand are encouraged to 
purchase medicines from this list. However, many new chemotherapy medicines are 
not listed there since the prices are not deemed to be affordable by the government 
(Ministry o f  Public Health 2008). Cancer patients will therefore need to pay out o f 
their own pocket for non-NLEM  medicines, shown in appendix 5. Another related 
policy ensures that at least 80% o f  the medicine budget allocated to public hospitals 
m ust be used to purchase from the Government Pharmaceutical Organization (GPO), 
unless the GPO’s price is 3% more expensive than private suppliers, which further 
encourages generic usage.
In conclusion, Thai cancer patients depend heavily on imports. Although patented 
and monopoly medicines are expensive, there is an absence o f  direct regulatory and 
procurement measures to control price, and indirect measures are used instead. 
Although it is suggested that pharmaceutical companies set prices according to cost, 
cost-effectiveness and international reference, it is not clear how patent rights are 
utilised in setting medicine price. Inspite o f  market power also depends on the 
existence o f  therapeutic substitute products that may offer patients an alternative 
medical treatment, in the Thai market, where the government does not intervene in  
price determination, a patent may provide substantial market power to set the price 
far above that indicated by the three factors mentioned above.
3.3. Extensive literature review: patents as a determinant of medicine price
A n extensive literature review was performed to assess the scope o f  empirical 
research that had examined the role o f  patents as a determinant o f  medicine price. A 
three stage strategy was used to search and select articles to be included in the 
literature review. First, a computerized search using multiple keywords across four 
databases: namely Econlit, Embase Classic and Embase, Global Health and OVID 
Medline, as the most relevant to public health and economics (see Appendix 4 for 
further detail o f  searches). Second, the results from stage 1 were then filtered for 
publications reported in the English language and published between 1 January 1990 
and 31 December 2011 to cover the implementation o f  international patent
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protection in 1995. Finally, the reference lists o f  those articles retrieved for final 
review were manually searched, especially for grey literature, including technical 
reports from government agencies or scientific research groups, working papers from 
research groups or committees and white papers.
The search resulted in 417 potential articles for the literature review. All these 
articles were entered in  to a M icrosoft Excel database that contained each article’s 
reference, setting (i.e. medicine therapeutics, year conducted and countries), 
objectives o f  studies, the statistical method used for data analysis and the conceptual 
model and explanatory variables included in the analysis. Two criteria were then 
used to select potential studies for lull review. To be included in the literature 
review, a study had to:
1. Deal empirically with the implications o f  pharmaceutical 
product/processpatent on price. Studies dedicated to  other types o f  
innovations (i.e. motor vehicles, electrical equipment innovations, etc.) and to 
other types o f  implications ( i.e. access or research and development) were 
not retained.
2. Include an empirical study, allowing for both descriptive statistics and 
econometric methods. Theoretical and conceptual studies as well as 
discussion studies were not retained.
3,3.1 Extensive literature review: results
The combined searches and other data sources found 417 potential titles. After the 
exclusion o f duplicate publications, 396 abstracts were left for analysis, as outlined 
in figure 3.2. Applying the above two criteria to title and abstract review yielded 
exclusion o f 338 papers which did not meet the first inclusion criteria, i.e. not 
investigating patent impact on pharmaceutical price. Further review of the remaining 
58 full papers led to the exclusion o f 47 articles which did not meet the second 
inclusion criteria above (e.g. discussion o f the effect o f patent on price).
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Figure 3.2 Flow-chart of literature review
21 articles were excluded based 
on duplications
338 articles were excluded based 
on the abstract because they 
were not investigate 
pharmaceutical patent on price 
evidence
47 articles were not empirical
This left a total o f  11 studies which matched both criteria. The bibliographies o f  
these publications were then examined for additional relevant studies, which resulted 
in four additional studies included, making total o f  15 articles for review. Table 3.1 
gives the characteristics o f  these 15 studies included in this analysis.
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T ab le  3.1 G en e ra l c h a ra c te r is tic s  o f in c luded  stud ies
No. A u th o rs  an d  
R eference  no.
S tudy
p e rio d
Setting
(C o u n try /
m edicines)
O bjectives P a ten t
im pact
S tudy type M ethod
1 W atal (2000) 1985-
1992
India,22 patentable 
m edicines in 
m ailbox (varied in 
w ide therapeutic 
areas)
The effect o f  product 
patents, price control 
and CL on medicine 
prices and welfare.
+26-+242% Demand
function
estimation
Comparing effect from different demand 
functions, the constant elasticity demand and the 
linear demand function, and estimation price as 
the composite o f  demand function.
2 Fink (2004) 1992 India, two 
therapeutic groups, 
quinolones and 
synthetic 
hypotensives
The impact o f  product 
patents on medicine 
price and 
pharmaceutical 
company’s profit
+30-+277% Demand
function
estimation
Modelling a dem and function as two-stage 
decision-making process (chemical entity and 
brands under that chemical entity). Then 
estimating price and profit under each 
substitution elasticity among chemical entities 
and among brands.
3 Kessomboon 
et.al. (2010)
1992-
2042
Thailand/ all 
m edicine spending
To assess the im pact 
o f  the TRIP-Plus 
proposal, patent 
extension and data 
exclusivity, o f  Thai- 
US Free Trade 
Agreement on  access 
to medicines
+32-+67% Demand
function
estimation
The Model o f  Impact o f  Changes in  Intellectual 
Property Rights (MICIPR) comparing two 
specific scenarios, baseline (TRIPS) and TRIPS- 
Plus scenarios. It is based on assumption o f  
constant price different between two scenarios, a 
constant price elasticity demand function, 
constant m arket share entire product life and 
constant m arket share o f  domestic and the 
innovative industry. The model then calculates 
impacts on expenditure o f  each scenario.
4 Grabowski 
and Vernon 
(1992)
1983-
1986
USA, 18 expired 
patent m edicines
The pricing and 
competitive behaviour 
after patent expiration
+7% one 
year and 
+11% in 
two years 
after patent 
expiration
Observational 
study and 
Regression 
analysis
Descriptive statistics o f  price index o f  overall 
market, original medicine and generic medicine. 
Regression o f  the determinant o f  generic entry
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No. A u th o rs  a n d  
R eference  no.
S tudy
p e rio d
Setting
(C o u n try /
m edicines)
O bjectives 1 P a te n t
im pact
S tudy type M ethod
5 Griliches and
Cockbura
(1994)
1987-
1990
USA, two anti- 
infective drugs: 
cephalexin and 
cephradine
The pricing and 
competitive behaviour 
after patent expiration
+60%  in 
three years 
after patent 
expiration
Observational
study
Calculation o f  the aggregate price indexes for a 
simple two-goods world where consumers buy 
either the brand or the generic version o f  a drug
6 Challu (1995) 1987- Italy, 38 m edicines The impact o f  the 
1978 patent law 
change
+163%
compared
topre-1978
price
Observational
study
Comparing new drug prices in Italy before and 
after the 1978 patent law. Using US prices as a 
reference
7 Boersma et.al. 
(2005)
1996 to 
2001
The Netherlands, 
three m edicines 
which patents 
expired between 
1996 and 2001
To observe price and 
share prior to  and 
after patent 
expiration.
+51-+69% 
in one year 
after patent 
expiration
Observational
study
Trend analysis o f  volumes and price (measured 
as defined daily doses (DDD) prior to and after 
patent expiry w ere calculated.
8 Jones et al. 
(2001)
1981-
1994
Canada, 82 
m edicines from  the 
British Colum bia 
Pharmacare 
Programme.
The im pact o f  the 
Canadian Patent Act 
in 1987 on  price
Make price 
index pre- 
1987=0.940 
Post-
1 9 8 7 ^ .057
Observational
study
Descriptive statistics o f prices before and after 
1987 and log regression o f  generic m arket share, 
one factor, to predict market price
9 Supakankunti 
et. al. (2001)
1987-
1998
Thailand, six 
therapeutic 
categories were 
chosen to  represent 
the patented m arket
The effect o f  new 
patent law  on  price
Nominal 
value show 
stable and 
likely to 
decrease
Observational
study
Since the Thai patent law was changed in  1992 
and there were no patented m edicines at the time 
o f  study, medicines included in  this study were 
monopoly medicines that suspect that the 
owners would file for patent protection once the 
patent law allow.. Descriptive statistics w ere 
used to report the price movement or trend o f  
real price and nominal price o f  branded and 
generic medicines.
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No. A u th o rs  an d  
R eference  no.
S tudy
p e rio d
S etting
(C o u n try /
m edicines)
O bjectives P a te n t
im pact
S tudy type M ethod
10 Suh et al. 
(2000)
1984-
1987
USA, 35 chemical 
entities w hich 
patents expired 
betw een 1984 and 
1987
The effect o f  generic 
medicine entry on 
price after patent 
expiration
+5%  in 1 
year
+20% in 3 
years after 
patent 
expiration
Observational 
study and 
Regression 
analysis
Descriptive statistics o f  price after patent 
expiration and analysing the influential factors 
that affect price, which are number o f  multiple- 
source medicine, market growth, m arket size, 
profitability, severity o f  illness, duration o f 
treatment, num ber o f  year after patent 
expiration.
11 Limpananont 
et. al. (2004)
2001-
2004
Thailand, 
antiretroviral 
therapy m edicines
Price differences o f  
patented and generic 
medicines
+150-
+300%
Observational
study
Comparing and calculating price ratio o f 
patented and generic DDD prices
12 M agazzini et 
al. (2004)
July 
1987- 
Decemb 
er 1998 
(Quarter 
ly data)
USA, UK,
Germany, and 
France, all 
m edicines w hich 
patents expired 
w ithin study period
Price and determinant 
o f  price after patent 
expiry
-5%-+5% 
-20%- 
+10%  (3 
years after 
patent 
expiration)
Observational 
study and 
Regression 
analysis
Descriptive statistics o f  prices before and after 
patent expiration. Regression o f  the price with 
controlling o f  m arket share o f  patented 
products, m arket size, % o f  sales to the hospital 
segment, the average market growth, the num ber 
o f  brand names, ratio o f  the average price o f  
original products, etc.
14 Borrell (2007) 1995-
2000
34 low and m iddle 
incom e countries in 
14 antiretroviral 
therapy m edicines.
The impact o f  patents 
on m edicine bundle 
prices across 
developing countries
+16-+70% Regression
analysis
Developing a price function as a composite 
function o f  num ber medicines in  patent and non­
patent systems, number o f  generics after patent 
expiration, num ber o f  doses per day, efficacy, 
adverse reactions, number o f  year in  the US 
market
15 K elton et al. 
(2008)
2001-
2002
USA, 5,000 
individual drug 
products purchased 
by the Buyer during 
12000 to 2001
To determine factors 
associated w ith 
percentage o f  change 
in price
+78-+86% Regression
analysis
Dependent variable is price change. Explanatory 
variables are brand, dummy variables o f  
shortage 2000-2002, dummy variables o f  patent 
expiration in 2000-2002 and log o f  expenditure.
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Fifteen studies looked at the effect o f  patent on price, including two Thai studies. 
M ost focussed on the patent expiration effect in the USA. Overall, patent protection 
appears to increase price by around 26%-277% depending on which o f  three 
approaches to estimation is used. The first method uses elasticity o f  demand to 
calculate price. M ost studies have used this method to estimate the likely effects o f 
patents on the price o f medicines not currently under patent protection but eligible to 
be once TRIPS was introduced, and then extrapolated the results o f this exercise to 
the situation o f  those medicines being under TRIPS obligations. By this 
m ethodology the entire patentable medicine price in India would increase by a mean 
o f  26% with linear demand and 242% with constant price elasticity o f  demand 
(W atal 2000). Similarly, by accounting for different products through trademarks 
and advertising, this approach estimates that price would increase by 30-277% if  
these medicines came under patent protection (Fink 2004).
As an example, Kessomboon et.al. (2010) estimated the impact from TRIPS to the 
TRIPS-Plus obligation from the Thai-US Free Trade Agreement on price by using a 
model developed by Joan Rovira and jointly produced by the W orld Health 
Organization and the Pan American Health Organization. The paper is light on 
methodology, with heavy reliance on assumptions including a constant price 
difference between patented price and price under competition, and a constant price 
elasticity demand function. This model estimated that a 10 year patent extension 
would cause a 32% increase in the price index for medicines in Thailand. The impact 
could be as high as 67% when adding patent linkage and data exclusivity on patent 
extension (Kessomboon, Limpananont et al. 2010).
This approach would be useful i f  the price elasticity o f  demand is known and correct. 
For the pharmaceutical market, the consumption decision commonly involves 
participation by a physician and a third-party payer (government or hospital 
committee). The consumer m ay or m ay not bear some part o f  the price depending on 
a country’s specific regulatory and reimbursement regimes. The pharmaceutical 
m arket’s demand function is thus often distorted. Therefore, a model based on price 
elasticity o f  demand might not present the real world situation o f  the complexity o f  
the pharmaceutical market. This is also not appropriate for analysing the current 
situation in  Thailand, as stronger patent protection has been implemented since 1992,
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and there seems to be no effect from the introduction o f  product patent protection at 
this tim e on the price o f  patentable medicines in the market before 1992 
(Supakankunti, Janjaroen et al. 2001).
Second, the observation o f  price before and after patent expiration is used to infer the 
price effect o f  patent protection. The maximum price reduction was found in the 
Netherlands, where the price fell by 51-69% after patent expiry, compared with the 
last year o f  patented price (Boersma and et al. 2005). Less reduction was found in 
Germany, the UK and France; three years after patent expiration the price index 
decreased approximately 20% in Germany and the UK while for France the price 
index was stable. Conversely, two US studies showed that an original product can 
have an increase in price o f  7% after one year and 11 %  after two years following 
generic entry (Grabowski and Vernon 1992; Suh, M anning et al. 2000). Another 
study showed a 60% price increase after three years expiration while the generic 
price decreased by 30% (Griliches and Cockburn 1994). However, the effect in  each 
country will differ since each nation has a different medical tradition, policy for 
financing and supporting generic entry and brand royalty o f  physicians, pharmacists 
and customers. The marketing strategy o f pharmaceutical companies also differs, and 
often they spend more heavily on advertising intensity once the patent has expired 
which could explain at least some o f  the price increase. Nonetheless, the evidence is 
equivocal.
This approach is also not suitable for the current Thai situation since product patents 
have been allowed since 1992, so the first product patent expiration will not happen 
before 2012. Moreover, while these studies are able to isolate the likely impact o f  
patent enforcement on prices, they are limited by the fact that they do not provide 
any sense o f  the magnitude o f  the patent effect, and there may be selection bias 
concerning medicines analysed, reducing generalizability (i.e. price sensitivity is not 
equal across every medicine). Only three studies were able to assess the impact with 
or without (before-and-after) patent introduction concurrently with market 
competition from generic medicine. One study in Thailand compared the price o f  
patented and generic HIV/AIDS medicines from 2001-4 and found that the patented 
price was approximately 1.5-3 times higher than the generic price in 2001 (Jirapom 
Limpananont, Vithaya Kulsomboon et al. 2004). The experience in Canada and Italy 
corresponds with that in  Thailand. A  study o f  the impact o f  the 1987 Canadian
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Patent Act, delaying the exercise o f  compulsory licences to manufacture and/or 
import the patented pharmaceuticals , found that after 1987 medicine prices, in 
general, increased relative to pre-1987 prices (Jones, Tanya et al. 2001). Similarly, 
after a patent law in Italy came into effect in 1978, new medicine prices were 163% 
higher than new drug prices before 1978 (Challu 1995).
Third, studies perform regression analysis o f  possible explanatoiy factors on 
medicine price, o f which patent status is one factor. One study estimated the impact 
o f  patent protection o f 14 ARV molecules in 34 low- and middle-income countries 
which have different patent systems, where patenting was eligible or ineligible 
between 1995 and mid-2000. This showed that combination therapy containing at 
least one patented medicine was on average priced 70% higher than combination 
therapy containing only generic medicines. Combination therapy containing at least 
one original medicine were priced 16% higher than local copies even when 
introduced in no-patent systems (Borrell 2007). However, these studies did not 
include market characteristics, showing supply and demand factors which are major 
determinants o f  price, in their models. The consequences o f  not including a relevant 
independent variable in the model are that OLS regression generally produces biased 
and inconsistent estimates.
From three approaches employed in previous studies, multiple regression analysis is 
the m ost reliable since it allows researchers to establish objective measures o f  
relationships between independent and dependent variables. However, previous 
literature shows the importance o f  regression analysis including independent 
variables that consist o f  relevant variables that determine price to avoid omitted 
variable bias.
3.3.2. Research gap
The literature review revealed that little empirical research has been undertaken on 
the extent to which patent rights affect price. Most studies that are undertaken 
investigate price after patent expiration. The setting o f  these studies are very mixed, 
across therapeutic areas and medicines. The literature generally shows that the size 
o f  impact varies across a huge range, depending on what methods are employed in  
the studies. Current evidence therefore makes it difficult for a country, such as
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Thailand, to come to a conclusion on advice to national policy makers to make 
decisions which trade-off health or access impacts with wider economic issues. The 
high price o f  medicine may not be related to patent rights. Furthermore, price may 
not be related to access either. This latter issue is tackled in chapter 4, and the former 
in the remainder o f  this chapter. This paper adds to the literature in several ways: (i) 
it is an empirical study on the impact o f  patent on price concerned with a non- 
communicable disease, cancer; (ii) it is focussed specifically upon Thailand, which is 
a unique case study as patent law was changed to comply with TRIPS obligations at 
a very early stage and there is no price control or government committee to monitor 
patented price; and (iii) it incorporates a series o f  demand and supply factors, in 
addition to patent, as explanatory factors.
3.4. Methodology
This study seeks to assess the relative impact o f  patent status as a component o f  
pharmaceutical prices while controlling for other factors. In general, patenting gives 
the patentee an exclusive legal right authorising monopoly power to set price much 
higher than the marginal cost. However, as with other products, medicine price also 
depends upon other supply and demand factors. From the literature review discussed 
previously, some common factors o f  note in setting medicine prices were identified: 
therapeutic value o f  the new compounds (degree o f  novelty), manufacturing cost, 
market share, price control system, tax, exchange rate, patent system and patent 
duration, purchasing power and willingness to pay, reimbursement, and substitutes. 
These factors drive the conceptual model underpinning the analysis conducted here, 
as outlined below
3.4.1 Price determinants: conceptual framework
Pricing behaviour is a complex issue, and one which is highly dependent on 
manufacturing, marketing, and distribution costs, medicine characteristics, market 
competition characteristics and the economic goals o f  the parent company 
(Monaghan and M onaghan 1996). Economic theory suggests that in regular markets 
important determinants o f  price relate to a series o f  supply and demand side factors. 
From the supply side, there are four important factors determining price. First, 
increasing competition may lead to lower price. This factor reflects the availability
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o f  substitute goods: the more and closer the substitutes available, the cheaper the 
price is likely to be. I f  no close substitutes are available, the supplier o f  a product has 
more flexibility over the price they can charge. Scholars testing the influence o f  the 
number o f  competitors on medicine price have indeed found that a higher number o f 
competitors leads to a lower price (Perez-Casas, Herranz et al. 2001; Kanavos, 
Costa-Font et al. 2008), and that increasing the number o f  substitutes from one to 
two leads on average to a 38% reduction in the price and increasing from two to 
three to a 19% reduction (Lu 1993).
Second, the product age (the number o f  years that the product has been on the 
market). This factor is used to represent the therapeutic effectiveness, assuming that 
more recent compounds are generally more effective. The newly introduced 
medicine, displaying improvements in efficacy compared with existing ones, will be 
priced at a premium. This variable may also reflect life-cycle pricing strategies in 
unregulated markets and age-related regulation. W ith increasing years on the market, 
the supplier may decrease the price in order to cover the mature stage o f  the product 
life-cycle; Danzon and Chao, for example, found a sharp decline o f  price with 
molecule age (Danzon and Chao 2000). However, although some evidence suggests 
that longer product life is associated with lower price (Kanavos and Vandoros 2011), 
other evidence finds no evidence that product age has an impact on price (Bemdt, 
Griliches et al. 1992). This might be because o f  the different setting and treatment o f  
variables.
Third, recent studies have focused on the impact o f  the number o f  medicines 
presented on price (Reiffen and W ard 2005; Regan 2008). The number o f  forms or 
strengths available provides the prescriber with greater flexibility to prescribe the 
product that most suits their patients’need. Recently, Ellison and Ellison (2007) have 
suggested the use o f  presentation proliferation as a strategic tool o f  entry deterrence. 
By increasing the number o f  presentations available the branded firm increases the 
cost to the generic entrant o f  reproducing the entire product line thereby deterring 
entry, which allows the branded firm to charge a higher price (Ellison and Ellison 
2007). Fourth, the cost o f  production. It is recommended that price should be 
determined at least in part by the cost incurred during the manufacturing process 
(Mrazek 2002).
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Demand side factors also determine price level. The higher the sales volume (the 
higher the number o f  cases) the lower the drug price (Hornbeck 2005). Scherer and 
W atal found that drug prices decreased with the number o f HIV/AIDS cases, 
although the magnitude o f  the effect was small (Scherer and W atal 2005). With 
respect to quality-adjusted price, therapeutically innovative medicines are found to 
be priced higher than existing substitutes (Weston 1982; Lu 1993).
On the basis o f existing literature and in order to study the determinants o f medicine 
price, a price function was developed. Here prices are assumed to be set by profit- 
maximizing firms, taking the effects o f  supply and demand and patent rights into 
consideration. This price determination function is depicted in equation (1):
P = f(S ,D ,P a )  (1)
where price, P, is a function o f  the supply characteristics, S, demand characteristics, 
D, and the nature o f  monopoly right, whether on- or off-patent (Pa).
3.4.2 Literature review: medicine price determinants
From the papers reviewed, it appears that medicine price, in general, depends on 
several supply and demand factors. For example, therapeutic advantage and number 
o f  substitutes are significant price determinants; as the number o f  substitutes 
increased in one study from one to two there was an average 38% decline in the ratio 
o f  the new drug price to the average existing market price (Lu and Comanor 1998). 
Kanavos and Vandoros (2011) also found that product age has a significant and 
negative effect on prices (Kanavos and Vandoros 2011). However, there are some 
variables absent, such as the prescribing patterns o f  doctors, tax, exchange rate, 
reimbursement and subsidy, and duration and conditions for exclusive rights. Based 
on the literature review, Table 3.2 lists factors that have been shown to influence 
price. These influenced factors will be described in detail in the next section.
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Table 3.2 Key factors influencing m edicine price and  correla tion  sign.
Influence factors C orrela tion
sign
References
Therapeutic value o f  the new 
compounds, product efficacy or less 
adverse effect
+ (Lu 1993; Danzón and 
Chao 2000; Borrell 
2007)
Molecule age, representing a novelty or 
high efficacy o f  new molecule and 
pricing strategy by product life cycle
+/- (Innovation ; Danzón 
and Chao 2000; 
Kanavos and Vandoros 
2011)
Number o f  forms as showing choices 
and convenience available to patients
+ (Danzón and Chao 2000; 
Reiffen and Ward 2005; 
Regan 2008)
Number o f competitors (Danzón and Chao 2000; 
Suh, Manning et al.
2000; Adriaen, W itte et 
al. 2007; Kanavos, 
Costa-Font et al. 2008; 
Regan 2008)
M anufacturing cost + (PReMA)
M arket share, market concentration 
and market power
+ (Suh, Manning et al. 
2000)
Price control or reference price system (Danzón and Chao 2000; 
Kanavos, Costa-Font et 
al. 2008)
Country m ean income, purchasing 
power
+ (Borrell 2007)
Price control policy, reimbursement and 
subsidy
(Adriaen, Witte et al. 
2007; Kanavos, Costa- 
Font et al. 2008)
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3.4.3 Data and Sources
A s described in chapter 2, all medicines in the th e r a p e u t ic  c la s s  o f  oncology were 
retrieved from the M onthly Index o f Medical Specialities (MIMS) Thailand 
database, and these were then confirmed against the Thai FDA to verify the 
availability and completeness o f  medicines marketing in  Thailand in 2008, when this 
study was conducted. At this time there were 88 chemical substances, contributing to 
249 products in 418 forms for oncology treatment. These medicines are categorised 
into four therapeutic groups: cytotoxic chemotherapy, hormonal chemotherapy, 
immunological chemotherapy and supportive care therapy. For each medicine, price 
data and other data related to pricing behaviour were collected from various sources 
described in the following section.
Dependent variable: Price
The price data for all oncology medicines in 2008, in each form, were obtained from 
the Intercontinental Medical Statistics (IMS) Health database. This database provides 
retail pricing for over-the-counter medicines at drugstores and wholesale prices at 
hospital, as well as sales volume, date o f  launches and market growth for all 
instances o f  a medicine. Price at the hospital level was chosen for the analysis since 
the hospital is the major channel for medicines in Thailand, accounting for 71% 
(IMS Health 2012). IMS price is calculated form the results o f  a survey o f  purchase 
price from 276 general and 22 specialized hospitals.
Alternative sources o f  medicine price at hospital level are FDA and DMSIC, 
however both sources have limitations. FDA provides manufactured or imported 
price reported by product owners. This ex-factory price from FDA is surprisingly 
higher than the wholesaler price, showing the transfer pricing strategy o f  MNCs. The 
second source, DMSIC, also provides the purchase price facing government 
hospitals; the limitations o f  different standards o f  drug identity codes makes it 
impossible to have a  comprehensive list o f  medicine price and volumes through this 
route. Also, it is set up by voluntary basis; there are no rules and regulations that 
government hospitals have to submit purchasing price to DM SIC or any government 
authorities. Large hospitals which are likely to have procurement o f  oncology 
medicines do not follow the system (Holloway ; Tangcharoensathien 2008).
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Therefore, the sample size o f  DMSIC database is relatively small and many 
medicines are ‘missing’.
It is said that price data from IMS are audited and adjusted to represent the whole 
market (Joncheere 2003). The limitation o f  IMS price is that the price at hospital 
level does not include mark-up by hospital; however, the majority o f  patients who 
are insured will received medicines free at the point o f  delivery. As a result, price 
from the IMS database is the most standardized data available and will be used in 
this study.
This private database provides retail pricing, sales volume, date o f  launches and 
market growth for all instances o f  a medicine. Price is the retail price set by the 
pharmaceutical company. However, patients or hospitals may not actually pay that 
price. Free-cost medicines, medicines provided without payment, are a common 
practice; however, it would be extremely difficult, i f  not impossible, to determine the 
exact buying price o f  hospitals. This data are the most standardized data available for 
price.
Prices were calculated on the price per daily maintenance dosage adapted from the 
defined daily dose (DDD) as suggested by WHO guidelines (WHO 2011). The DDD 
is an  average dose per day for a medicine used in adults to standardize the 
comparison o f  medicine usage between different medicines or between different 
health care environments. However, the data for DDD is not available for anti-cancer 
medicines, since treating cancer patients, for the majority o f  chemotherapy drugs, is 
dosed based on body surface area (BSA) or the patient’s weight. As a result, the 
cumulative dose received during treatment in cycles needed were calculated based 
on the average BSA at 1.51 m2 and patient’s weight at 60.88 kg (Sinawat and 
Chiyabutra 2004; Nedphokaew, Aphinives et al. 2007).
The recommended dose for each medicine in  each indication was retrieved from 
MICROMEDEX, a database o f  drug indication, dosage, interactions and side effect 
information. It covers all FDA approved medications. Based on this information, the 
cumulative dose received during the cumulative number o f  days that the patient 
received that medicine was estimated. The price per daily maintenance dose was 
computed at the average daily dose and at product level using the volume-weighted
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average o f  all forms available in 2008. There were 88 active ingredients contributing 
to 249 products in 418 forms. In each product, price was calculated at a weighted 
average price; therefore, it has 249 observations (sum o f  a product o f  quantity and 
price o f  each strength divided by quantity).
Explanatory variables
Patent information for each medicine was obtained from the patent survey presented 
in Chapter 2. As indicated in table 3.3., the cytotoxic chemotherapy group appears to 
have the largest number o f  patented medicines; 21 patented medicines or 23 
medicines likely to have patent protection out o f  58 medicines. The group o f  
supportive care therapy is found to have six patented medicines and there are four 
patented medicines in the hormonal chemotherapy group. For the immunological 
chemotherapy group, although there is no patented medicine based on patent 
information available, it is likely that two medicines are on-patent medicines since 
they have monopoly status and are under patent protection in the USA and Canada. 
To sum up, there are 27 patented medicines and seven medicines that are suspected 
to have patent protection. From the patent data available, patent expiry date was 
collected and was estimated as the number o f  years to expiry; from this the average 
patent life from 2008 is estimated to be 11.30 years. In general, a product that has 
monopoly rights would use a high price initially to recoup the investment (Ferrell 
and Hartline 2011). Borrel (2007) also confirm this pricing strategy o f  HIV/AIDS 
medicines in developing countries (Borrell 2007).
It is hypothesized that a patent shifts price up, and that price is also higher the greater 
the num ber o f  years remaining o f  patent protection. Therefore the null hypothesis is 
that there will be a significant positive association between patent status o f  
medicines, o r number o f  years o f  patent remaining, and the price.
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Table 3.3 N um ber of oncology m edicines in each therapeu tic  g roup  by 
m onopoly and patenting status
Therapeutic group No. Of 
medicines
Patented
medicines
Patent 
information 
not available
Average 
years to 
expiry
1. Cytotoxic 
Chemotherapy
58 21 2 11.4
2. Hormonal 
Chemotherapy
14 4 3 11.5
3. Immunological 
Chemotherapy
7 2
4. Supportive Care 
Therapy
9 6 10.83
T otal 88 27 7 11.30
Data concerning other supply and demand side characteristics of the market were 
obtained from IMS. The IMS provides launch year, market growth, sales and sales 
volume of each product across all its versions available in the market. These data 
allow calculation of product age, market size and number of competitors in each 
active ingredient. To avoid the duplication of number of competitors in the same 
active ingredient, the patented medicines were checked and found that there was 
only one seller in each patented medicine.
The marginal cost of production represents the complete process of production and 
cost of material in manufacturing. Generally, in a perfect market, one could expect 
that entry and competition would push generic medicine prices down to a level 
approaching the marginal cost of production. Some studies have therefore employed 
the lowest unit cost of a generic medicine on the market as a proxy of marginal cost 
(Grabowski and Vernon 1992). However, often there is no generic competition on 
the domestic market since the market is protected by a patent. Therefore, the Indian 
procurement price was selected as a benchmark to represent the marginal cost 
variable. This is because not only is India a leader in generic medicine production, 
but medicine pricing in India can also represent the manufacturing cost with
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exclusion o f  monopoly right exercised on price since, prior to 2005, there were no 
product patents on Indian medicines, just process patents. Indian pricing, with 
adjustment for the same strength, was mainly obtained from the Tamil Nadu Medical 
Services Corporation Ltd., (TNMSC) (TNMSC 2010), a public sector organisation in 
India with the primary objective o f  ensuring the availability o f  essential medicines in 
government medical institutions. For medicines not available from this source, the 
average price from M edindia11 was used. The average exchange rate for 2008 at 0.82 
Baht per Indian Rupee was used to convert into Thai currency.
The price o f  a medicine should, in  theory, represent the marginal health gained from 
taking that medicine. Quality-adjusted life years (QALYs) are a measure o f  health in 
terms o f  length o f  life and quality o f life. The QALY has been widely used to value 
the benefits o f  interventions as they provide a single index o f  outcome for use in 
cost-effectiveness analysis. Although treatment as chemotherapy can extend life for 
a period o f  time by killing or stopping the process o f cancer cells growth, it does 
create adverse side effects to health at the same time. Since the QALY is a function 
o f  life extension and quality o f that life, QALYs gained is a good proxy to represent 
both life year gained and adverse effects. However, the availability o f  ‘QALY 
gained’ is scarce. Information concerning other outcomes associated with medicines 
could add another level in the search for the relationship between quality and 
quantity o f  life obtained from that treatment. Defining the benefit o f  anti-cancer 
medicines is challenging since surrogate outcomes have not always been established 
(Vera-Badillo, Al-Mubarak et al. 2013). The amount o f  time a new drug prolongs 
life was found as the most important factor in choosing among treatment options 
(Hare J 1992). It is also found that medicine price is determined by life-prolonging; a 
longer life-extension treatment, considered high value, would be priced higher 
(M artin 2010; Kantaijian and Zwelling 2013). Life years saved (LYS) is thus chosen 
to be a proxy for the benefit o f  anti-cancer medicines.
Chemoherapy has a range o f  side effects that depends on the type o f  medications 
used. Nausea and vomiting are common side effects that can frequently be reduced 
or eliminated with less costly self-care measures. This study includes two severe 
complications o f  chemotherapy, neutropenia (low white blood cell counts) and
" http://www.medindia.net/buy_n_sell/pharmjndustry/ph_dmgprice.asp
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thrombocytopenia (low platelet counts), although some chemotherapy drugs can also 
cause damage to other cells, such as the bone marrow cells. It is expected that both 
o f  these indicators would have a negative impact on price since they are life- 
threatening and also costly to manage.
QALYs gained, life year gained and important adverse effects were selected to 
represent medicine characteristics. To avoid the problem o f  multicollinearity -  since 
QALY combines quantity and quality o f  life -  there would be interaction effects 
between QALY and LYS and side effects variables. Therefore at the analysis step, 
when choosing independent variables to include in the analysis, the QALY variable 
and LYS and side effect variables were chosen separately. For example, if  QALY 
variable is included, LYS and side effect variables were excluded from that model.
Life year saved and Quality Adjusted Life Years (QALYs) gained were selected to 
represent the health benefit o f  taking the treatment while the probabilities o f  severe 
thrombocytopenia and neutropenia were selected to represent adverse effect. The 
num ber o f  life years saved and QALYs gained are expected to have a positive effect 
on the price o f  a medicine as they reflect the benefits obtained, and thus a higher 
QALY would imply, ceterus paribus, a higher price able to be set by the 
pharmaceutical company.
The Health Economic Evaluations Database (HEED) and Cost-Effectiveness 
Analysis Registry at the Centre for Reviews and Dissemination were databases used 
to find QALYs gained and life years saved which are gained when compared with 
best supportive care available on the market. Data for the percentage o f severe 
neutropenia and thrombocytopenia were retrieved from DRUGDEX database which 
reports the percentage o f  adverse effect o f particular medicines.
3.4.3 Model specification
A model o f  price as a function o f  factors indicated above was developed and data 
fitted to establish the relationship and the sensitivity o f  price to these different 
factors. Two factors related to the patent were whether or not there is a patent in 
place and, where there is, the number o f  years before patent expiration. The other 
selected factors consist o f  efficacy and adverse effect reduction (proxy o f  novelty),
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Indian price (proxy o f  cost o f  production), quantity purchased, number o f  substitutes 
and market size. The final set combined in a multiple regression model, as illustrated 
below.
P i= at + + e,
W here Pt is the price for daily dose o f  medicine i, x¡ is a vector o f  observable 
characteristics o f  the individual medicines (i.e. patent status, market share, sales, 
number o f  seller and form available, QALYs, etc.) and £¡ is the effect o f  the 
unobservable. The definitions o f all variables are listed in Table 3.4. Price per daily 
dose, sales volumes and Indian price were transformed on a logarithmic scale, as this 
was more manageable as the data covers a large range o f values. It also tends to 
convert exponential (compound growth) trends to linear trends to comply with linear 
regression analysis. Hence, the coefficient estimates are interpretable as elasticities, 
serving as an approximation o f  the elasticity o f  price to the interested variables 
(Wooldridge 2002; Dougherty 2011).
T able  3.4 Definitions o f variables
V ariables D escription N um ber of
observation
D e p e n d e n t  v a r ia b le  
Price per day Log o f  price per average dose needed for one 
day.
249
E x p l a n a to r y  v a r ia b le
Patent status 1 for patented medicine and 0 for non- 
patented medicine
241
Patent expiry Number o f  years to patent expiration 249
Log o f  sales volume 
Number o f Number o f  sellers selling the product in the 249
competitors same active ingredient
Number o f  forms Number o f  forms available for each brand 249
name
Product age Number o f  year that product has been on 
market, from the registration year to 2008
243
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V ariables D escription N um ber o f 
observation
Log o f  Indian price Log o f  Indian price 194
Life year saved Number o f life year saved gained 54
Thrombocytopenia Percentage o f  severe Thrombocytopenia 
event
170
Neutropenia Percentage o f  severe Neutropenia event 109
QALYs QALYs gained compared with best 
supportive care
57
There are two plausible options for analysis depending on the medicine group and 
patent information input in the model. As shown in table 3.1 there are four main 
groups o f  medicines used to treat oncology; however, the group o f  cytotoxic 
medicines is the majority o f the sample, 160 out o f  249 products. The sample sizes 
o f  hormonal therapy and immunotherapy are relatively small, 38 and 13 respectively. 
As a  result, the analysis included these three groups together since they are all cancer 
treatments aiming to destroy or halt the growth o f  cells from dividing, multiplying 
and spreading throughout the body. The fourth group is supportive care therapy 
which is  the prevention and management o f  the adverse effects o f  cancer and its 
treatment. It lightens the symptoms and complications o f  cancer and reduces or 
prevents toxicities o f  treatment. The analysis therefore has two options, including all 
four groups or including the three groups which aim to destroy cancer cells.
Another important scenario concerns the patent. Since patent information for seven 
medicines is unidentified, there are two possible alternatives in conducting the 
analysis: (i) analysing without those seven medicines w ith missing patent statuses; 
and (ii) analysing w ith an assumption that those seven medicines are patented 
medicines. The year o f  expiration for these seven medicines is calculated from the 
latest year o f  expiration in the USA and adding one more year for the patent 
application process. As a result, there are four different models, M odel A to D, with 
m ixed variables to estimate the price setting determinants, as shown in Figure 3.3.
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F igure  3.3 F our models based on four d ifferen t scenarios to analysis
Four groups of 
medicines
27 Patented 
medicines
34 Patented 
medicines
l r 1l_____
Model A Model B
Three groups of 
medicines
27 Patented 
medicines
34 Patented 
medicines
1l_____ f
Model C Model D
For each model in Figure 3.3, different specifications were estimated to present a 
pricing equation reflecting the groups o f relevant explanatory variables; market 
characteristics, medicine characteristics and market and medicine characteristics 
together. Since the variable o f  manufacturing cost was proxied by the Indian price, 
resulting in a biased underestimate o f  manufacturing cost, two specifications were 
estimated (model 1 and 2), inclusion and exclusion o f  the marginal cost variable. 
Model 1 represents the influence o f market characteristics variables but excludes this 
marginal cost variable, whereas model 2 includes the marginal cost variable. The 
second group o f specifications, models 3 and 4, representing medicine characteristics 
which separate QALYs gained and life years saved. The last group o f specifications 
(model 5-8) include all explanatory variables, accounting for the different 
manufacturing cost and medicine benefit variables.
3.5. Results
A correlation test among variables was undertaken to avoid multicollinearity. Given 
linear model specification, it would be expected that there is an interaction between a 
num ber o f  forms and price and between product age and number o f  competitors. The 
correlations are small: -0.06 and 0.18 respectively. Also, when testing the model for 
the multicollinearity by  variance inflation factor (VIF), the maximum mean VIF 
appears at the 7th regression specification at 4.2 while the VIF values o f  other models 
were found at around 3. A s a  rule o f thumb, i f  VIF values are higher than 10, then
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there is a problem with multicollinearity and it needs further investigation(Kutner 
MH, Nachtsheim CJ et al. 2004).
Results for model A, outlining the determinants o f  price from most available patent 
data and including all four therapeutic groups, can be found in Table 3.5. In the first 
specification, sales volume and number o f  competitors have a negative and 
statistically significant coefficient at a  = 1%. For example, a one percentage increase 
in purchased volume would decrease price by 0.2%, and entrance o f  a new seller 
would decrease price by 20%. As expected, patent status and product variety have a 
positive and significant effect on prices at the same level. Patented products are 
priced 190% higher than non-patented medicines. However the number o f  exclusive 
years left has an effect opposite to that expected. It seems the more patent life a 
medicine has, the cheaper it is; one year less in patent life leads to a price increase o f 
approximately 5%.
The number o f  competitors has a negative and significant effect on price, as 
expected; only in the 7th regression specification is this variable not significant and 
this seems likely to be because o f  the small observation numbers. In general, i f  there 
is one more competitor, the price would decrease by around 13%-30%. The 
coefficient estimates on the number o f  forms available is positive and statistically 
significant in column 2 and 6 suggesting that the more variety in choices, the higher 
price. However, this variable is a more consistently significant regressor in models C 
and D. The estimated coefficient on product age is negative and statistically 
significant in the 2nd specification in model A and B and shows significance in the 1st 
and 2nd specifications in model C and D. This suggests that the longer the product is 
on the market the lower the price. However, the impact is minimal.
W hen the marginal cost variable was included in the model (Column 2), results 
rem ain very similar to Model 1. Although, the number o f  observations dropped to 
182, the sign o f  every variable was unchanged and followed from theory. However, 
the magnitude o f  explanatoiy variables was less significant than the M odel 1 results. 
The impact o f  patent on price dropped to 135%. M arginal cost has a positive 
significant impact on price: one percent increase o f  cost would increase price by 
approximately 0.2%. In the third specification, with a very small sample size , 
investigation toward how medicine efficacy and adverse effects affect the price o f
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medicines, suggests that life years saved has a positive and significant coefficient: 
one life year saved could increase price by around 90%. The event o f 
thrombocytopenia has a negative, but not significant, effect on price. The percentage 
o f  severe neutropenia shows a positive relationship with price which is not as 
expected. W ith a small R2 in model 4, QALYs gained has a positive correlation with 
price; however, this variable is not a significant price determinant. Surprisingly, 
rather than an adverse effect, neutropenia shows asignificant positive effect on price; 
a percentage increase in chance to severe neutropenia would increase price by 3-6%. 
This maybe because o f  the colinearity between neutropenia and thrombocytopenia 
(r=0.36).
W hen including both market and medicine characteristics, Models 5-8, some o f  the 
m arket characteristics turn out to be insignificant but still show the expected signs. 
Although M odels 6 and 8 show high R-square, this is from a very small data set, 
determined by the availability o f  QALYs information, as shown in table 3.4. M ost o f  
the medicines included in these models are not patented medicines. It is therefore 
suggested that models 1-3 be seen as the core, most reliable, results.
For Model B, with the assumption o f  patent information, the results, as shown in 
table 3.6, show minimal differences to Model A. The number o f  observations 
increase and signs and significance level o f  each explanatory factor are similar to 
Model A. However, the percentage o f  thrombocytopenia now becomes a significant 
price determinant. W hen analysing data for only three chemotherapy groups (Models 
C and D), the results are almost identical to those o f  Models A and B, as shown in 
Table 3.7 and 3.8.
In conclusion, with regards to the effect o f  patent on price, monopoly rights 
protection from a patent for the particular medicine generates a price o f  patented 
medicines some 130-200% higher than medicines without a patent. This effect is 
statistically significant and shows an expected sign. However, pharmaceutical 
companies appear to use a penetration pricing strategy rather than skimming strategy 
as expected to launch new products in Thailand. Over time, as brand loyalty 
increases, the low introductoiy price is often raised. Price is negatively correlated 
w ith patent year left, as seen from the experience in  the US(Grabowski and Vernon 
1992; Suh, M anning et al. 2000).
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Table 3.5 OLS coefficient (SE) o f pricing regressions o f M odel A: four groups o f
medicines with patent information available
(1) (2) 
lnpddd lnpddd
(3)
lnpddd
(4)
lnpddd
(5)
lnpddd
(6)
lnpddd
(7)
lnpddd
(8)
lnpddd
Patent status 1.9 0 2 * * *  1.355*** 1.529*** 2.001***1 1.353*** 0.957* 0.988** 0.338
(0.583) (0.390) (0.320) (0.569) (0.387) (0.564) (0.410) (0.565)
Years to patent -0.052 -0.059* -0.048* -0.007 -0.046** -0.061* _ -0.061
expiration 0.065***
(0.046) (0.031) (0.028) (0.046) (0.018) (0.034) (0.021) (0.037)
Log of sales -0.074* -0.088 0.014 -0.099
volume 0.219*** 0.255***
(0.042) (0.043) (0.065) (0.066) (0.060) (0.063)
Number of . -0.139** -0.002
competitors 0.186***0.131*** 0.308*** 0.199***
(0.019) (0.022) (0.058) (0.036) (0.060) (0.033)
Number of forms 0.062 0.280*** 0.253 0.394** 0.112 0.243
available (0.086) (0.081) (0.159) (0.193) (0.133) (0.184)
Product age -0.026 0.002 -0.010 0.015 0.013
0.039***
(0.016) (0.014) (0.033) (0.040) (0.030) (0.033)
Log of Indian 0.253*** 0.310*** 0.283***
price (0.045) (0.106) (0.087)
Life year saved 0.908*** 0.523** 0.716***
gained (0.194) (0.238) (0.210)
% of severe -0.022 -0.019 0.001
Thrombocytopenia (0.016) (0.011) (0.009)
% of severe 0.062*** 0.037*** 0.033***
Neutropenia (0.006) (0.011) (0.010)
QALYs gained 0.371 -0.077 -0.003
(0.225) (0.158) (0.126)
cons 8.685*** 5.903*** 3.289*** 5.448*** 5.774*** 9.988*** 2.426* 6.724***
(0.396) (0.507) (0.450) (0.505) (1.236) (0.630) (1.295) (0.800)
N  232 182 43 54 40 51 39 42
I ?  0.458 0.600 0.883 0.135 0.905 0.829 0.927 0.889
adi. R2 0.443 0.584 0.868 0.083 0.876 0.801 0.901 0.862
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significant at (*) 10%, (**) 5% or (***) 1%
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Table 3.6 OLS coefficient (SE) o f  pricing regressions o f M odel B: four groups o f
m edicines with assum ption fo r the missing p a ten t inform ation
(1)
lnpddd
(2)
Inpddd
(3)
lnpddd
(4)
lnpddd
(5)
lnpddd
(6)
Lnpddd
(7)
lnpddd
(8)
Inpddd
Patent status 1.439*** 1.448*** 1.742*** 2.065*** 1.660*** 1.058** 1.085** 0.248
(0.509) (0.387) (0.390) (0.581) (0.440) (0.504) (0.465) (0.551)
Years to patent -0.022 -0.076** -0.043 -0.023 -0.061 -0.076** -0.086** -0.076*
expiration (0.040) (0.034) (0.051) (0.048) (0.043) (0.034) (0.041) (0.038)
Log of sales -0.225*** -0.082* -0.153* -0.283*** -0.015 -0.099
vol ume (0.041) (0.042) (0.080) (0.069) (0.061) (0.062)
Number of -0.182*** - . -0.304*** 0.003
competitors 0.127*** 0.160*** 0.192***
(0.019) (0.021) (0.055) (0.035) (0.075) (0.035)
Number of forms 0.076 0.305*** 0.309* 0.399** 0.120 0.216
available (0.090) (0.080) (0.176) (0.193) (0.144) (0.179)
Product age -0.026 - 0.003 -0.001 0.021 0.027
0.038***
(0.016) (0.014) (0.036) (0.041) (0.032) (0.034)
Log of Indian 0.256*** 0.391*** 0.310***
price (0.045) (0.130) (0.090)
Life year saved 0.645** 0.267 0.521**
gained (0.241) (0.221) (0.227)
% of severe -0.029** -0.018** 0.005
Thrombocytopenia (0.013) (0.009) (0.010)
% of severe 0.063*** 0.030*** 0.025**
Neutropenia (0.006) (0.010) (0.010)
QALYs gained 0.267 -0.163 -0.026
(0.251) (0.188) (0.145)
_cons 8.676*** 5.861*** 3.538*** 5.534*** 6.762*** 10.189*** 2.647* 6.568***
(0.388) (0.508) (0.381) (0.503) (1.177) (0.673) (1.540) (0.860)
N 240 186 46 57 43 54 41 44
R 2 0.451 0.596 0.815 0.124 0.857 0.810 0.904 0.883
adj. R l 0.436 0.580 0.792 0.075 0.818 0.781 0.871 0.856
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Significant at (*) 10%, (**) 5% or (***) 1%
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Table 3.7 OLS coefficient (SE) o f pricing regressions of Model C: three groups
of medicines with assumption for the missing patent information
(1)
lnpddd
(2)
lnpddd
(3)
Lnpddd
(4)
lnpddd
(5)
lnpddd
(6)
lnpddd
(7)
Inpddd
(8)
lnpddd
Patent status 2.395*** 1.343*** 1.529*** 2.001*** 1.353*** 0.957* 0.988** 0.338
(0.512) (0.448) (0.320) (0.569) (0.387) (0.564) (0.410) (0.565)
Years to patent -0.068* -0.038 -0.048* -0.007 -0.046** -0.061* -0.065*** -0.061
expiration (0.035) (0.031) (0.028) (0.046) (0.018) (0.034) (0.021) (0.037)
Log of sales -0.250*** -0.086* -0.088 -0.255*** 0.014 -0.099
volume (0.041) (0.048) (0.065) (0.066) (0.060) (0.063)
Number of -0.168*** -0.096*** -0.139** -0.308*** -0.002 -0.199***
competitors (0 .019) (0.020) (0.058) (0.036) (0.060) (0.033)
Number of forms 0.446*** 0.391*** 0.253 0.394** 0.112 0.243
available (0.094) (0.081) (0.159) (0.193) (0.133) (0.184)
Product age -0.060*** -0.043*** 0.002 -0.010 0.015 0.013
(0.016) (0.015) (0.033) (0.040) (0.030) (0.033)
Log oflndian price 0.334*** 0.310*** 0.283***
(0.048) (0.106) (0.087)
Life year saved 0.908*** 0.523** 0.716***
gained (0.194) (0.238) (0.210)
% of severe -0.022 -0.019 0.001
Thrombocytopenia (0.016) (0.011) (0.009)
% o f severe 0.062*** 0.037*** 0.033***
Neutropenia (0.006) (0.011) (0.010)
QALYs gained 0.371 -0.077 -0.003
(0.225) (0.158) (0.126)
_cons 8.620*** 5.133*** 3.289*** 5.448*** 5.774*** 9.988*** 2.426* 6.724***
(0 .400) (0.591) (0.450) (0.505) (1.236) (0.630) (1.295) (0.800)
N 194 159 43 54 40 51 39 42
/f2 0.575 0.680 0.883 0.135 0.905 0.829 0.927 0.889
adj.f?2 0.562 0.665 0.868 0.083 0.876 0.801 0.901 0.862
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Significant at (*) 10%, (**) 5% or (***) 1%
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Table 3.8 OLS coefficient (SE) o f pricing regressions of Model D: three groups
of m edicines w ith assum ption fo r the missing paten t in form ation
(1)
lnpddd
(2)
lnpddd
(3)
lnpddd
(4)
lnpddd
(5)
lnpddd
(6)
Lnpddd
(7)
lnpddd
(8)
lnpddd
Patent status 1.737*** 1.424*** 1.742*** 2.065*** 1.660*** 1.058** 1.085** 0.248
(0.510) (0.437) (0.390) (0.581) (0.440) (0.504) (0.465) (0.551)
Years to patent -0.027 -0.056* -0.043 -0.023 -0.061 -0.076** -0.086** -0.076*
expiration
(0.037) (0.034) (0.051) (0.048) (0.043) (0.034) (0.041) (0.038)
Log of sales - -0.093* -0.153* •-0.283*** -0.015 -0.099
volume 0.252***
(0.040) (0.047) (0.080) (0.069) (0.061) (0.062)
Number of _ . - -0.304*** 0.003 -
competitors 0.165*** 0.091*** 0.160*** 0.192***
(0.019) (0.021) (0.055) (0.035) (0.075) (0.035)
Number of forms 0.473*** 0.411*** 0.309* 0.399** 0.120 0.216
available
(0.095) (0.080) (0.176) (0.193) (0.144) (0.179)
Product age _ - 0.003 -0.001 0.021 0.027
0.060*** 0.042***
(0.016) (0.015) (0.036) (0.041) (0.032) (0.034)
Log of Indian 0.340*** 0.391*** 0.310***
price (0.047) (0.130) (0.090)
Life year saved 0.645** 0.267 0.521**
gained
(0.241) (0.221) (0.227)
% of severe -0.029** -0.018** 0.005
Thrombocytopenia
(0.013) (0.009) (0.010)
% of severe 0.063*** 0.030*** 0.025**
Neutropenia
(0.006) (0.010) (0.010)
QALYs gained 0.267 -0.163 -0.026
(0.251) (0.188) (0.145)
cons 8.552*** 5.076*** 3.538*** 5.534*** 6.762*** 10.189*** 2.647* 6.568***
(0.394) (0.589) (0.381) (0.503) (1.177) (0.671) (1.540) (0.860)
N 202 163 46 57 43 54 41 44
R 2 0.562 0.677 0.815 0.124 0.857 0.810 0.904 0.883
adj. R 1 0.548 0.663 0.792 0.075 0.818 0.781 0.871 0.856
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Significant at (*) 10%, (**) 5% or (***) 1%
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3.6. Conclusion and  discussion
This study investigates the relative role o f  patents, compared to other market and 
medicine characteristics, in determining the price o f  medicines treating oncology in 
Thailand in the year 2008. This is to get a figure on the effect o f  patent on price to 
inform the impact o f  patent, via price, on access, analysed in the next chapter. Fewer 
empirical studies have investigated the price o f medicines for non-communicable 
disease, even fewer o f which explicitly take patents into account. The strengths o f  
this study are that the study design is focussed only on one specific market and that 
the variables input in the model covered various factor known to affect price from 
both economic theory and empirical evidence.
The result in a qualitative sense is not surprising; patenting is associated with higher 
prices relative to a regime where patents are not available. However, from literature 
reviews the impact could range anywhere from 26-277%. This study shows that the 
impact o f patent on the price o f oncology medicines in Thailand is within this range, 
130-212%, but although far less, itself still forms a considerable range. This 
relatively high patent impact in Thailand could be the result o f  pricing freedom, with 
no patented price monitoring and control in Thailand. Many countries that regulate 
manufacturer prices, either directly or indirectly, are likely to have a patent impact 
on price that is lower (Magazzini, Pammolli et al. 2004). Although the Thai health 
system provides universal coverage to the Thai population, the cost o f  some 
medicines will be the responsibility o f  the hospital, each o f  which purchases 
medicine separately. Therefore, the range o f  price between hospitals is high, 
depending upon negotiations. Moreover, most patented oncology medicines are not 
supported by universal coverage, and pricing o f  these medicines is likely to depend 
more on market characteristics and market power.
Another aspect o f  importance, in addition to having a patent or not, is the length o f  
the patent life o f the product. This study found that the lower the patent life, the 
higher the medicine price is. This could be due to the ‘generic paradox,’ suggested 
by Scherer (1993), that price o f off-patent medicine increases after patent expiration, 
specifically in the US market. This m ight be because the pharmaceutical company 
uses that increased price strategy, with retention o f  their loyal customers, to 
compensate for losing market share when generics enter the market, or because
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pharmaceutical companies might use entry with lower price to build loyalty and then 
increase price subsequently. However, this factor has unstable significance in four 
models, only showing significance in some specifications. Another factor that has a 
high im pact on price is the benefit obtained from life years saved. A product 
extending life by one more year could shift price approximately 100%. Although the 
source o f  life year saved, as well as adverse effect, is obtained from a clinical trial 
conducted directly by the company holding the patent, patients would choose an 
expensive chemotherapy even though it has a small benefit on health (Matsuyama, 
Reddy et al. 2006; Baker 2008; Harrington S 2008).
Since QALYs area well-known tool to estimate outcomes for assessing the benefit o f  
medicines, it should have a positive relationship with price. The findings presented 
here reveal the opposite. This maybe because the newly introduced and expensive 
medicines provide fewer QALYs gained than one that has already been in the market 
for a long tim e (diminishing marginal returns); the average QALYs gained for newly 
introduced drugs in 2008 is 0.29 while the average QALYs gained for those 10 years 
old is 1.36. This is consistent with an empirical study that concluded that the 
improved therapeutic gains do not account for the higher prices that have been set 
(Suslow 1992).
In addition, the adverse effect o f  neutropenia was found to have a positive 
relationship with price while thrombocytopenia shows a negative sign. Although 
chemotherapy kills fast dividing cancer cells, it also ends up killing some fast 
dividing cells in bone marrow that eventually cause white blood cell counts to fall. 
However, white blood cells will reach th e ir  l o w e s t  num ber 10 to 14  days after 
chemotherapy and then increase steadily and usually return to normal before the next 
cycle is due. W hile thrombocytopenia causes bleeding from the nose or more serious 
haemorrhage can occur at the back o f  the eye (retina), sometimes threatening sight 
(Ignoffo 2011).
This study has three potentially significant limitations, due to  lack o f  data. First, 
prices input in this model do not take discounts or promotions from pharmaceutical 
companies into account. Therefore, the patent effect may be overestimated. 
However, the most available data source that represents the price was used and this 
study aims to  assess the intent o f  the patent owner to exploit the monopoly. Second,
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the method employed in this study is cross-sectional, which looks a t price at a 
specific point o f  time. It does not take the price trend into account i f  the product 
owner decreases or increases price during the period from introduction to the year 
2008. This was because it was not possible to obtain a time series o f medicine prices 
in Thailand. However, market growth and product age were chosen to proxy price 
trend to capture the relationship between price and time. Third, there is a lack o f  
systematic data on the benefits and adverse effects from medicines. This information 
was retrieved from clinical trials that were performed on specific indications. 
However the results o f  the same medicine in  different indications yield different 
results. O f  course, the population samples included in clinical trials also differ. As a 
result, this factor might not represent the actual benefits and costs o f  treatment by 
that medicine.
Hence, directions for future research include investigating the real purchase price at 
government hospitals, which are responsible for the access to medicines for the 
m ajority o f  the Thai population, investigating patented price setting behaviour over 
time, and a more appropriate assessment o f  benefit. Because the cost o f  providing a 
full range o f  treatments for cancer could potentially be high, prices and financing are 
inescapable factors in determining access to cancer treatment. Further study should 
therefore examine the effect o f  these patented prices on access to medicine.
Some have suggested that companies are hesitant to lower prices in poorer countries 
for fear o f  causing a backlash in richer markets (Hombeck 2005).W hen price range 
scan be reviewed and compared, lower prices can be obtained through skilful 
negotiation, in locating new supply sources, and in assessing the efficiency o f  local 
procurement systems. I f  the medicine is an important therapeutic advance with no 
close competitors, the degree o f  monopoly pow er can be large, with corresponding 
profits for the manufacturer or patent owner.
M any medicine policies have major implications for access to, and utilization of, 
treatments for cancer patients. W ith respect to market characteristics, m ost o f  them 
have a significant impact on price. For instance, the higher the sales volume, the 
more suppliers selling the same medicine in the market and the longer time that 
product has been on the market, the cheaper prices medicines are. However, the 
magnitude o f  their impacts is minimal, i.e. a policy related to market characteristics
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would have a small impact on oncology medicine use. Therefore, this study reveals 
that policies relating to patenting are effective options to decrease the price o f  
oncology medicines. The use o f TRIPS flexibilities (CL, parallel importation, limits 
on data protection, use o f  broad research and other exceptions to patentability, etc.) 
may be needed, although the adverse effect o f  CL policy needs to be considered and 
is the subject o f  investigation and discussion in Chapters 5 and 6.
This study has investigated the determinants o f  the price o f oncology medicines, 
across market competitiveness and the characteristics o f  the medicine, taking into 
account their sales volume, number o f  providers, patent status and years to patent 
expiration, product age, production cost, benefits gained and adverse effects. The 
evidence shows that patent status, most o f  the market characteristic factors and the 
benefits o f  the medicine in terms o f  life years saved are significant, and the sign o f  
correlations are shown as expected. Patent status is the most significant price 
determinant, and so policies affecting patent status could be considered as effective 
measures to bring down the price. The next chapter considers the impact o f the 
patented price on access to medicines.
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C H A PT E R  4 T H E  IM P A C T  O F  PA TEN T AND PR IC E  O N  A C CESS T O  
O N CO LO G Y  M ED IC IN E S IN  TH AILAN D
4.1. Introduction
The rapidly rising cost o f  health care, and high medicine prices for non- 
communicable diseases (NCDs), especially cancer, are growing concerns worldwide 
(Marquez and Suhrcke 2005; World Health Organization 2005). Approximately 80% 
o f premature mortality resulting from NCDs occurs in low- and middle-income 
countries (World Health Organization 2003). Cancer now constitutes a huge health 
and economic burden for developing countries (Kanavos 2006). Also, since 2006, 
cancer has been the major cause o f death in Thailand, responsible for nearly 30,000 
deaths annually and more than 100,000 new cases reported each year 
( W ib u lp o lp r a s e r t  2 0 0 7 ) .  A significant proportion o f morbidity and mortality could be 
prevented if  treatments are made more widely accessible. Unfortunately, oncology 
medicines, which comprise a substantial proportion o f  the cost o f  organising and 
delivering cancer treatment programmes, are generally expensive (Featherstone and 
Whitham 2010). For example, in 2007 the average cost o f chemotherapy treatment 
for 10 common cancer types where chemotherapy is a key treatment modality ranged 
from some $17,212 to $27,494 in the US (Fitch and Pyenson 2010). As a proportion 
o f  income, these modem medicines are even more expensive -  and often 
prohibitively so -  in low- and middle-income counties (Quick JD, Hogerzeil HV et 
al. 2002).
There are concerns that the patenting o f  medicines makes them unaffordable and that 
this is the driver which makes them ultimately inaccessible and hence underutilised. 
The exclusiveness in selling a medicine conferred by a patent to a particular 
manufacturer discourages competition among manufacturers, and makes generic 
competition illegal. This makes it difficult for countries to implement effective and 
sustainable policies to bring down the price ( ’t Hoen 2003). O f  course, 
pharmaceutical companies stress that the prices secured in the period o f  the patent 
are necessary to recuperate the initial investment in R&D. They argue that without 
substantial investment in R&D the discovery o f  new more efficacious products
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would not be possible. The patient therefore would lose out on the benefits o f  a more 
efficacious drug yet to be developed, as a result o f  decline in funding for R&D, if  
they were to benefit from lower present prices (a subject returned to in the next 
chapter).
However, despite the focus and emphasis placed on patents as a root cause o f 
inaccessibility to modem medicines, empirical evidence directly linking patented 
price and access is rare. M ost studies describe how patenting increases price, and 
then a s s u m e  that price is the driver o f  access and so, by deduction, the patent must 
prohibit access. A number o f  studies have discussed how patents might do more 
harm than good in terms o f  access to medicines, and that the World Trade 
Organization (W TO)’s agreement on Trade-Related Aspects o f  Intellectual Property 
Rights (TRIPS) has exacerbated this situation (Schulz 2000; Scherer and Watal 
2002; Forman 2009). Several studies have also examined the availability, price and 
affordability o f  medicines on the WHO essential medicine list (WHO-EML) in 
several countries including Thailand (Babar, Ibrahim et al. 2007; Kotwani, Ewen et 
al. 2007; Mendis, Fukino et al. 2007; Suh 2011). However, none have focused 
specifically on medicines used to treat cancer or empirically on the contribution o f  
price to access and the contribution o f  patent to price (which was the subject o f  the 
previous chapter). Recently, WHO initiated a global initiative to improve the care o f  
chronic diseases in low- and middle-income countries (W orld Health Organization- 
Health Action International 2008). However, the project focused mainly on diabetes 
and cardiovascular disease. There were only two palliative cancer treatm ents,12 
codeine and morphine, included in the survey list. Moreover, these studies lack 
information concerning the direct association between the extent o f  price increases 
and the extent o f  changes in access, controlling for other influences. It is this issue 
that this chapter seeks to address.
In Thailand, the NLEM  adopted the WHO-Essential Medicine List (EML) concept 
(World Health Organization. 2002). This specifies a set o f  medicines which the Thai 
population will not have to pay out-of-pocket for, but will be covered by the state. 
Therefore, in principle, the NLEM  determines the extent to which a medicine will be 
widely accessible to the Thai population. The process o f selecting a medicine for this
12 A treatment designed to relieve symptomsrather than cure an illness.
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list is important, and correspondingly complex, including factors related to health 
need, safety, efficacy, efficiency, equity, treatment cost, national affordability, 
availability, compliance and quality (Chongtrakul P 2005). Many new anti-cancer 
medicines are not included on the NLEM, and a reason often stated is because o f 
their high price (Ministry o f  Public Health 2008). For these medicines, not on the 
NLEM, patients have to pay out-of-pocket. It is therefore important, for Thailand, to 
understand the role o f  patent and price in getting a medicine listed on the NLEM, 
and to understand how, where it is not on the NLEM, price impacts access to that 
medicine.
Specifically, this study is to determ ined) whether patented medicines are available 
on the NLEM, and the extent to which patent status and the price o f  the medicine 
affect its selection; (ii) whether non-NLEM medicines, both patented and non- 
patented, are considered to be affordable to the Thai population; and (iii) the extent 
to which, from i and ii above, price determines access to NLEM and non-NLEM 
medicines.
The paper is organized as following. The next section describes how the medicine 
system in Thailand determines access. Section 3 presents literature review o f  the 
impact o f  patent status and price on access to medicines. Section 4 describes the data 
and presents an econometric specification o f the probit model used in this study to 
estimate the impact o f  price on access, and section 5 presents the results. Finally, 
further steps are discussed in the concluding section.
4.2. Access to m edicines in  T hailand
Access to health care in Thailand is provided by both public and private insurance 
schemes. Thailand achieved universal coverage for the entire population in 2002 by 
introducing a new public insurance to cover the approximately 47 million people 
who were not beneficiaries o f  two major existing public insurance schemes: the 
CSMBS and SHI (Tangcharoensathien, Patcharanarumol et al. 2010). These three 
public health insurance systems together comprise a comprehensive free benefit 
package that includes ambulatory care, hospitalization, surgical operations disease 
prevention, health promotion and many expensive medical services.
I l l
The NLEM adopted from the WHO concept o f essential medicines was developed to 
provide medicines that are deemed necessary, effective and safe for Thai people 
through government hospitals and other health stations. Also, the NLEM  aims to be 
used as a tool to encourage the rational use o f  medicines (National Drug Committee 
2008). The first version was launched in 1981, and is revised periodically; the 
current version was issued in 2008, the 9th edition. The NLEM includes 637 items, in 
17 therapeutic groups. The NLEM is referred to as the pharmaceutical 
reimbursement list by the three public health schemes, so that prescription medicines 
that are on the NLEM are also free o f  charge. The cost o f  prescribed medicines not 
on the NLEM is the responsibility o f  individuals under the SHI and UC schemes, but 
not under the CSMBS. The CSMBS allows three medical doctors to co-endorse the 
use o f  medicines outside the NLEM  (Tangcharoensathien 2003). The CSMBS 
scheme is a primary driver for growth as it is a free market and there are no 
restrictions for out-patient use. It covers 8 percent o f  the population but accounts for 
40-50 percent o f branded pharmaceutical sales (W ibulpolprasert 2007).
The NLEM  directly involves medicine availability for the government sector. 
Procurement regulations in the public sector attempt to encourage the use o f  
medicines listed on the NLEM by requiring public hospitals to spend at least 6 0 -  
80% o f  their government medicine budget on medicines on the list. However, the 
medicine listed in public hospitals is different from the NLEM  list, and varies by the 
size o f  hospital. Medicine management is the responsibility o f a hospital pharmaco- 
therapeutic committee, and medicine procurement carried out by the pharmacy 
department (Pitaknetinan, Tangcharoensathien et al. 1999). Large hospitals, 
especially central and university hospitals, generally have broader medicines and 
bigger lists than the NLEM, since the diseases are on average more complex. The 
proportions o f  medicines that are on the NLEM  and not on the NLEM in rural, 
general, central and university hospitals are 82:18, 81:19, 71:29 and 57:43 
respectively (Sripiroj, Tantivess et al. 2000). Each hospital individually manages its 
budget to procure and manage its medicine inventory. Medicines on the “Jor 2” 
sublist o f  the NLEM, a special category for expensive or closely monitored 
medicines for safety reasons, which are mostly high price medicines, will be 
reimbursed or provided from the National Health Security Office directly. This
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policy allows doctors to prescribe expensive medicines to patients in need without 
concern for burdening hospitals.
As two o f  the main components o f  access are affordability and physical availability, 
access to medicines in Thailand depends heavily on whether a medicine is on the 
NLEM, as the NLEM provides a medicine free to the patient at point o f  use. 
Moreover, the National Health Security Act o f  2002 ensures all Thai citizens the 
right to health care and access to medicines listed on the NLEM, i f  they are needed, 
with no cost sharing. The determinants o f medicine selection to the NLEM are 
therefore a crucial determinant o f  access. Generally the NLEM committee consists o f 
17 working groups according to therapeutic area. Several factors are applied before a 
medicine can be included on the NLEM, concerning disease severity, efficacy, costs, 
compliance, prevalence and incidence o f  the disease. It also has to have been cleared 
by the safety monitoring programme (SMP) implemented by the Thai Food & 
Medicine Administration (FDA).
Since 2004 a scoring system has been used for medicine selection (Sripiroj A, 
Tantivess S et al. 2000). The score is based on four criteria which cover Information 
(quantity and quality o f  evidence), Efficacy, Safety (precautions, severe adverse 
effects and medicine interaction) and Ease o f  use (administration restriction score 
and frequency o f  medicine administration), which is known as the ISafE score. The 
maximum score for each o f  the four components is 1, and the minimum is 0, and the 
overall ISafE score is the result o f  simple addition o f  the four individual scores, 
although any 0 scores will lead to immediate rejection o f  the medicine. Due to this, 
the ISafE system is not applicable to anti-cancer medicines as the m edicines’ adverse 
reactions mean that they would be classified as unsafe and hence their safety (S) 
score would be zero, and the medicine would be excluded automatically despite its 
high scores in other criteria.
The NLEM  therefore do not use the ISafE score for oncology medicines, but rather 
make a decision based on health need, relative safety, efficacy, compliance, quality, 
total treatment cost, cost-effectiveness, equity, and national affordability 
(Yoongthong, Hu et al. 2012). According to the secretariat o f  the Health Economics 
W orking Group under the Subcommittee for the Development o f  NLEM (personal 
com m unication), from approximately 40 oncology medicines proposed, less than 10
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medicines are accepted. Even where medicines are cost-effective they may not be 
selected i f  they need a significant budget to be able to provide them (Ministry o f  
Public Health and National Health Security Office 2008).
Patents on medicines, which are tied to market prices as shown in the previous 
chapter, have been clearly shown as a factor in determining whether a medicine is 
listed on the NLEM. For example, prior to 2003, patented antiretroviral (ARV) 
medicines were not included in the NLEM  due to their high prices (Tantivess and 
W alt 2006). In  October 2003, the government declared its commitment to provide 
universal access to triple ARVs for HIV/AIDS treatment. EFV was therefore put in 
the NLEM. However, this commitment required a significant budget to ensure 
universal access to ARVs for all patients in need. Since EFV was under patent 
protection, CL was used to reduce its price and this enabled the MOPH to provide 
this medicine to an additional 20,000 AIDS patients (M inistiy o f  Public Health 
2008). Four patented anti-cancer medicines were finally listed on the NLEM 
following CL in 2008. This suggests that some patented medicines currently not on 
the NLEM  might be included i f  there were generic versions available. Although CL 
can decrease price significantly, it raises the wider question o f  the role o f  price 
specifically as a determinant o f  access.
4.3. Extensive literature reviews
A n extensive search o f  the literature was performed to search for empirical evidence 
concerning price as a factor determining access to medicines in any country. Econlit, 
Embase Classic and Embase, Global Health and Medline were the four databases 
searched, selected because they cover journal articles, books, and dissertations, as 
well as articles in collective works, such as conference proceedings and collected 
essay volumes in the areas o f  economics and health. Keywords were identified from 
published work related to the research question. The search strategy involved a 
combination o f  three search steps which individually addressed the price, 
pharmaceuticals and access or affordability. These were combined as follows:
(p a t e n t  O R  T R IP S  O R  p r i c e )  AND (m e d ic in e  O R  d r u g  O R  p h a r m a c e u t ic a l s )  AND 
{ a c c e s s  O R  a f fo r d  O R  u ti l iz a t io n ) .  The combined search, lim ited to English 
publications between 1990 and 2011 to cover the TRIPS agreement era implemented
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during mid-1990s, yielded 744 articles.Three criteria were used to select and assess 
the potential studies. To be included in the literature review, a study had to:
1. Focus on the issue o f  the implications o f  pharmaceutical patents, patented price or 
policies favouring pharmaceutical patent protection or patenting on access to 
medicine. Studies dedicated to other types o f  innovations (i.e. motor vehicles, 
electrical equipment innovations, etc.) were not retained;
2. Include an empirical study, either descriptive statistics or econometric analysis. 
Theoretical and conceptual studies as well as discussion studies were not retained; 
and
3. Define access (usually in terms o f  a utilization rate).
The identified articles were screened (Figure 4.1). After the exclusion o f non-English 
and duplicate publications, a first assessment based on title and abstract resulted in 
475 papers which did not meet the first inclusion criteria, i.e. not investigating 
impact o f  pharmaceutical patents. Following a review o f  the text o f  the remaining 
papers, a further 124 articles were excluded which did not focus on patent 
implications on access to medicine and 117 articles were excluded for not meeting 
the second and third inclusion criteria above.
Figure 4.1 Flow-chart followed when performing a systematic review
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Empirical evidence directly linking (patented) price and access is rare. Most studies 
describe how patenting increases price and then a s s u m e  that price affects access, but 
do not measure the direct association between the extent o f  price change and the 
extent o f  changes in access, controlling for other factors. Only three studies were 
found which did this, two o f  which are about the Thai setting but reported in English.
Akaleephan et al. (2009) examined the effect o f  patent life extension from a TRIPS- 
Plus proposal on access to medicines in Thailand. Using two datasets from the FDA, 
providing import or produced price and volume, and the Drug and Medical Supply 
Information Centre (DMSIC), providing purchased price o f  some government 
hospitals, the top 74 items which accounted for 50% o f  market value were selected. 
W ith no information concerning patent verification in Thailand provided, o f  these 74 
medicines, 18 were grouped as patented items and 14 as monopoly items. However, 
these two groups were then combined later in the analysis since the authors were 
unsure i f  these medicines were actually patented items. Nonetheless, the authors 
regressed market share o f  generics based on year o f  entry and used this to predict the 
additional expense when there is an extension o f  market exclusivity. The results 
illustrated that a period o f  extension o f  10 years would generate an additional 
expenses o f  around 13.4-86.9 $US million. This study also estimated that expected 
expenses only patented brands constituting the consumption volume in 2003 (i.e. no 
generics) would have been $US 517 while the actual expense (with generics) was 
$US 264 million. Under the assumption that the national budget for medicines is 
fixed, the increasing expense from lack o f generic competition could reduce the 
consumption volume o f medicines, from 2,538 million DDD to 1,653 million DDD 
The authors concluded that, the availability o f  generics would help to save 105% o f  
actual government expenditure, and accessibility -  defined as expected utilization 
rate-w ould increase by 54% (Akaleephan, W ibulpolprasert et al. 2009). However 
the model employed in this study was a static model and it estimated the monopoly 
status effect rather than the patent effect since almost ha lf o f  medicines included in 
the m odel were monopoly status medicines, not patented medicines per se. 
Therefore, the results o f  this study are overestimated.
The second study (Yamabhai, M ohara et al. 2009) focused on CL implementation in 
Thailand, which enabled generic manufacturers to offer generic equivalent versions
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o f  medicines at some 3-38% o f  the branded price. By a regression o f  increased 
access on time only, as a result, it was estimated that approximately 8,000 extra 
patients could utilize efavirenz (EFV), and over five years suggested that the 
increased number o f  patients with access to EFV would be 17,959.The study also 
considered anti-cancer medicines, where four CL were granted in January 2008 for 
letrozole, docetaxel, erlotinib, and imatinib (which are used in the treatment o f breast 
and lung cancers, gastrointestinal stromal tumors (GIST) and leukaemia).The 
estimated increases in the five-year period are as follows: 8,916 patients for 
letrozole; 10,813 for docetaxel, 1,846 for imatinib; and 256 for erlotinib. A 
limitation o f  this study is that, unlike estimating from the trend o f real numbers o f  
increased access as in the HIV/AIDS case, the increased utilization o f  anti-cancer 
medicines was estimated from expert opinion since there was no importation o f  
generic equivalents at the time o f  the study.
The last study focused on access to HIV/AIDS medicines in low- and middle-income 
countries more broadly from 1995 to 1999. By estimating a sample selection model 
to examine the impact o f  patents on sales, the authors estimated two key 
simultaneous relationships to tackle the question under study: (1) the relationship 
between the likely entry decision across drug-country-year divisions and patents; and
(2) the relationship between market coverage (i.e. mean coverage o f  patients under 
annual treatment with a specific ARV drug) and patents, conditional on drug entry 
decisions and patent regimes. The authors estimated access by multiplying the 
probability o f  having a medicine available with the conditional expected access to 
that medicine, and showed that switching all medicines under a patent regime to a 
no-patent regime would have only increased the percentage o f  AIDS patients with 
access to new medicines from 0.88% to 1.18% between 1995 and 1999 (Borrell and 
W atal 2003). However, with reference to individual countries, it suggested different 
m agnitudes o f  impact. For example, in  Thailand, where most o f  the relevant 
medicines were under patent, around 10,000 additional prescriptions were felt to 
have likely been prescribed i f  all patents were waived, generating an increase in 
access o f  some 50%.
It is clear that evidence on the role o f  price on access, especially with respect to anti­
cancer medicines, is limited, inconclusive, and problematic; estimated data and the
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use o f  expert opinion are some o f  the issues involved. This suggests that a more 
holistic assessment o f  the impact o f  high prices, due to patent rights, on access to 
oncology medicines with specific focus on the Thai health system, in which access to 
m edicine is dependent on its NLEM status, is required.
4.4. Methodology
The critical issue o f  access to medicines for the majority o f  people in Thailand can 
be divided into three main groups. First, how price affects whether or not the 
medicine is on the NLEM. I f  that medicine is chosen to be on the list, patients who 
need that medicine have a right to be treated without cost. I f  that medicine is not 
chosen, patients face the full price. This suggests that assessing the role o f  price on 
the probability o f a medicine being listed on the NLEM  is important. Second, in the 
case o f  non-NLEM medicines, affordability is a critical issue (that is, medicines not 
under patent may be cheaper but not cheap enough to significantly increase access). 
Third, there will be other factors, such as a sufficient supply chain infrastructure, 
which will also affect access, and it is important to understand how much price, 
relative to these other factors, is a determinant o f  access. This section describes the 
methods used to examine these three questions.
4.4.1 Assessing the role of price on NLEM status: Probit model
This section describes the analysis undertaken to investigate factors that influence 
whether or not a patented medicine is selected by NLEM , focusing on the role o f 
price. The outcome variable has only two possible values: selection or non-selection, 
suggesting that a binary choice or qualitative response model 13is suitable. A linear 
regression probability model cannot be used to fit factors influencing this choice 
since the outcome variable causes problems with the disturbance term, as it consists 
o f  only two values, i.e. it is neither continuous nor a normal distribution. This means 
that the standard errors and the usual test statistics are invalidated. Moreover, the 
predicted probability may be greater than 1 or less than 0 for extreme values o f  X. 
These problems are dealt with by fitting the model with a  technique known as 
maximum likelihood estimation and elaborating the model as a sigmoid function o f
13 The model is binary with the outcome, which is always denoted Y, being assigned a value of 1 if 
the event occurs and 0 otherwise.
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Z, a linear function o f  the explanatory variables. The two most popular forms are the 
logistic function, which is used in logit estimation, and the cumulative normal 
distribution, which is used in probit estimation. According to one o f the leading 
authorities on the subject, Anemiya (1981), both give satisfactory results most o f the 
time and neither has any particular advantage.
M odel
This study assumed that the unobservable term is normally distributed with the same 
mean and variance, and thus a probit model was selected. This uses the cumulative 
standardized normal distribution to the sigmoid relationship F(Z), zero mean and 
unit variance. Z is a linear function o f  the variables that determine the probability:
z=p1 + plx2+....+pkxk. ( 1)
F(Z), the cumulative standardized normal distribution, gives the probability o f  the 
event occurring for any value o f Z:
Pi=F(Zi). (2)
Maximum likelihood analysis is used to obtain estimates o f  the parameters. The 
marginal effect o f  Xi is ^  which, as in the case o f logit analysis, is best computed 
as
(3)
Now, since F(Z) is the cumulative standardized normal distribution, f(Z), its 
derivative, is just the standardized normal distribution itself:
1 ~  *
(4)
Though logit and probit analysis generally yield similar marginal effects, the shapes 
o f  the tails o f the logit and probit distributions are different and so logit and probit 
can give different results if  the sample is unbalanced. A logit model is therefore
l l 9
employed to test i f  the results from both models are different, with the same set o f  
data and variables.
V ariab le  definitions and  sources o f d a ta
To estimate the probability o f  medicine selection as a function o f  a set o f  relevant 
variables, this study selects all medicines treating oncology marketed in Thailand in  
2008. The NLEM version 2008, the most recent version when this study was 
conducted, was used as the outcome o f  decision making. The list o f  medicines is 
available on the Thai Food and Drug Administration website. I4The outcome variable 
(Yj) has only two possible values: select or not select. Yi is the variable that captures 
various reasons for which a medicine is accepted into the NLEM. The dependent 
variable takes on the value o f  one if  medicine i has been selected for the NLEM, and 
zero i f  that medicine has not been selected.
The characteristics o f  these medicines will then be explored, in terms o f  sales, patent 
status, cost o f  treatment, number o f  patients needed and QALYs gained. The 
explanatory variables o f  the model are explained in detail below. The range o f  
factors included is outlined in  table 4.2.
This study considers price in terms o f  annual cost o f  treatment. It is an important 
factor for policy makers since it directly affects the government budget, and thus the 
affordability o f  other medicines. Cost o f  treatment per course was estimated by the 
unit price multiplied by the volume needed for each cycle suggested for each 
medicine, as obtained from MICROMEDEX, a database providing evidence-based 
medicine information. Price in this case was the average price that government 
hospitals procured the medicine at in 2008. Though in the NLEM selection process, 
pharmaceutical companies submit the price to consider, only 16 medicine owners 
submitted their prices to the NLEM  committee in 2008,Moreover, most o f  them 
were higher than the market price, and thus did not seem reliable and reflective o f  
practice. In practice, i f  NLEM  working groups are interested in putting a medicine 
on the list, negotiation will be undertaken in order to bring down the price to an 
acceptable level. This study therefore employed the ‘real’ prices paid by government
14http://www.thaifda.com/ed2547/?pg=result
120
hospitals since they include discounts and promotions. This cost was then log- 
transformed to reduce wide-ranging quantities.
Patent status o f  a medicine could possibly be a reason that a medicine is not 
proposed for consideration, since the committee might use this as a proxy for 
affordability. Patent status takes a value o f  one i f  the individual medicine is patented 
and a value o f  zero where it is not patented. The patent statuses o f  medicines were 
obtained from various sources (see Chapter 2). Correlations between variables were 
checked and none o f  them show severe correlation; the maximum correlation was 
0.55, found for product age against patent status. However, the previous chapter 
demonstrated that price is significantly determined by patent, and thus 
multicollinearity could occur. The correlation between the two factors was checked, 
and does not show a high correlation (r=0.39), and multicollinearity checking was 
done by the variance inflation factor (VIF) test and the Collin test in STATA. The 
test statistic o f  VIF is 1.18 and the condition num ber15is 9.65 indicating no 
multicollinearity problem. It is suggested that a large VIF, 5 or more, and condition 
number, 30 or more, is an indication o f  multicollinearity problem (Carlsson and 
Lundstrom 2002; O'Brien 2007).
Number o f patients needing the medicine is an influential factor on the selection 
process since it shows the size o f  the potential burden. It is expected that the 
government would prioritise diseases o f  higher prevalence in choosing medicines for 
the NLEM. From the MICROMEDEX database, the indications o f each medicine 
were noted and then used to find the code o f International Statistical Classification o f 
Diseases and Related Health Problems, 10th Revision (known as ICD-10). Each 
medicine’s ICD-10 code was recorded and matched with the number o f patients 
which were recorded with the ICD-10 code, obtained from the National Health 
Securities Office which manages the universal coverage scheme and accounts for 
75 /o  o f  the population. This study selected the average number o f  patients during the 
period 2004 to 2007, since the previous version o f the NLEM was issued in 2004 so 
the number o f patient during the period before the NLEM 2008 version was 
launched is considered as the influential factor. However, as each medicine has a 
slightly different indication, and not every patient is treated with the medicine since
15 A commonly used index of the global instability of the regression coefficients.
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there may be more suitable treatments available, such as surgery or radiotherapy, the 
number o f  patients by ICD-10 was adjusted using the National Cancer Institute o f 
Thailand data on the numbers o f patients undergoing specific methods o f treatment 
each year.
Table 4.1 Percentage o f trea tm en t by therapeu tic  g roup from  2004-2007
T herapeutic  group 2004 2005 2006 2007
1. Cytotoxic Chemotherapy 27.6% 38% 25.5% 27%
2. Hormonal Chemotherapy 0.2% 0.3% 0.5% 7%
3. Immunological Chemotherapy 0.1% 0.1% 0.1%* 0.1%*
4. Supportive Care Therapy 4.6% 13% 24.5% 10%
Source: Cancer Registry 2004-2007
♦estimate from the previous year since the data are not available
There are wide variations in  choosing chemotherapy regimens that are based on 
d o c to r  p r e fe r e n c e s  (Shabaruddin, Elliott et al. 2010). Sales and market share 
represent the ‘doctors’ favourite’ medicine (M organ MA, Dana J et al. 2006). This 
could reflect a view that a specific well-known medicine is accepted as a first line or 
first choice therapy. This data was obtained from IMS. Product life also indicates the 
possible reliability and safety o f  a medicine, and the number o f  years from 
registration year was employed in  the model to reflect this.
It is said that the NLEM 2008 version was the first version that used pharmaco- 
economic evidence in designing reimbursement (Akaleephan, W ibulpolprasert et al. 
2009). Economic evaluation is mainly conducted by the Health Intervention and 
Technology Assessment Program (HITAP), a health technology assessment agency 
under the MOPH. HITAP developed national guidelines for economic evaluation 
and uses a cost-effective threshold set at average GDP per capita, as suggested by the 
W HO (WHO Commission on M acroeconomics and Health 2001; Ngorsuraches, 
M eng et al. 2012). Results o f  economic evaluation studies are considered by the 
Subcommittee o f  NLEM  when they make decisions on whether to include or exclude 
a medicine (Jirawattanapisal, Kingkaew et al. 2009). It estimated that cost-
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effectiveness analysis (CEA) would therefore be a relevant factor in decision 
making. However, not every medicine was assessed by CEA, and often it applies 
only to expensive medicines (Ngorsuraches, Meng et al. 2012). Nonetheless, 
although CEA data for each medicine are not available, QALYs gained are always 
used as an outcome measure (Harper 2011). This measures the change in life 
expectancy and in quality o f  life resulting from treatment, i.e. it captures the benefits 
and adverse effects o f  the medicine in question. Moreover, it allows comparison 
across disease areas. M edicines that provide a high level o f  QALYs would be 
expected to have a high chance o f being selected to the NLEM. The HEED, the 
Cost-Effectiveness Analysis Registry, and the Centre for Reviews and Dissemination 
were databases used to find QALYs gained and life years gained for each medicine, 
when compared with the best alternative supportive care available on the market.
Table 4.2 Definitions o f variables
V ariab le Definition
NLEM 1 for NLEM  medicine and 0 for non-NLEM medicine
Patent 1 for patented medicine and 0 for non-patented medicine
Cost o f  treatment Log o f  cost o f  treatment per course
Cancer cases Registered cancer patients by type o f  cancer specified for 
that medicine (average from 2004-2007)
Sales value Sales in  Thailand in the year o f  2008 (Baht)
M arket share Market share within the same therapeutic area
Product age Number o f  year from the registration year (year)
QALYs gained QALYs gained
4.4.2 A ffordability  o f  non-N LEM  m edicines
This section outlines the methods used to assess the affordability o f  those medicines 
which are not on the NLEM. Generally, affordability is always assessed as the cost 
o f  treatment in  relation to peoples’ income. The num ber o f  days the lowest paid 
unskilled government worker would have to  work to pay for one treatment course 
was employed by  the W HO/HAI study referred to earlier (Sooksriwong C, 
Yoongthong W  et al. 2009). Since the lowest paid unskilled government worker pay
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in Thailand varied from 148 to 203 Baht/day, depending on province, this part o f  
study uses the average wage o f  the Thai population in 2008, equal to 297 Baht/day, 
which is more reasonable, as obtained from the National Statistics Office. This figure 
is then used to estimate the number o f  days this worker would have to work to 
purchase various treatments that were not on the NLEM. It is also conservative, 
knowing that a considerable number o f  people will o f  course fall below this level.
Cost o f  treatment was estimated as the cost per day. This is because chemotherapy is 
not usually a single treatment, but a course o f  treatments. It is typically given in 
cycles, with rest periods between the cycles. A cycle can last one or m ore days. 
Therefore, the cost per day is selected to estimate affordability. First the cost o f  one 
cycle is estimated. This is then divided by the number o f  days in that cycle.
Selection probability of patented medicines not on the NLEM
The best model developed from section 4.4.1 was used to estimate the probability o f 
a medicine being put on the NLEM from the pool o f  patented medicines that were 
not already on the NLEM list. This probability will be compared with the simulated 
probability o f  being put on the NLEM when that patent is removed. However, with 
the removal o f  patent protection, the replacement with generic equivalent version is 
possible, which will discount the price. This analysis will therefore simulate discount 
schemes at 50% and 80% o f  the original price and to see the extent to which the 
chance o f  those medicines being selected forth NLEM  changes. The model relating 
to equation (4), replacing the patent status factor with the cost o f  treatment, is 
estimated.
4.4.3 Price Sensitivity of demand for prescription drugs
Finally, analysis was undertaken to estimate the responsiveness o f  prescription 
dem and by exploiting exogenous variation in  the prices o f  oncology medicines. A  
dependent variable representing prescription demand was developed. A number o f 
patients (Access) in  each year was also estimated by dividing sales volume o f  each 
medicine by the average volume needed for one patient in one year. This variable 
was regressed on the independent variables shown in table 4.2 which are price, 
number o f  cancer cases, market share, product age and QALYs gained. Price here is
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the median price o f medicines purchased from government hospitals obtained from 
the Drug and Medical Supply Information Center (DMSIC). For the missing values, 
mostly monopoly medicines, prices were retrieved from the IMS. To summarise, this 
section investigates whether demand for prescription drugs is sensitive to price, 
through OLS regression in the following functional forms.
AccesSi =  P0 +  P^Price^ + P2Canceri
+ p 3Market share, + p r o d u c t  age,+ PsQALYsi + £,
(5)
These functions were also estimated for subgroup analysis: NLEM and non-NLEM. 
This was done to determine whether medicine prescription treatment differs among 
these two groups.
4.5. Results
In 2008 version o f NLEM, 43 o f  the 88 available active ingredients for treating 
cancer were chosen to be put on the NLEM (see appendix 5). With respect to each 
therapeutic group, around 43-50% o f active ingredients available on the Thai market 
were chosen to be put on the NLEM. Table 4.3 shows the number o f  medicines 
selected for the NLEM in each o f  the four main categories outlined previously.
Table 4.3 N um ber o f medicines on m arke t and NLEM
Group Medicine on 
market
(No.)
Medicine on 
NLEM
(No.)
%
1. Cytotoxic Chemotherapy 58 29 50
2. Hormonal Chemotherapy 14 6 43
3. Immunological
Chemotherapy 7 3 43
4. Supportive Care Therapy 9 5 50
Total 88 43 49
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Figure 4.2 compares the number o f NLEM and non-NLEM status medicines which 
are patented to those which are not patented. It can be seen clearly that the number o f 
patented medicines on the NLEM was relatively small compared with non-NLEM 
medicines; only five patented medicines were selected for the NLEM, while 21 
patented medicines were excluded.
Figure 4.2 N um ber of medicines trea ting  oncology by NLEM  and paten t status
Number
4.5.1 The role o f pa ten t and price  on m edicine selection
With the aim o f  estimating the overall effect o f individual variables, including patent 
and price, on the selection o f medicines for the NLEM, a binomial probit model was 
fitted to the data available. Obviously, price affects the affordability o f  medicines for 
the government. However, a patent may or may not affect the decision-making 
process. As a result, this section will estimate two main models. The first model 
includes both patent and price factors while the second model excludes patent 
variables. Since QALY data availability was limited to only 24 medicines, models 3 
and 4 were created to test the impact o f  costs and benefits from treatment. Including 
all variables together, the program failed to run since there was an insufficient 
sample.
Table 4.4 shows the results o f  the estimation by the probit model. The majority o f 
the sample was included in models 1 and 2, while there were only 22 and 24 
medicines included in models 3 and 4 respectively. Beginning with model 1, all 
explanatory variables show the expected signs. Patent, sales and product age are
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statistically significant determinants o f  medicine selection. Having patent status 
decreases the probability o f  being selected by 36%. A 10% increase in sales and a 
product that is one year older could increase the probability o f being selected by 2% 
and 7% respectively. The annual cost o f treatment and number o f  patients requiring 
treatment are not significant determinants o f  the NLEM status decision. The 
estimates o f  the marginal effects at the sample means o f  model 2 are virtually the 
same as those obtained from model 1.
Model 3 consists o f  patent, cost o f  treatment, number o f  patients, sales value and 
QALYs gained. Derived from only 22 medicines, patent still seems to be a 
significant determinant. Sales and number o f  patients are also significant. Model 4 
shows slightly different results, as the cost o f  treatment is significant. A  surprising 
result here is the insignificance o f  the QALYs gained variable, although the 
coefficients estimated show the expected signs. Given likely bias from the small 
sample size, models 3 and 4 have some instability and variables with inconsistent 
signs and significance. In addition, there is an omitted variables bias, such as product 
age and patent status. Although the model is likely to be unreliable, sales value 
seems to be a relatively robust factor affecting NLEM  selection.
W ith respect to the number o f  observations, Chi-square and pseudo-R2, model 1 
represents the most robust model o f  selection o f  medicine to NLEM. NLEM status is 
explained by patent status, cost o f  treatment, number o f  patients, sales and product 
age. Patenting has a strong and significant effect on the selection decision. Sales and 
product age have a positive relationship to the probability to be selected. However, 
price is not a significant independent determinant o f  medicine selection.
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Table 4.4 Determ inants o f the medicine selection into NLEM: Probit models
Variable Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4)
Coefficient Marginal effect Coefficient Marginal effect Coefficient Marginal effect Coefficient Marginal effect
Patent -0.936* -0.360** -3.795* -0.821***
(0.488) (0.175) (2.274) (0.274)
Cost of treatment -0.149 -0.059 -0.137 -0.055 -0.971 -0.202 -1.064** -0.295**
(0.125) (0.049) (0.108) (0.043) (0.643) (0.152) (0.530) (0.123)
Log of No. o f patients 0.041 0.016 0.112 0.045 -1.109* -0.230 -0.608 -0.168
(0.108) (0.042) (0.093) (0.037) (0.623) (0.159) (0.373) (0.104)
Log of sales value 0.522*** 0.205*** 0.370*** 0.147*** 2.073* 0.430* 0.978* 0.271**
(0.146) (0.058) (0.119) (0.048) (1.210) (0.249) (0.536) (0.112)
Product age 0.167*** 0.065*** 0.171*** 0.068***
(0.039) (0.015) (0.035) (0.014)
QALYs gained 0.097 0.020 -0.029 -0.008
(0.112) (0.020) (0.056) (0.016)
N 85 85 93 93 22 22 24 24
pseudo/?2 0.544 0.544 0.498 0.498 0.687 0.687 0.487 0.487
Log likelihood -26.755 -26.755 -32.307 -32.307 -4.520 -4.520 -7.839 -7.839
Chi-squared 63.749*** 63.749*** 64.215*** 64.215*** 19.801*** 19.801*** 14.875*** 14.875***
Notes: Standard errors in  parentheses. Significant at (*) 10%, (**) 5%  or (***) 1%
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4.5.2 A f f o r d a b i l i ty  o f  non-NLEM m e d ic in e s
This section presents the results of analyses concerning the affordability of 
treatment, estimated by the number of day’s wages that the average Thai worker 
would be required to pay to purchase the medicine that is not on the NLEM list at the 
lowest price available. There were 47 medicines not on the list, of which 43% were 
not patented. Analysis was conducted by the group of medicine; non-patented and 
patented across four main therapeutic areas. Figure 3 shows how many days that an 
average Thai worker needs to work to pay for a daily dose of that medicine. There 
are 10 medicines, of which one is a patented medicine, that cost less than one day’s 
wage to buy. In cytotoxic chemotherapy, patented medicines are clearly less 
affordable compared to non-patented medicines. It is interesting to note that 
azacitidine, which requires the highest number of days to pay for it (20), is the only 
non-patented medicine with monopoly status, where there is only one seller in the 
Thai market.
Figure 4.3 A ffordability  of noil-patented medicines th a t a rc  not on NLEM
N o .  o f  days C ytotoxic  C hem otherapy
Non-patented Patented
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Hormonal chemotherapy seems affordable compared with the other three therapeutic 
groups. On average it needs approximately two days’ wage to purchase. The 
affordability o f  patented and non-patented medicines is not substantially different. It 
is interesting to see that patented medicines in the immunological therapeutic group 
are more affordable than non-patented medicines, although o f  the three non-patented 
medicines in  this category, one is a monopoly and the other two have only two 
suppliers. W ithin supportive care therapy, medicines need, on average, 1.2 days’ 
wages to afford on-patented medicines and 2.1 days’ wages for patented medicines.
In conclusion, patented medicines in cytotoxic chemotherapy create a high burden o f  
payment for patients who need them. Some o f  the non-patented medicines also, 
however, show a high burden if  they have a small number o f  suppliers.
4.5.3 Probability of patented medicine selection
This section presents analyses o f  how th e  probability o f  selection to NLEM changes 
if  the medicine were no longer under patent protection. Removing a legal monopoly 
right would allow the Thai government to procure cheaper medicines 
(notwithstanding the relationship between patent and price already discussed in the 
thesis). By deriving from the probit model o f  the determinants o f  the selection o f  
medicine forth NLEM  from the previous section, Table 4.5 shows that five 
medicines would have a greater than 80%chance o f being selected to be put on the 
list; irinotecan, oxaliplatin, rituximab, cyproterone, and leuprorelide acetate. Some 
medicines would not be chosen even i f  they lacked patent protection; alemtuzumab, 
dasatinib, lapatinib, and nilotinib. The common feature o f  these four medicines is 
that they are new medicines and have been marketed in Thailand for less than two 
years.
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Table 4.5 Probability to be on the NLEM with the original price, with 50% and 
80% discounted price.
No. Generic name Original
price
(Baht)
NLEM 
probability 
with original 
price 
(%)
NLEM 
probability 
with 5 0 %  
discount 
(% )
NLEM 
probability 
with 80% 
discount 
( % )
1 Alemtuzumab 70,000 0.0 0.02 0.03
2 Bevacizumab 19,591 7.0 33.10 38.22
3 Bortezomib 56,500 1.3 11.61 14.51
4 Cetuximab 14,935 1.9 15.08 18.48
5 Dasatinib 144,000 0.0 0.00 0.00
6 Erlotinib HC1 82,497 6.3 31.14 36.14
7 Fludarabine phosphate 28,168 4.0 29.59 34.50
8 Gefitinib 28,168 5.8 33.79 38.88
9 Ibritumomab tiuxetan 700,000 0.39 0.55 0.80
10 Irinotecan 10,982 47.8 83.69 86.82
11 Lapatinib 35,000 0.0 0.02 0.03
12 Nilotinib 39,000 0.0 0.00 0.00
13 Oxaliplatin 8,294 53.0 86.71 89.44
14 Pemetrexed 42,000 3.7 22.89 27.21
15 Rituximab 61,096 45.7 82.33 85.66
16 Sorafenib 89,700 0.9 9.05 11.47
17 Sunitinib malate 49,000 0.1 2.28 3.13
18 Trastuzumab 76,358 16.5 52.63 58.05
19 Tretinoin 8,840 0.6 7.05 9.07
20 Cyproterone 2,429 49.2 84.65 87.64
21 Goserelin 23,005 12.6 45.73 51.20
22 Leuprorelide acetate 6,811 68.7 93.65 95.19
23 Thalidomide 15,400 3.4 21.65 25.84
24 Aprepitant 681 1.0 9.97 12.60
25 Granisetron 5,178 18.7 55.96 61.30
26 Ibandronic acid 1,510 23.3 62.27 67.36
Source: Authors calculations based on table 4.4 estimates
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4 .5 .4  P r ic e  d e t e r m in a n ts  o f  m e d ic in e  p r e s c r ip t io n s
This section presents the results concerning the responsiveness of medicine 
consumption to changes in price. Figure 4.4 shows the relationship between price 
and number of treatments prescribed (as a proxy of demand and consumption). Both 
groups show that the demand for oncology medicines is inelastic, which would be 
expected given their unique, and life-saving, properties. In addition, the elasticity of 
demand for the NLEM listed group is greater than the non-NLEM listed medicines, 
i.e. prescription of NLEM medicine is more responsive to price changes than non- 
NLEM medicines.
Figure4.4 D stribution o f price and  num ber of trea tm en t by g roup  of medicines
L° 8 ° fp n C e  Non-NLEM
Log o f  n u m b er o f  
treatm ent
To illustrate the role of covariates in the estimations, Table 4.6 shows all sample and 
subgroup analysis. Since the availability of data on QALYs gained is limited, two 
specifications were estimated for each group of medicines, one with and one without 
QALYs gained information. For example, models 1 and 2 are the estimates o f the 
utilization o f all oncology medicines without QALYs gained and with QALYs 
gained respectively. In general, the analysis confirms that price has a significantly 
negative effect on the number o f prescriptions, especially in the medicine in the no 
cost-sharing group, i.e., a 10% percentage price decrease leads to 8% increase in 
prescription. Price sensitivity for NLEM medicine was nearly twice that of non-
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NLEM medicine (-0.81 versus -0.48). As anticipated, cancer epidemiology and the 
‘doctors ‘favourite’ (proxied by market share) are also positively related to the 
number o f  prescriptions for the non-NLEM group where patients spend privately. In 
contrast, these variables have less or no significant effect on medicine u ti l iz a t io n  in  
model 2. The coefficients for product age bear positive signs and are not significant, 
at least a t the five percent level. W ith a lower sample size due to lack o f  QALYs 
information, models 2,4 and 6 find price not to be a significant determinant on 
number o f  treatments. Surprisingly, the coefficient o f  QALYs shows a negative sign 
in the all sample and non-NLEM  groups. For NLEM medicines, this coefficient 
shows a positive sign, i.e. the higher QALYs gained, the more utilization o f  the 
medicine.
Table 4.6 Determinants of medicine utilization
Dependent variable=Access
All sample Non-NLEM medicines NLEM medicines
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log of price -0.701*** 0.076 -0.484*** -0.429 -0.813*** 0.118
(0.130) (0.369) (0.154) (0.421) (0.159) (1.081)
Log of 0.609*** 0.449* 0.539*** 0.035 0.651** 0.913
patient no. (0.136) (0.221) (0.157) (0.354) (0.254) (1.032)
Market 0.087** 0.172 0.193*** 0.290** 0.042 0.078
share (%) (0.039) (0.105) (0.059) (0.114) (0.036) (0.306)
Product age -0.007 0.154 -0.066 0.212 -0.092 0.116
(0.037) (0.126) (0.059) (0.139) (0.059) (0.364)
(Year)
QALYs -0.016 -0.060 0.070
gained (0.063) (0.089) (0.221)
_cons 10.271*** 3.818 8.583*** 8.937 12.771*** 2.375
(1.221) (4.353) (1.456) (5.278) (1.699) (12.279)
N 93 24 45 16 48 8
R 2 0.528 0.531 0.394 0.536 0.523 0.663
adj .F t 0.507 0.400 0.334 0.304 0.478 -0.179
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses
* p < .l,  **p<.05, ***p<.01
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4.6. Conclusion and  discussion
This study investigated the impact o f  patent and price on access to, and the 
affordability of, oncology medicines to the Thai government and Thai population. 
W ith respect to the government, around 50%  o f  oncology medicines on the Thai 
market are able to be provided by the Thai government and made available to 
everyone based on need and free at point o f  use. The results o f  this study confirm 
that price is not the significant rationale determining whether a medicine is put on 
the NLEM  (Chongtrakul P 2005). However, whether medicines are patented does 
significantly decrease the probability o f  the medicine being listed, and hence 
available to the Thai population.
One reason why patent status, independent o f  price, may affect whether a medicine 
is listed is that patented medicines are new to the Thai market, and hence 
information on safety and efficacy might not be enough to outweigh the expense. In 
the case o f  the most clinically effective new patented medicines, a CEA study would 
need to be conducted and it usually takes longer to get consensus among 
stakeholders who are policy makers, economic evaluation working groups and 
patient groups. I f  there were no patents, then five more medicines would be likely to 
have been put on the list. W ith respect to affordability to the Thai population o f  non- 
NLEM  medicines, most are considered unaffordable to the average Thai worker.
This study also suggests that medicine utilization is mainly determined by price. 
Utilization for NLEM medicine is more responsive to price than for non-NLEM 
medicine. This is because the system o f  NLEM  is at the national level, while 
medicine delivery occurs at the local level, and this m ainly depends on the 
procurement system o f  each hospital. W hether medicine deemed essential and 
expensive will be prescribed will depend on physicians. In the case o f  government 
hospitals or private hospitals in  the UC system, physicians are imperfect agents for 
patients since their prescription choices may reflect their own direct financial or 
nonfinancial incentives due to insurers’ reimbursement and cost control strategies 
(Danzon and Ketcham 2004). Therefore, prescription o f  medicines on the NLEM is 
more responsive to price. This agrees with the findings o f  Liu and Chollet(2006) that 
in low-income populations, the price elasticity o f  demand for prescription medicines 
may be particularly high (Liu and Chollet 2006). This is also supported by the CL
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implementation o f HIV medicines in Thailand. Though EFV was already on the 
NLEM, due to its high price physicians tended to prescribe it to severe patients only. 
After CL implementation, a significant increase in the number o f  EFV prescriptions 
was observed (Yamabhai, Mohara et al. 2011).
Conversely, as shown in this chapter, most non-NLEM medicines are unaffordable 
by the majority o f  the Thai population. These medicines tend to be prescribed in 
private hospitals to rich patients, regardless o f  price. Therefore, utilization o f  non- 
NLEM medicine is price-insensitive. A study by the RAND Corporation shows that 
price elasticities o f  around -0.2 are expected for all types o f medical care 
(M eyerhoefer and Zuvekas 2010). Price responsiveness for medicines used for more 
acute conditions is higher (-0.3 to -0.6) (Goldman, G. F. Joyce et al. 2004; 
Landsman, W. Yu et al. 2005). In this study, the price elasticity o f  oncology 
medicines in the Thai market, specifically in the out-of-pocket market, is in  this 
range, at -0.4.
This study has limitations. First, it focuses on access only affordability for the Thai 
government and population. Other factors such as access to hospital and medicine 
availability are also important factors affecting access (Kanavos P, Lim JY  et al. 
2002). Despite the fact that public hospitals should use NLEM as a reference and 
there is a regulation requiring hospitals to procure medicines that comply with the 
NLEM, needed medicines m ay not be available at the health care facilities close to 
the patient’s home. This is because some chemotherapy treatments need complicated 
technology and a skilled health workforce, so the Pharmacy and Therapeutic 
Committee at rural hospitals might exclude those medicines from  the hospital’s 
m edicine list. As a result, although the policy has provided affordability, the system 
m ay fail to deliver access to them. The availability o f  NLEM  oncology medicines 
and to what extent Thai patients have to pay in order to reach to the point o f  service 
where they can get the ‘free medicine,’ depends on the price and physical access to 
medicine. There is a clear need for iurther investigation at the hospital level, where 
physical variables, including logistics and supply chain variables, are included in  
order to assess whether the NLEM  can m eet it objectives for all o f  the Thai 
population.
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Second, the analysis presented here failed to estimate the size o f  the impact that 
patenting has on access, defined as the number o f  patients. Data are available to 
estimate the num ber o f  patients on an overall disease basis. For example, a patented 
medicine is suggested for treatment o f  colorectal cancer in  patients for whom first- 
line based therapy has failed, and who are intolerant to other therapies. Data on the 
number o f  colorectal cancer patients are available. However, information on the 
number o f  patients who have failed with the first-line based therapy and who also are 
intolerant to other therapies is unknown. This may be the reason why the num ber o f  
patients in the model is not significant, since it could be a redundant factor.
The relationship between access and the price o f  non-NLEM medicines is a 
challenge for fixture study. Since there are no systematic data showing the num ber o f  
patients that would have received non-NLEM medicine but have received the NLEM 
medicine instead, the effect o f  patented non-NLEM medicines on access is subject to 
debate. This suggests that the further exploration o f  the demand estimation for non- 
NLEM  medicines would be useful. This is important since for some medicines the 
number o f  patients requiring the medicine is relatively small. In addition, the demand 
for a patented medicine may be a static demand curve, as chemotherapy always has 
adverse effects (i.e. though there is a decrease in price, the doctor might not 
prescribe it since it m ight lead to severe adverse effects). Therefore, the effect o f  the 
patent status o f  non-NLEM medicines on access m ay not be as high as expected.
The burden o f  NCDs is already significant in Thailand, and yet universal access 
remains out-of-reach for most non-NLEM medicines. Calculating affordability in  
this study based on the average wage o f  a Thai worker may, however, lead to an 
overoptimistic result, since a significant proportion o f the population earns less than 
this amount. This study thus confirms the unaffordability o f  cancer treatments which 
are not on  the NLEM. From  this study, patent status is assumed to be a barrier to 
access, given that it decreases the probability o f being on the NLEM  by around 36%.
Overall, it is clear that patents determine the listing o f  medicines on the NLEM, 
which in turn affects the affordability o f  the medicines, and ability o f  the Thai 
population to access them. In  this case, appropriate measures could be introduced to 
help the poor access medicines they require. Since Thailand, as a member o f  the 
W TO TRIPS Agreement, is free to use various means to withdraw exclusive rights
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for a particular medicine, such as CL, then these might help improve public health. 
However, this all refers to medicines currently on the market, and it has been 
suggested that such measures may prevent new medicines being released and hence 
disadvantage the Thai population in the future (The Nation 2007). It is to this issue 
that the next chapter turns.
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C H A PT E R  5 T O  W HAT EX TEN T DO N A TIO N A L PA TEN T PO L IC IE S 
IM PA C T ON N EW  PR O D U C T LAUNCHES
5.1. Introduction
There continues to be widespread debate over the implications o f  increasingly 
stringent international patent legislation, following the WTO-TRIPS Agreement, and 
recent TRIPS-plus developments (Mercurio ; El-Said 2005; Smith, Correa et al. 
2009). The patent system is used to ensure that pharmaceutical R&D has the 
necessary income to support it, by granting exclusive rights over products to set a 
price higher than the marginal cost o f  production in order to recover expensive and 
high risk R&D costs (DiMasi, Hansen et al. 2003). However, although the higher 
prices sustained by patents finance the search for new innovations, higher prices also 
mean that fewer consumers can purchase goods incorporating those innovations in 
the period o f  the patent -  usually 20 years (G uennif and Lalitha 2007). Granting 
inventors patent rights thus unavoidably involves a trade-off between two equally 
important public health goals: widespread access to existing medicines and the 
maintenance o f  incentives to create and make available new ones (Borrell and W atal 
2003).
The ‘access to medicines’ discussion tends to focus upon the first o f  these goals, 
centred around affordability o f  existing medicines. Clearly patent status and price are 
important elements o f  access but, as we saw in the previous chapter, they are not the 
only elements. M ore importantly, the most fundamental requirem ent for access to a 
medicine is for the medicine to first exist. This ‘existence’ is expressed in two ways. 
First, and m ost basic, is that the product is actually discovered and marketed. 
W ithout adequate income for R&D arguably no new  medicines would be developed 
at all, which would be a global welfare loss and the precise reason for the 
development o f  the patent system in the first place (Nogu6s 1993). However, there is  
a second, and more subtle but equally important expression o f ‘existence’ and that is 
availability in the patient’s domestic market and health system to be purchased. This 
is important given that fewer than 50% o f  the new pharmaceutical molecules 
marketed worldwide are sold in  any given country (Lanjouw 2005). Even those
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medicines that are eventually marketed in one country frequently appear in other 
countries some six or seven years after becoming available to consumers elsewhere 
(Lanjouw 2005). This diffusion rate for new, or patented, medicines depends on the 
strategies implemented by product owners, which in turn is affected by local patent 
and pricing policy (Borrell and Watal 2003; Danzon, W ang et al. 2005). Indeed, it 
was the aim  o f  th e  TRIPS Agreement to standardise patent legislation, making 
medicines more likely to be quickly diffused and hence available to a wider 
population (Lanjouw 2005).
This chapter seeks to understand the role that patents have as a determinant o f  the 
launch o f  all medicines in to the Thai market. Although, it would seem intuitive that 
weaker price regulation would facilitate entry, by virtue o f  increasing flexibility in 
price setting and securing returns on the product, the degree o f  patent protection, 
either provided by national patent law or acquired from the patent status o f  the 
product, is also important for medicine launches. W here it lacks patent protection, a 
pharmaceutical company may refuse to make a medicine available in a country. This 
was the experience in Brazil for example, where Boehringer Ingelheim refused to 
register tipranavir because o f  a lack o f  guarantees o f  protection from national patent 
law (Lotrowska 2008). Similarly, in India, when patent law had not been amended to 
com ply with TRIPS, there were only two original anti-retroviral products marketed 
locally, while eight other molecules were not made available (Dhamija, Bansal et al. 
2009).
In addition, monopoly control over medicines gives enormous power to 
pharmaceutical companies. W hile stringent patent law makes local markets more 
attractive, multinationals m ay delay o r even avoid launching medicines in lower- 
priced countries because they are concerned about the implications for pricing in  
other markets (and the possibility o f international (illicit or legal) trade in  medicines, 
including parallel importing). O n the one hand, the owner m ay want to market a 
patented medicine as quickly as possible to benefit from a local monopoly. On the 
other hand, as the product is already protected from duplication by local patent law, 
the owner may want to wait for some time after the global launch to avoid price 
discrimination which could damage the higher prices that the firms enjoy in high- 
income countries (Kyle 2006; Kyle 2007). For instance, Bayer introduced its new
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antibiotic ciprofloxzcin in India eight years after the drug’s global launch (Lanjouw 
2005), and Roche refused to make Fuzeon available in South Korea since the 
M inistry o f  Health, W elfare and Family Affairs listed it at US$18,000 a year while 
Roche charged US$25,000 a year elsewhere (W eissman 2008).
In Thailand, the medicine market depends heavily on imports. The proportion o f  
imports rose with accelerating rates during the nation’s period o f  high economic 
growth in  the mid-1990s, coinciding with the amendment o f  the Thai Patent Act, 
which effectively introduced patents for pharmaceutical products in 1992. M ost 
medicines treating cancers are therefore also imported. Only one substance, out o f  
88, is produced locally and it is not a medicine intended to kill cancer cells but a 
supportive care therapy. As a result, access to medicines for cancer patients in the 
future depends heavily on whether multinationals o r local subsidiaries decide to 
launch their products in the Thai market.
As indicated, Thailand provided significant pharmaceutical patent protection from 
1992 until 2006, which was when the Thai government decided to issue CL. 
Although explicitly specified in the TRIPs agreement, countries that have 
implemented CL have usually faced a form o f  retaliation from the pharmaceutical 
company owning the patent for that medicine (Correa 2002). For instance, the CL on  
lopinavir/ritonavir, a second line treatment for HIV/AIDS patients, led Abbott, the 
patent owner, to state that, due to the CL, the company would no longer register 
seven products in Thailand. These seven withdrawn medicines were the heat stable 
form o f  lopinavir/ritonavir, a high blood pressure medicine (trandolapril/verapamil 
hydrochloride ER), a painkiller (ibuprofen), an antibiotic (clarithromycin), a blood 
clot medicine, (reviparin sodium), an arthritis medicine (adalimumab), and a Kidney 
disease medicine (paricalcitol) (Baker 2007).
There were many campaigns from activists to boycott Abbott’s products. Although, 
these products were launched in the Thai market eventually, almost two years later, 
the CL implementation created a concern about future access to new products if  
pharmaceutical companies would stop launching new medicines in Thailand, or 
delay their introduction to the Thai market. In  this situation, it is very challenging for 
policy makers to choose between the benefits o f  increasing access to current 
medicines a t the possible cost o f  reduced access to medicines not yet on the market.
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Previous studies have paid close attention to the market entry o f  generic medicines 
after patent expiration (Torres, Puig et a l . ; Kanavos, Costa-Font et al. 2008; Laursen 
2009; Granier and Trinquard 2010) and the barrier that patents present to generic 
entry (Rudholm 2001; Ellison and Ellison 2011). To date there has been little 
analysis o f  the determinants o f  international medicine launches. Some empirical 
studies focus on the effects o f  price regulations and price implications on New 
Chemical Entities (NCEs). They suggest that higher prices and larger markets have a 
significantly positive effect on the likelihood and speed o f  launch (Danzon, W ang et 
al. 2005). Only two studies specifically concerned with the effects o f  patent 
protection were found (Borrell and W atal 2003; Lanjouw 2005); these are described 
in the next section.
This chapter seeks to analyze the role that patents, including patent policy and patent 
status, have on the launch pattern across a range o f  cancer treating medicines over 
the period 1982-2009 in Thailand by using a duration analysis o f  the likelihood and 
speed o f  launch. Explanatory variables determining speed o f  launch include those 
related to the attractiveness o f  markets, patent protection and price setting rigidity. 
Section 2 presents the findings o f  the prior literature on the implications o f  patents 
on medicine launches. Section 3 describes the model used to estimate m edicine 
launches in Thailand, and Section 4 presents the role o f  patents compared with other 
determinants o f  product launches. Finally, section 5 discusses the results and draws 
the main conclusions which lead to the policy implications that arise.
5.2. Extensive literature review
In order to assess how future access, through product launches, may be affected by 
patent policy, it is important to establish what factors influence the market entry 
decision and, in particular, to what extent patent status and price influence it. 
Literature relating to this issue was obtained through search o f four relevant 
databases to cover the literature o f trade and health: Econlit, Embase Classic and 
Embase, Global Health and Medline. Keywords were identified from papers related 
to this area published in peer reviewed journals. The search was then conducted 
using the following expression: (patent* or intellectual propert*).af. AND (public 
health or health* or drug* or pharmaceutical* or medicine*).af. AND (availabilit* or 
entry or launch).af. The full search strategy is shown in Appendix 4. Six hundred and
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eighty nine articles written in English, and published between January 1st, 1990 and 
December 31 st, 2011 were retrieved.
All the references were screened and 81 excluded as duplicates, leaving 608 for 
further analysis. To be included in the literature review, a study had to:
1. investigate the pharmaceutical industry. Studies looking at other types o f  
innovation (i.e. energy, electrical equipment) were excluded;
2. deal with the issue o f  the implications o f patent policy on medicine entry. 
Studies providing patent information o f  inventions or assessing the 
implications o f  patent on other topics (i.e. the implication o f  patent on price 
or access) were excluded; and
3. be an empirical study, either descriptive statistics or econometric methods. 
Theoretical and conceptual studies, as well as discussion studies, were not 
retained.
A flow-chart o f  the review is presented in figure 5.1. From the above databases, 
there were 34 journals and grey literature reports passed the first criteria. Twelve 
studies were excluded by the second criteria and 20 studies were excluded since they 
were not empirical work.
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Figure 5.1 Flow-chart followed when performing a systematic review
81 articles were excluded 
because duplicates
459 articles were excluded they 
were unrelated to the study, i.e. 
not a pharmaceutical patent study
115 articles were excluded since 
they were not a study related to 
market entry
8 articles did not consider patent 
as an influence factor of market 
entry
4 articles focus on R&D, (not yet 
invented)
20 articles were not empirical 
evidence
It is surprising, given how much access is discussed, that such little attention has 
been devoted to studying the impact o f  patent rights on the introduction o f  medicine 
to domestic markets. There are only two empirical studies employing patent 
legislation as an explanatory factor for market entry. These studies estimated how 
intensively national patent enforcement speeds up or slows down the introduction o f  
new  medicines. Both studies were interested in  the relationship between the entiy 
decision across drug-country-year divisions and the patent factor. The first study 
used sales data on 15 patented ARVs filed in the US in  a sample o f  34 low- and 
middle-income countries providing or not providing patents to eligible drugs before 
1st January 1995. Controlling for relevant market characteristics (dosage, efficacy 
and adverse reaction) and also adjusting income for purchasing power parity and 
income equality, the results from their probit model suggested that patent legislation 
increased the marginal probability o f  new  drug launches from 28% to 33%. In
143
addition, the positive effect o f  patenting appears only to apply to a product that was 
launched in the US three years previously. For newly introduced medicines in the 
US, less than three years old, the patent legislation reduces the probability o f  having 
medicine in the local market o f  low- and middle-income countries (Borrell and 
W atal 2003).
W ith a broader scope o f  medicines, a similar question was explored by Lanjouw 
(2005), who investigated NCE global launches by year in 68 countries at all income 
levels, including Thailand, in the period 1986-2002. A probit and a log-logistic 
hazard model estimation were used to estimate the probability and speed o f medicine 
launch in a given country within either two years or ten years o f  the medicine’s first 
appearance on the global market. Patent variables include whether the patents are 
issued for a short or long period, and whether they are process or product patents. 
This study also considers the level o f patent protection, which is a variable that takes 
on values between 0 and 1, with a higher value indicating that a country has more 
limits on how patent rights can be curtailed. Other control variables are whether the 
country has moderate or extensive price control, and whether the medicine is on an 
essential list, with control for other socio-economic variables. The observed 
probability that a drug is launched in a low- or middle-income country within two 
years is about 9%. The estimates suggest that going from a regime with only short 
process patents to one with long process patents significantly encourages rapid entry. 
A long process patent regime still allows for possible generic entry and this appears 
to be important. The marginal effect is to raise the probability o f  launch within two 
years by 2-3 percentage points (or about a 30%  increase). However, the individual 
incremental effects o f  adding short and then long product protection are insignificant 
(Lanjouw 2005). This study also presented a policy simulation in some countries by 
using the empirical implications o f  the econometric model discussed. For Thailand, 
this study suggested that the probability o f  launch within two years, with a long 
patent term and no price control policy, is 43%, compared with a scenario in which 
there are no product patents and price control policies exist, in which the probability 
o f  launch is 26%.
The model employed in these two studies was multi-country, including high-income 
and low-income countries. Although the results are more generalizable, they
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sometimes mislead. Under some circumstances and model assumptions patent 
protection has a positive effect for some countries, while under other circumstances 
it has a negative effect. Single country studies are particularly effective at 
maximizing their explanatory leverage by exploiting the availability o f  comparable 
units o f  analysis, whether over market or medicine characteristic variations within 
the country (Pepper D. Culpepper 2005). Therefore, an analysis should be performed 
to determine how patent protection will affect market entry in depth in a single 
country. This would be especially beneficial to Thailand where the patent and health 
system is different from general middle-income countries.
5.3. Method
Duration analysis is a well-known tool used to analyse transition time-to-event data. 
It is also known as survival or hazard model analysis (Heckman and Singer 
1984).Though this technique is widely used in the medical and biological sciences, it 
is also applied in engineering (as an analysis o f  reliability and failure time), as well 
as in social and economic sciences (John P. Klein and Goel 1995). The benefit o f  
this method is that it takes time into account, by adjusting for the period at risk 
automatically and incorporating time-varying covariates, or explanatory variables 
that change with time (Kiefer 1988). W hile each product has a time series o f  annual 
observations, static models are estimated only with each firm’s last observation. 
Duration models, by estimating a ‘hazard function’, take advantage o f  much more 
data; they can be thought o f  as a  binaiy logit models that includes each product year 
as a separate observation (Jones and Branton 2005). Therefore, the hazard model was 
chosen to analyse the speed o f  drug launch since it accounts for the fact that firms 
change through time and the need to determine the product launch probability at 
each point over that time.
5.3.1 Estimating the hazard function
In practice, many hazard models are difficult to estimate because o f  their nonlinear 
likelihood functions and time-varying covariates (Jenkins 2004). Essentially, each 
hazard model is different based on the nature o f  the underlying distribution o f  the 
dependent variable. There are four m ajor techniques to estimate the hazard model:
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exponential regression, normal and log-normal regression, stratified analysis and 
Cox’s proportional hazard model.
Exponential regression is a model that assumes that the survival time distribution is 
exponential. In the normal and log-normal regression model, it is assumed that the 
survival times come from a normal distribution; the resulting model is essentially 
identical to ordinary multiple regression. Stratified analysis is used to test whether 
the relationships between the independent variables and survival are identical in 
different groups. Cox s proportional hazard model is not based on any assumptions 
concerning the nature or shape of the underlying survival distribution (Wu and Tuma 
1994). The model assumes that the underlying hazard rate is a function of the 
independent variables.
A Cox’s proportional hazard model, as known as the Cox model, was employed in 
this study. This model, proposed by David R Cox in 1972, is the most-often cited in 
survival analysis (Henderson 1995). The Cox model is the most general of the 
regression models because it estimates the relationship between the event rate (i e 
launch of drug in Thailand) and explanatory variables without having to make any 
assumptions about the shape of the underlying survival distribution. The Cox model 
presumes that the ratio of the hazard rate to a baseline hazard rate is an exponential 
function of the parameter vector. The hazard function can be estimated using the 
following equations:
-MfL = e x ,B  = +btx ,+  ..+bnx n
MO (1)
h ( t)  =  h0( t) . e blXl+b*x*+b*x*+ ■*bnxn 2^ )
Where h(t) denotes the resultant hazard, given the values of the n covariates for the 
respective case and the respective survival time (/). The quantity h0(t) is called the 
baseline hazard  or underlying hazard  function and corresponds to the probability of 
reaching an event when all the explanatory variables are zero. The base line hazard 
function is analogous to the intercept in ordinary regression (since exp°=l). The 
regression coefficients p, to pn give the proportional change that can be expected in 
the hazard, related to changes n in the explanatory variables. The assumption of a 
constant relationship between the dependent variable and the explanatory variables is
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called a proportional hazard that remains the same for all analysis periods. To 
estimate a hazard model, each product contributes only one launch observation ( 
y *  -  V  *° toe Cox model. Time-varying covariates are incorporated simply by 
using each annual data for their product-year observations.
5.3.2 Data
Dependent variable: The launch and lag data
The Thai launch data are drawn primarily from the Thai Food and Drug 
Administration database.16 The database identifies the registration number which 
shows the year that a product owner requested a market approval from the Thai 
FDA. For missing data, the launch data are obtained from IMS identifying the month 
and year that a product first had retail sales in Thailand. For each product, IMS 
provides the trade name, active ingredient, and the firm  making the product. 
Coverage includes entry o f  cancer medicines during 1982-2009 in the retail sector 
and also the hospital sector in Thailand. The Thai data cover a broad set o f 
therapeutic classes treating cancer launched in the Thai market during that period. 
The combined dataset covers 248 samples, from 88 active ingredients, o f  all 
medicines launched. The number o f  medicines launched in each o f the years covered 
is shown in figure 5.2. The first medicines was registered in Thailand in 1983 and, 
on average, nine medicines, whether original or generic, are registered annually 
thereafter, although the number is higher in later years.
,6http://wwwappl.fda.moph.go.th/consumer/conframe.asp
Figure 5.2 N um ber o f new oncology m edicines in T hailand  by year of 
registration
25
A recent study of the introduction of NCEs worldwide from 1982 through 2003 
suggests that the US was the leading market for first launch choice (Citeline Drug 
Intelligence ; Grabowski and Wang 2006). Thus the US approval date is used as a 
reference to indicate how quickly a product comes to launch in the Thai market. The 
set of medicines available in Thailand in 2008 were searched for by propriety name 
in each chemical substance in the US FDA/Center for Drug Evaluation and 
Research17 to find the approval date given for sale in the US market. For products 
with the same trade name that were not selling in the US market, the first product 
with the same generic name sold in the US market was used as the reference launch 
date in the US. This information indicates how long it takes for an approved 
medicine from the US to be available on the Thai market. The dependent variable, 
launch lag, is a constructed dummy variable. It takes the value of 1 if it is introduced 
in to Thailand within two years after US approval, and 0 if it is introduced in to 
Thailand more than two years after.
1 h ttp :/ / w w w .a c c e ss d a ta .fd a .g o v / sc r ip ts / c d e r/ d r u g sa tfd a / in d e x .c fm
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Explanatory variables
This section describes the independent variables influencing the lag in launch 
between the US and Thailand (the dependent variable). Previous studies analysing 
the launch lag were reviewed to indicate the likely determinants o f  new medicine 
launch decisions taken by pharmaceutical companies. From this review, explanatory 
variables can be categorised into three groups. The first group concerns the degree o f 
government intervention in the pharmaceutical industry. Several studies included the 
role o f  regulatory regimes in  explaining new medicine launches internationally, and 
suggested that countries with more regulation tend to get access to new drugs 
relatively later than those with fewer regulations (Danzon, W ang et al. 2003; Danzon 
and Epstein 2008; Stremersch and Lemmens 2009; Carpenter and et al. 2010). 
However, since this study focuses only on the Thai market, regulatory variables, i.e. 
market approval or price control regulations, are excluded since the regulatory 
impact on each medicine would be identical, i.e., no variance in variable. The 
explanatory variables representing government intervention were constructed based 
on four important policies favouring the pharmaceutical industry during 1990 to 
2008. Four dummy variables were created to examine whether these policies affect 
the speed o f  new medicine entry or not. The first variable reflects the amendment o f  
Thai patent law in 1992 (variable PA LAW 92) to increase the level o f  patent 
protection, either a product or a process patent for inventions in all fields o f  
technology. The second variable represents the withdrawal o f  the Committee on 
Pharmaceutical Patent in 1999 (variable PALAW 99). This committee was intended 
to protect consumers from manufacturers’ rights to market exclusively, through 
monitoring and comparing international medicine prices, and dispensing corrective 
measures where inappropriate price behaviour was found. Therefore, the amendment 
in 1992 secured pharmaceutical companies from duplication and the amendment in 
1999 confirmed their right to price-set.
The third variable indicates the introduction o f  a universal health-care coverage 
scheme in 2002 (variable UC02). This scheme offered comprehensive health care 
that included not just basics, such as free prescription drugs, outpatient care, 
hospitalization and disease prevention, but more expensive medical services, such as 
radiotherapy, surgery and critical care for accidents and emergencies. This shifted
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the market from individual based financing to government financing. The fourth 
variable is the CL policy implemented during 2006-2008 (variable CL06). As 
mentioned previously, stringent patent policy might attract product owners to 
introduce a medicine quickly, and withdrawing patent rights o f  some medicines, 
under CL, might make a patent owner reluctant to launch a new patented medicine in 
that market. These four dummy variables (PALAW 92, PALAW 99, UC02, CL06) 
take a value o f  1 after the policy implementation year o f  1992, 1999, 2002 and 2006 
respectively to capture the effect o f  these four policies.
The second group identifies market-driven characteristics. The larger the potential 
sales, the more likely that the product owner would launch with shorter delay. 
Lanjouw (2005) investigated launch patterns o f  new medicines in 68 countries over 
two decades, 1982-2002. The results suggested that GDP per capita and size o f  
population, representing market opportunity, are significant determinants in high 
income countries (Lanjouw 2005). Specifically focusing on oncology treatment in 
Thailand, this study selected two variables, percentage o f  medicines imported (D IM ) 
and number o f  patients (NOP) to represent market opportunity. As mentioned 
previously, most cancer medicines selling in Thailand are imported, so the high 
proportion o f  imported medicines shows potential market encouraging market entry. 
Therefore, the percentage o f  imported medicines was chosen to represent market 
attractiveness. The health problem presented by cancer also denotes the need for 
treatment. Number o f  cancer patients could represent the level o f  the problem, with 
data taken from the Thai National Cancer Institute. This institute has collected data 
for more than ten years through five cancer registries in Thailand (Sriplung, 
W iangnon et al. 2006). Three-year cancer incidence in Thailand covering the years 
1990-2008 has been regularly reported in ‘Cancer in Thailand’ reports. The trend in 
incidence for the 1980s was estimated by using an equation derived from the actual 
trend from 1990 onwards. This variable could hasten drug entry because it is 
expected that an increasing trend will denote higher demand and hence generate 
higher sales. These two variables are all expected to have a positive effect on the 
launch speed.
The last group o f  variables represents market structure and product characteristics. 
Sales, sales volume, and price were found to be significant determinants o f  market
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entry in previous literature (Danzon, W ang et al. 2003). Unfortunately, due to budget 
limitations, this study was able to acquire data o f the year 2008 only, not the data 
when the products were introduced. Therefore, the expected profit o f  each product in 
the year 2008 had to be constructed by accumulating profit margin, price and cost, 
and sales volume. Since the opportunity to charge a price greater than the marginal 
cost to get higher profit may stimulate firms to introduce products into Thai market 
more quickly, this study uses price set by the pharmaceutical companies from IMS 
and assumes that the price was equivalent to the introduction price, and was stable 
during the study period. This is likely to be more true for the original products where 
discounts on price are rare (Borrell and Watal 2003). To be able to measure this 
profit earned, the marginal cost o f  production is estimated. This study employed the 
Indian price as a proxy o f  marginal cost. Profit margin o f  each product was 
calculated by subtracting IMS price from Indian price. The information on sales 
volume o f  each medicine was also obtained from IMS. Expected total profit earned, 
EX PRO , was derived from multiplying the profit margin and sales volume in 2008.
Two other important factors are that large firms always gain advantages in 
pharmaceutical regulation (Carpenter, Brian Feinstein et al. 2000). This is because 
large firms have economies o f scope from sharing R&D cost and experience gained 
across many products available for sale in the same therapeutic area (Singh A, 
Gilbert JK  et al. 2003). Kyle (2003) used discrete-time hazard models and found 
evidence that multiple launches in a given market and market competition situation 
were significant determinants o f  new medicine launches from 1980 to 2000 in G7 
nations (Kyle 2003). Pharmaceutical companies gain experience from several market 
launches, enabling them to come up with more efficient launch strategies leading to 
faster introduction o f new products, while intense competition may slow down 
market entry as the expected return would be diminished (Lichtenberg and Philipson 
2000).
This study therefore uses the total number o f  products (TP), within the same 
company, sold for cancer treatment as a proxy o f  economy o f  scope and market 
experience. The hypothesis is that the higher the num ber o f  products being sold the 
more likely the launch o f  a new product, as the company faces a lower cost o f
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market entry. The number o f products from different firms previously on the market 
in the same therapeutic area, (PM ), indicates the level o f  market competition.
The variable o f  interest that this study wants to test is patent, PAT. Borrell and 
Watal (2003) concluded that patents have a positive impact on medicine availability. 
The hypothesis o f this study is that stronger patent status speeds up the market 
launch o f  a medicine in Thailand. Thus, it takes a value o f  1 i f  the medicine is 
patented and zero i f  not. However, patents may slow product entry i f  the product 
owner wishes to wait after the global launch o f  a new product to enter a developing 
country market with a lower price, which will allow them to capture market share to 
avoid price discounting (Borrell and Watal 2003). All explanatory variables are 
defined in Table 5.1 with summary statistics.
Table 5.1 V ariables used in estim ation and th e ir  definitions
V ariable Definitions D ata sources
Patent law amendment 
in 1992 (PALAW92)
Dummy= 1 if  launches after 
1992
Patent law amendment 
in 1999 (PALAW99)
Dummy=l if  launches after 
1999
Universal coverage 
policy in 2002 (UC02)
Dummy= 1 if  launches after 
2002
CL policy in 2006 
(CL06)
Dummy=l if  launches after 
2006
Drug imported (DIM) Share o f  imported 
medicines from total 
medicine consumption
Thailand Health 
Profile
Log o f  number o f 
patients (NOP)
Number o f  patients 
diagnosed as cancer
NHSO
Prior number (PM) Number o f  products, with 
the same ATC code, on 
market prior introducing
Thai FDA
Total products (TP) Number o f  products, with 
different brand in the same 
ATC code within one seller
IMS
Log o f  expected profit Multiplying between profit IMS
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V ariable Definitions Data sources
(EXPRO) margin and sales
Patent status (PAT) Dummy=l if that medicine 
is patented medicine
Chapter 2
5.4. Results
5.4.1 Lag in in troduction of paten t and noil-patented m edicines
The lag between approval dates of cancer medicines in the US and the registration 
year and launch date in Thailand is shown in Figure 5.3. The average lag is 5.31 
years for non-patented and 3 years for patented medicines. Fifty-seven products were 
introduced in Thailand before they were approved in the US.
When the samples with negative lag length were excluded, the average lag is 9.1 
years for non-patented medicines and 4.5 years for patented medicines. Patented 
medicines were introduced to Thailand significantly faster than non-patented 
medicines. Although there were 248 products at the beginning, for this chapter the 
total number of observation is 231 since 17 products were not found in the US 
market and thus excluded from analysis. Table 5.2 shows the two groups mean 
comparison of non-patent and patented medicines. On average, patented medicines 
were launched in Thailand 2.3 years before non-patented medicines were significant 
at the 10% level. Patented medicines were launched even faster when considering 
only positive lags; the length for non-patented medicines to be introduced in 
Thailand was twice as fast as the launch lag of patented medicines, significantly 
different at the 0.1 % level.
Figure 5-3 Lag (years) of overall medicines and patented medicines
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Table 5.2 M ean com parison o f lag betw een non-paten t and  paten ted  medicines
Group All Positive lag only
Non-
patented
patented Non-
patented
patented
N 194 37 149 31
M ean (years) 5.31 3 9.10 4.51
Min (years) -18 -8 0 0
Max (years) 25 20 25 20
M ean comparison 
test
t=  1.458, (P = 0.0731) t=  3.668, (P== 0.0003)
There could be three possible reasons that non-patented medicines, on average, are 
introduced in the market later than an original patented medicine. First, patent 
owners may have an incentive to distribute a patented medicine more quickly since 
market exclusivity usually means higher prices and greater income flows which, in  
turn, may encourage patent holders to launch new product in Thailand soon after 
they are launched in the US, provided the price can be set close to the target price in 
the major market (since the pharmaceutical market in Thailand is not regulated). 
Second, some medicines in this study m ay be currently patented, or previously 
patented, in the countries where the generic pharmaceutical companies are capable o f  
manufacture. It could take considerable time until all patents covering a medicine 
expired and bioequivalent test data were ready to register in Thailand. Third, 
patented medicines generally has a higher competitive advantage, as it promises 
higher efficacy or more convenience, which may attract higher demand from 
customers compared w ith non-patented medicines which are likely to be considered 
‘inferior’ in some way and also face price competition. The next section will 
investigate i f  a  patent has a role in market entry, compared with other important 
determinants.
5.4.2 Determinant of entry
Table 5.3 reports the results o f  the models estimating the impact o f  determinants on 
entry to the Thai market within two years. The num ber o f  observations is decreased 
to 147 as there are limitations in the availability o f  Indian price data to establish the 
expected profit variable. Since the high correlation between policy, the value o f the 
imported medicines and the number o f  cancer patients, they were analyzed
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separately to avoid possible multicollinearity. However, the model with all variables 
is also shown as model 4 for completeness. The correlation table among variables is 
shown in Appendix 8.
Starting with model 1, the first three dummy variables indicate whether Thailand 
offers policies that positively affect pharmaceutical entry. They are the patent law 
amendment to protect product patents in 1992, the removal o f  the Committee on 
Pharmaceutical Patent and amendments to allow for a six years o f  protection for 
petty patents in 1999, and the introduction o f  universal coverage in 2002. It can be 
seen that these policy variables encouraged rapid entry. In model 1, the marginal 
effects o f  the increase in the probability o f  launch within two years are 6.5, 2.8, and
1.6 times for the structural break variables o f 1992, 1999 and 2002 respectively. 
However, the dummy variable corresponding to the introduction o f  universal 
coverage is not statistically significant.
The next three variables capture the size o f  market, as shown in models 2 and 3. 
They are percentage o f  imported medicines, num ber o f  cancer patients and market 
size. These first two variables are significant and positive determinants o f  medicine 
launch. An increase in  the share o f  imported medicine leads to an 11% increase in 
the probability o f  the entry o f  a new drug to Thailand. The number o f cancer patients 
increases the probability o f  entry by 3.5 times. M arket size is, however, not 
significant as a determinant o f  launch.
As expected, the dummy variable o f  CL shows a negative impact on rapid entry. It 
decreases the probability o f  a  rapid launch by 55%. This effect is statistically 
significant at the 5% level in  model 1 and at the 1% level for models 2 to 4. The last 
four variables indicate firm and medicine characteristics. They are the number o f 
products on the market before that product enters, total number o f  medicines by the 
same manufacturer in  the market, expected profit and patent status. There is a 
decline in  the likelihood o f  entry i f  there are many medicines in  the same ATC 
market. For example, i f  there is product already on the market, it decreases the 
probability o f  entry o f  new comers by around 10%. This determinant is significant 
and robust in all models. Firms that have many products for sale in the same ATC 
group choose to introduce new medicines some 6% more quickly. This variable is 
also significant at the 5% level in the model 1, and at the 10% level in  models 2^1.
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The surprise results were found in the last two variables, expected profit and patent 
status. Although they do have a positive impact on medicine entry decision, they are 
not significant determinants o f  entry.
In conclusion, it seems that policy variables have a strong and significant impact on 
rapid entry, as do market-based factors. Stringent patent protection, by changing the 
patent law to protect product patents and weakening patent protection, affects the 
launch lag significantly. In contrast, product-driven factors are weakly significant 
and have minimal impact on the rapidity o f launches.
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Model 1 : Policy Model 2: Drug imported Model 3: Number of patients
Coefficient Hazard ratio Coefficient Hazard ratio Coefficient Hazard ratio
Table 5.3 H azard model estim ates of probability o f launch within two years_______________________
Patent law 
amendment in 
1992
Patent law 
amendment in 
1999
Universal coverage 
policy in 2002 
Drug i mported 
(percentage) 
Number of patients
CL
Prior products 
(number)
Total product
Expected profit
Patent status
N
Log lik. 
Chi-squared
1.859*** 6.420***
(0.698) (4.480)
0.913 2.492
(0.568) (1.416)
0.668 1.951
(0.456) (0.888)
-0.791** 0.453** -1.150*** 0.317*** -1.048*** 0.351***
(0.389) (0.176) (0.397) (0.126) (0.390) (0.137)
-0.090** 0.914** -0.101*** 0.904*** -0.106*** 0.900***
(0.037) (0.033) (0.037) (0.033) (0.037) (0.033)
0.065** 1.068** 0.058* 1.059* 0.062* 1.064*
(0.032) (0.034) (0.033) (0.035) (0.032) (0.034)
0.062 1.064 0.013 1.013 0.001 1.001
(0.074) (0.079) (0.075) (0.076) (0.074) (0.074)
0.386 1.471 0.360 1.434 0.454 1.574
(0.385) (0.567) (0.399) (0.571) (0.390) (0.615)
147 147 147 147 147 147
-200.496 -200.496 -199.056 -199.056 -196.484 -196.484
73.397 73.397 76.931 76.931 82.076 82.076
Model 4: All variables 
Coefficient Hazard ratio
-1.132 0.322
(1.060) (0.342)
-0.462 0.630
(0.716) (0.451)
-0.790 0.454
(0.659) (0.299)
-0.040 0.960
(0.065) (0.063)
2.648** 14.128**
(1.114) (15.732)
-1.121*** 0.326***
(0.408) (0.133)
-0.110*** 0.896***
(0.037) (0.033)
0.059* 1.061*
(0.033) (0.035)
-0.039 0.961
(0.077) (0.074)
0.523 1.688
(0.400) (0.675)
147 147
-195.447 -195.447
84.149 84.149
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5.5. Conclusion and discussion
This study examined factors that might determine the entry o f  new medicines to the 
Thai pharmaceuticals market, specifically those for cancer care. The theoretical 
model is based on the assumption that possible entrants will launch m ore quickly 
when there is a supportive patent policy and the market is attractive and profitable. 
The empirical results show that policies related to patent law have a significant and 
positive im p a c t  o n  th e  rapidity o f  new  product launches in  Thailand. These results 
contrast with the previous studies o f  Borrell(2003) and Lanjouw (2005), which 
showed that providing patent protection has a minimal impact on medicine launches 
on a cross-sectional, cross-country basis. This might be because the data set included 
in both studies covered different health systems which the models cannot capture 
adequately. The study presented here also found that policies favouring price setting, 
a large market and high demand are also positive and significant determinants o f  a 
rapid launch.
There is little evidence, however, that expected profit enhances the likelihood o f  
quick entry into the Thai market, which contrasts with the study o f  Rudholm (2001) 
who found that the profit opportunity has a positive impact on entry to the Swedish 
pharmaceutical market. This might be because multinational companies do not see 
Thailand as a significant profit making country as the market size is very small. They 
might expect more marginal profits from marketing in Thailand or price positioning 
for other regional markets.
There are, o f  course, limitations to the study presented here. For instance, that the 
estimates o f  the delay are based solely on the products that were launched in 
Thailand, and that it  focuses only on cancer medicines. These both affect 
generalizability to other countries and therapeutic areas.
M ost importantly from the perspective o f  this thesis, CL is shown to have a 
significant and adverse effect on the speed o f  new medicine launch in Thailand. It is 
likely that this will slow access for patients to new medicines available in other 
countries. This will have implications for public health and social welfare. If, for 
example, five percent o f  new drugs are no longer marketed in a country due to CL, 
this may be damaging, or not, depending on which drugs were in  that five percenC A '
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new superior antibiotic medicine, for instance, could save society approximately 
$4.6 billion by 20 years after approval (Spellberg, M iller et al. 2007). The 
implication is that removing patents to gain increased access now, would result in 
patients foregoing the opportunity to get this new medicine in  the future, as it would 
not have been launched. The balance to be assessed in this example is whether the 
increased access now was worth more than $4.6 billion opportunity cost; i f  so, CL is 
a  pareto-optimal policy, i f  not, it has resulted in  a second best situation. In the 
extreme case o f  patent termination, the study o f  Huges et al. (2002) identified that 
for every dollar in consumer benefit realized from providing greater access to current 
medicines, future consumers would be harmed at a rate o f  three dollars in present 
value terms from reduced future innovation (Hughes, M oore et al. 2002).
Future research to expand this area is therefore essential to address more precisely 
the costs and benefits o f CL to current and future health and welfare. For example, to 
investigate the forgone health cost, in  terms o f  QALYs or DALY, from the seven 
new medicines withdrawn from the Thai FDA registration process as  retaliation to  
the introduction o f  CL. This figure will need to be compared with the health gain, in  
QALYs and DALYs, from increasing access to current medicines subject to CL over 
the period until the patent licence expired and/or the price would have fallen in  any 
case. This is essential i f  decision-makers are to evaluate policy options relating to 
patents and access to medicines which balance the full health and welfare needs o f 
the Thai population over time.
Further, pharmaceuticals often have acceptable substitutes, and some “ lifestyle” 
drugs may not be o f  great clinical importance. Future research is required to  explore 
the therapeutic significance o f  pharmaceuticals that are launched slowly, or not a t all, 
and the extent to which this failure is associated with substitutes being available in 
the market. Therefore, the lack o f  new medicine being introduced to local markets 
m ight not lead to adverse effects as expected. Clearly, multi-national pharmaceutical 
companies are not the only source o f  new medicines, as evidence suggests that 20% 
o f  new breakthrough patented medicines were developed by public institutes 
(Bhaven 2009). It is also estimated that o f  the total global medical R&D funding o f 
$100 billion in 2010, approximately 44% was provided by the public sector in the 
form  o f  funds flowing to government research bodies or government grants provided
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to private bodies (Bird and Cahoy 2008). This means that access to medicines in the 
future might not depend so heavily on the private pharmaceutical sector, i f  the public 
sector is able to develop and distribute their own products.
Stringent patent protection might encourage quicker entry o f  innovative products, 
and at the same time stringent patent protection will protect local capacity, and also 
cause the country to lose that capacity. In the longer term that same local capacity 
could be an alternative source o f  entry, and the country offering extensive patent 
protection m ay lose the benefits o f  that activity and have fewer new products in the 
market overall as a result (Maskus 2000). Finally, giving innovators the strongest 
patent protection might be viewed as worthwhile irrespective o f  its effect on entry, 
on the grounds that it might boost R&D and the discovery o f  new NCE.
A final implication o f  CL worth mentioning is that CL might come with another 
price: that industry more generally may mistrust a licensing nation’s promises to  
protect and enforce patent rights (Vaughan 2001). As a result, industries that find the 
security o f  property rights lacking in a given nation m ay avoid engaging in FDI with 
that nation (Bird and Cahoy 2008). FDI is a major potential source o f  economic 
growth for recipient nations, withdrawal o f  which might arise as a reaction to CL 
practices, which could force developing nations to pay a particularly heavy cost for 
providing needed medicines for its citizens. The next chapter will examine the 
implications o f  strengthening and weakening patent protection for FDI.
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C H A PT ER  6 T H E E F F E C T  O F  PA TEN T PR O T E C T IO N  ON FO R EIG N  
IN V ESTM EN T AND IN NO VA TION
6.1.In troduction
The TRIPS Agreement established international agreement on minimal standards for 
IPR protection for WTO members. TRIPS requires a minimum patent protection o f  
20 years for inventions in  several areas, including the pharmaceutical sector. TRIPS 
clearly states that “ th e  p r o te c t io n  a n d  e n fo r c e m e n t o f  in te l le c tu a l  p r o p e r t y  r ig h ts  
s h o u ld  c o n tr ib u te  to  th e  p r o m o t io n  o f  te c h n o lo g ic a l  in n o v a tio n  a n d  to  th e  t r a n s f e r  
a n d  d is s e m in a t io n  o f  te c h n o lo g y ,  to  th e  m u tu a l a d v a n ta g e  o f  p r o d u c e r s  a n d  u s e r s  o f  
te c h n o lo g ic a l  k n o w le d g e  a n d  in  a  m a n n e r  c o n d u c iv e  to  s o c i a l  a n d  e c o n o m ic  w e lfa r e ,  
a n d  to  a  b a la n c e  o f  r ig h ts  a n d  o b l ig a t io n s ” (World Trade Organization 1995). 
Although technology diffusion can take place through a variety o f channels that 
involve the transmission o f  ideas and new technologies, such as importation o f  high- 
technology products, adoption o f  foreign technology and acquisition o f  human 
capital through various means, FDI has been suggested to be the most important 
channel for technology transfer (Borensztein, De Gregorio et al. 1998). Therefore, 
the strengthening o f  IPR protection through the amendment o f patent law to comply 
with TRIPS by low- and middle-income countries should motivate foreign investors 
to invest capital in these countries (Wade 2003). The benefit to the host country is 
not limited to the direct monetary benefit this brings to stimulate their national 
economy and labour market, it is also the indirect benefits o f  the transfer o f  
knowledge and the improvement o f  labour skills (W u 2000; Lee 2004).
To promote a country as the best place to invest, several policies maybe introduced, 
such as de-regulation, liberal investment rules and operational flexibility (Kumar 
1998). Strengthening IPR protection is one policy promoted. Firm s for which such 
rights are crucial, especially pharmaceutical companies, are unlikely to invest in 
manufacturing or research and development activities directly in countries where 
patent protection is weak (Mansfield 1994; Saggi 1999). This can be seen from the 
m any developing countries that changed their patent laws to comply with the TRIPS 
Agreement earlier than the agreement required, in order to attract FDI (Morin 2009).
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It was believed that these countries would benefit from new knowledge and more 
advanced technology.
In Thailand, the main justification in favour o f  the 1992 IPR strengthening, which 
included pharmaceutical patenting, was to encourgae multinational companies to 
invest in Thailand (Kuanpoth 2007). The other expected benefit o f  strengthening 
patent protection for medicines is that this could increase domestic capabilities and 
strengthen the local pharmaceutical industry through the transfer o f  new technologies 
to the country (Howard A. Kwon 1995). It certainly appears as i f  this amendment to 
the patent law has worked, since Thailand has been one o f  the fastest growing 
economies in the world for more than two decades and was ranked among the top 
twenty countries in  the world as a place to do business (Ismail and Y ussof 2003).
Although this strengthening o f  patent protection is designed to lead to greater 
technology transfers through the inflow o f  FDI, the TRIPS Agreement is also 
suggested to  be an obstacle to access to patented medicines. However, this 
agreement has a passage, reaffirmed in the Doha Declaration o f  2001, that allows 
countries facing a public health emergency to grant CL for patented pharmaceutical 
products. The CL allows the country to either manufacture or distribute the product 
itself, or to import medicines manufactured overseas. However, the removal o f  a 
patent owner’s rights often provokes retaliation by the pharmaceutical industry, as 
well as wider international investment sources. The crucial question is whether 
pharmaceutical companies, and other investors, may mistrust the licensing nation’s 
promises to protect and enforce patent rights once CLs are issued, and whether 
industries that find the security o f  property rights lacking in a given nation may 
avoid engaging in direct investment with that nation, within the pharmaceutical and 
chemicals sector specifically, o r the wider economy m ore generally.
The purpose o f  this chapter is to address the question: what impact has stronger 
patent protection had on FDI and innovation, and what happens to  FDI and 
innovation if  a country decides to weaken its patent system through the 
implementation o f  CL? The experience o f Thailand in dealing with patenting and 
FDI issues is used as the context, as it has significant experience with IPR. On the 
one hand, IPRs protection in Thailand is considered extensive when compared with 
other countries in the region, as the amendment o f  the Thai patent law in 1992 was
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eight years before the effective date, or 13 years before the transition period allowed 
for developing countries, to comply with the TRIPS Agreement o f  W TO (Kuanpoth 
2007). On the other hand, during 2006-2008, Thailand issued CLs for a number o f  
HIV/AIDS retroviral drugs, a heart medication and four cancer medicines, becoming 
the country with the highest number o f  CL issuances in Asia. After the Thai 
government introduced CL on seven medicines, the Office o f  the United States 
Trade Representative (USTR) elevated Thailand’s ranking from a country on the 
W atch List (WL) to one on the Priority Watch List (PWL) in the USTR’s Special 
301 Report. In another move by the USTR, duty-free access to the US market for 
three Thai products under the US GSP was withdrawn in July 2007. This has raised 
concerns in Thailand that such trade sanctions and policies may undermine FDI, or 
that their effect might outweigh the expected benefits o f  the CL.
Although it has been 18 years since the patent law amendment, empirical evidence o f  
the impact o f  patent policy on FDI is absent, meaning that several critical questions 
have yet to be answered, including whether inward FDI increased after the 
amendment o f  the Thai patent law and whether innovation activity (i.e. patents 
registered in Thailand by national patent owners) has increased. Since the current 
bilateral free-trade agreement (FTA) discussions between the USA and Thailand 
have caused great concern over the ability o f  the Thai government to issue further 
CL, such questions are critical to inform policy makers on the appropriate balance 
between public health and the wider investment and trade impacts o f  free-trade 
negotiations.
This paper consists o f  six sections. Section 2 summarises the previous findings 
relating to the impact o f  IPR on FDI. Section 3 describes the background o f  the FDI 
promotion and trade policy in Thailand since the 1970s. The data and estimation 
procedures, econometric model specification and other methods are described in  
Section 4. Section 5 presents the empirical results, and section 6 draws some 
conclusions and provides recommendations related to patent policy based on this 
empirical work.
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6.2. E m pirical evidence concerning the im pact o f IP R  pro tection  on FDI
This study focuses on issues o f  attracting FDI, with a particular emphasis on the role 
o f  patent legislation in this process. There is a lot o f  discussion about the benefits o f  
strong patent protection as an incentive to  foreign investors to invest in developing 
countries, but this study wants to establish what the e m p ir ic a l  evidence is o f  the role 
o f  patent legislation on FDI. Therefore, an extensive literature review o f  empirical 
evidence concerning what extent patent law helps determine investment was 
conducted.
A three stage strategy was used to search for and select articles included in the 
literature review. First, a computerized search by using multiple keywords (see 
Appendix 9) in four databases, namely Econlit, Embase Classic and Embase, Global 
Health and OVID Medline, which are the most relevant databases to public health 
and economics. In the second stage, English language papers and those published 
between 1 January 1990 to 31 December 2011 were retrieved to identify literature 
published around the time o f  the implementation o f  the TRIPS Agreement. Finally, a 
manual search o f  the reference lists o f  the articles retrieved was done to include 
journal articles, and grey literature including technical reports from government 
agencies or scientific research groups, working papers from research groups or 
committees and white papers, not already identified. By doing so, 261 potential 
articles for the literature review were identified. Two criteria were then used to select 
and assess the potential studies. To be included in the literature review, a study had 
to:
1. deal with the issue o f  the implications o f IPRs or patent protection on FDI. 
Studies dedicated to other types o f implications (i.e. access or research and 
development) were not retained; and,
2. include an empirical study, using either descriptive statistics or econometric 
methods. Theoretical and conceptual studies as well as discussion studies 
were not retained.
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6.2.1 Extensive literature review: results
The combined searches and other data sources found 333 potential titles. Titles and 
abstracts (where available) were scanned. The screening process is shown in figure 
6.1. After the exclusion o f duplicated publications, o f which there were 72, 261 
abstracts were left for analysis. For each one o f these articles the title and abstract 
was first reviewed and assessed according to the inclusion criteria. This resulted in 
the exclusion o f 214 papers which did not meet the first inclusion criteria and 25 
which did not meet the second inclusion criteria.
Figure 6.1 Flow-chart of literature review
There were 22 papers which examined empirically the role o f  patent or IPRs 
protection on FDI. These papers, as indicated below, have reached inconclusive 
conclusions. A  brief summary o f  each paper and variables employed, are presented 
in Tables 6.1-6.3.
No relationship between IPRs protection and FDI
There are seven empirical studies found in this category, as shown in Table 6.1. 
M ost o f  them  use regression analyses on cross-sectional data to analyse the effect o f  
IPRs on FDI. Additional variables were included in the regression to control for the 
difference in country specific factors, although most used some estimate o f  economic
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risk and/or political risk. Some regression analyses for FDI in the 1980s based on 
research by Ferrantino (1993), Kondo (1995) and Primo Braga and Fink (1999), 
found no significant link between IPR protection and FDI (Ferrantino 1993; Kondo 
1995; Primo Braga and Fink 1999). These three studies employed different 
approaches to  IPR protection. The first study used dummy (0/1) variable to reflect 
differences in  national IPR protection schemes. The second study developed its own 
patent index. The last study employed the Ginarte and Park (1997) index. These 
studies then regressed these patent indices and other macroeconomic variables on 
FDI.
Using FDI data from the 1990s, the above results were confirmed with the study by 
Pfister and Deffains (2005) who investigated the role o f  patent protection, using the 
Ginarte and Park index, on location choices o f French firms in 17 developing 
countries from 1994 to 1995. Analysed using a tobit model and controlling for 
m arket competition factors and macroeconomic differences, patent rights protection 
was not found to influence the location choices o f  French firms (Pfister and Deffains 
2005).
Recently, Seyoum (2006) who developed a new patent index to include scope, patent 
life, and provision from weighted point survey firms did not find statistically 
significant correlation between patent index and FDI (Seyoum 2006). One study 
which more specifically focuses on the chemical industry, Fosfuri (2004), did not 
find IPR protection playing any significant role in fostering international activity or 
conditioning its m ode after controlling for several country characteristics (Fosfuri 
2004). An observational study o f  FDI inflows to Thailand from 1988 to 1998 also 
revealed that there had not been much foreign investment in the Thai pharmaceutical 
sector since the strengthened patent law in 1992 (Supakankunti, Janjaroen et al. 
2001) .
These studies have employed a wide range o f  approaches. The m ost common 
m ethod used is regression, taking macroeconomic and policy factors into account. 
However, these analyses only cover the period before TRIPS came into effect, 1995 
for developed countries and 2000 for developing countries, so one might expect that 
the impact o f  strengthening IPR protection has not yet taken effect. In  addition, the 
boom period o f  globalization in the 1 9 9 0 s  means that emerging economies had a
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strong and growing interest in attracting trade, FDI, and technological expertise and 
high income countries also sought to reallocate their resources into areas o f  greatest 
comparative advantage and growth, fuelling the expansion o f  trade and investment. 
These reasons might support the findings o f  no relationship between FDI and the 
level o f  patent protection.
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Table 6.1 Summary o f  literature reviews by methods and variables employed: N o relationship
No A utho rs P eriod Setting O bjectives M ethod V ariables
1 Ferrantino
(1993)
1982 US firms,
US affiliated 
in  45 
countries
The effect o f  IPR on 
trade and investment 
flows
Gravity model Using dummy (0/1) variables to reflect 
differences in national IPR protection 
schemes and control for economic risk 
(distance, phone, landlock, colony and 
European countries), political risk (Paris 
convention member, restriction on foreign 
firms, num ber o f  international agreement 
membership, duration o f  patent), labour 
cost, population and GDP while 
dependent variables are total exports, 
royalty fees, and sales o f  affiliates.
2 Kondo
(1995)
1976-
1980
US outward 
F D Iin  33 
countries
The effect o f  patent 
protection on FDI
Survey (for IPR 
index) and 
M ultiple
regression o f  FDI 
testing
Developed their own patent index, 
including scope, patent life, retrieved 
from weighted point survey firm. Then 
controlled for GDP per capita, population, 
education, English language, GATT 
membership and ICSID membership.
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No A u th o rs P erio d Setting O bjectives M ethod V ariab les
3 Prim o Braga 
and Fink 
(1999)
1989 89 countries 
from
developed to 
least
developed
countries
The effects o f 
increased protection 
on intellectual 
property
Gravity model A gravity model o f  bilateral trade, FDI, 
and technology licensing, which estimates 
the effects o f  increased protection on a 
cross-section o f  89x88 countries. Index on 
national IPRs systems developed by Park 
and Ginarte (1996),estimating the effects 
o f  explanatory variables (such as IPRs, 
GDP and population o f  both countries, 
geographical distance, a common border, 
language)
4 Pfister and
Deffains
(2005)
1994-
1995
The location 
choices o f  
French firms 
in 17
developing
countries
The role o f  the patent 
rights in the host 
country
A  conditional logit 
model
The independent variables are num ber o f  
French competitors, number o f  
subsidiaries, openness, GDP, GD P per 
capita, consum er price index, the status o f  
EU m embership, national R&D 
investment over GDP, education, 
democracy, corruption, patent protection 
index (Ginarte and Park index), dummy 
variable o f  the exceeding patent 
protection index.
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No A utho rs P eriod Setting O bjectives M ethod V ariables
5 Seyoum
(2006)
1990
and
1995
63 countries The im pact o f  patent 
protection FDI
TheO L S
regression
The patent index by Ginarte and Park 
(1997), controlling for other variables 
such as m arket size, GDP growth, 
exchange rates, population, corruption, 
unemployment, trade/GDP, scientists and 
engineers, G D P growth
6 Fosfiiri
(2004)
four
time
periods:
1981—
1983,
1984-
1987,
1988—
1991,
1992-
1996.
75 countries 
received 
investments 
in  chemical 
plants during 
the period 
1981-1996
The im pact o f IPRs 
protection compared 
w ith country risk on 
the determinants o f  
international activity 
through wholly 
owned operations,
joint-ventures and 
technology licensing,
OLS, Tobit and 
GLS random 
effect
Income per capita, population, weighted 
distance o f  country, averaged schooling 
years in  the total population, (exports + 
imports)/GDP, global index o f  risk, 
composite index o f  risk (political, 
financial and economic), dum m y variable 
for num ber o f  scientists and engineers per 
million o f  population, tim e fixed effect, 
IPR index by G inarte and Park
7 Supakankunti 
et. al (1999)
1988-
1998
Thailand The impact o f  patent 
law change in 1992 
on FDI in 
pharmaceutical 
industry Thailand
Observation Providing the trend o f FDI in overall and 
chemical industry in Thailand
170
Positive impact o f IPR protection on FDI
There are a number o f studies which suggest that the volume o f  FDI in a country 
tends to be inversely related to the weakness o f IPR protection. This section begins 
with literature focusing on the determinants o f US investment, and investment in 
China, and concludes with studies which deal with post-TRIPS implications on FDI 
in developing countries. A  brief summary o f each study is provided in Table 6.2.
Five studies looking at FDI determinants were found that focused on the activities o f  
US M ultinational Enterprises (MNEs). First, Lee and Mansfield (1996) calculated an 
IPR protection index from the perceived weakness o f  protection in 14 countries, 
obtained from survey results o f 94 US firms. The authors then regressed the total US 
FDI as a whole in those countries over the period 1990-1992 with the IPR index and 
the specific variables o f  some countries. The results show that weaker IPR protection 
has a significant negative impact on US FDI: a one percent rise in the perceived 
weakness o f  IPRs protection would reduce US FDI in that country by 14%. In a 
sample o f  chemical firms, the weakness o f  IPR protection in a particular country 
would cause firms to allocate their investment to sales, distribution and simple 
production activities rather than to manufacturing the final product or R&D facilities 
(Lee and M ansfield 1996).
W ith recognition o f the joint decisions made by M NEs in  choosing to export, invest 
or license, M askus (1998) used a seemingly unrelated regression to capture these 
jo int impacts, controlling for country specific variables. This is done for a panel o f 
US M NEs investing in  46 countries from 1989-1992. The index o f  patent strength 
was one developed by Rapp and Rozek (1990).18The results suggest that a one 
percent rise in the extent o f  patent protection would increase US investment in that 
country by only 0.45% (Maskus 1998).
The third and fourth studies used cross-sectional FDI data. Nunnenkamp and Spatz 
(2004) used US FDI at the industry level in 166 countries in 1995 and 2000. The IPR 
protection indices used were mainly from Ginarte and Park and W orld Economic 
Forum (WEF) data. Using a gravity model and controlling for country specific
l8A score based on the sum of five national patent law components: (1) extent of coverage, (2) membership in 
international patent agreements, (3) provisions for loss of protection, (4) enforcement mechanisms and (5) 
duration of protection. Each of the categories is assigned a value between 0 and 1, and the unweighted sum of 
these values constitutes the patent rights index.
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variables, IPR protection turned out to be insignificant in the base run; however, the 
estimation results for IPR protection interaction with host-country characteristics 
showed significant impact. IPR protection appeared to positively affect 
transportation equipment and machinery industries and negatively affect the food 
industry. Surprisingly, it was seen to have a negative impact on the chemical 
industry but this was not statistically significant (Nunnenkamp and Spatz 2004). An 
et.al. (2008) examined US FDI decisions in 52 manufacturing industries investing in 
62 countries in the year 1995. The IPR index was shown to have a positive impact on 
FDI and licensing. The results revealed that strengthening IPRs, by extending the 
monopoly period, would increase the chance that firms would choose FDI as a mode 
o f  entry (An, Maskus et al. 2008).
Fifth, a similar message was found in the study o f Awokuse and Gu (2010). The 
authors employed a Gaussian M ixture Model (GMM), controlling for various 
country specific variables, to examine the effect o f  IPR protection on the investment 
o f  US firms in 53 countries from 1994-2006. The IPR index used was from Ginarte 
and Park study and the Economic Freedom o f  the W orld (EFW) index. The results 
illustrate that countries that strengthen their IPR protection can attract more 
international transactions from US multinational firms, and that countries with strong 
imitative ability can attract more US FDI after strengthening their IPR protection 
(Awokuse and Gu 2010)
There are four studies concerning the location attractiveness o f  Eastern Europe and 
China. First, Javorick (2004) surveyed more than 1,405 global firms. The survey 
recipients were asked whether they had undertaken FDI in  any o f  the 24 countries in 
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union and, i f  so, what type o f  projects they 
were engaged in, whether they were investing in manufacturing projects or a solely 
in distribution related projects. The authors adapted the Park and Ginarte index and 
created a new set o f  indices based on the descriptions o f  IPR regimes provided by 
the International Intellectual Property Alliance in their recommendations for 
countries to be placed on the US Special 301 W atch List. Host country variables and 
firm specific variables were controlled for. The results indicated that weak protection 
o f  intellectual property rights deters foreign investors in four technology-intensive 
sectors: (1) drugs, cosmetics and health care products; (2) chemicals; (3) machinery 
and equipment; and (4) electrical equipment. In  addition, foreign investors in all
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industries tend to set up distribution facilities rather than to engage in local 
production in a country with weak IPR protection (Javorcik 2004).
The next three studies focus on China as a recipient o f  FDI. Du et al. (2008) 
investigated the FDI location choice o f  6,288 US firms investing in various regions 
in China from 1993-2001 and Kawai (2009) undertook the same but for Japanese 
investors. Both o f these studies used the logarithm o f  the number o f  approved 
patents per capita as a proxy IPR index. Though the former employed the gravity 
model while the latter employed a conditional logit model, these studies yield similar 
results: that US and Japanese MNEs prefer investing in the regions that have higher 
protection o f  intellectual property rights (Du, Lu et al. 2008; Kawai 2009). Awokuse 
and Y in (2010) assessed the impact o f  China’s IPR laws on its ability to attract FDI 
from 38 countries, after it had amended its patent law to align it with the TRIPS 
Agreement. The authors applied the IPR score o f  Ginarte and Park as well as that o f  
EFW. The results also confirmed that the strengthening o f  IPR protection in China 
had a positive and significant effect on FDI (Awokuse and Yin 2010).
The last study describes the implication o f  global IPR protection on FDI inflows in 
developing countries which have amended their law to comply with the TRIPS 
Agreement. Lesser (2002) examined the determinants o f  foreign investment in 44 
developing countries in 1998. With a multiple regression methodology, he concluded 
that an increase in the IPR index, developed by the author, by one-point would boost 
FDI by $1.5 billion (Lesser 2002). The study by Adam (2010) employed seemingly 
unrelated regressions to analyse the effect o f  strengthening IPR protection in four 
separate 5-year periods (from 1985-2003). The Ginarte and Park patent index was 
used to measure IPR alongside controlling for country specific variables. The results 
o f  the study indicated that strengthening patent protection has a positive impact on 
FDI. Additionally, the impact on FDI following the TRIPS Agreement is higher than 
before it came to effect (Adams 2010). However, this study used 1995 as a TRIPS 
implementation date for developing countries, whereas the deadline for developing 
countries was actually 2000 and some countries might have changed their patent law 
to comply with TRIPS before 1995.
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T ab le  6.2 S u m m a ry  o f l i te ra tu re  review s by m ethods an d  variab les em ployed: Positive rela tionsh ip
No A uthors P erio d Setting O bjectives M ethod V ariab les
1 Lee and 
M ansfiel 
d  (1996)
1991 U.S. firms and 
investment in 
14 developing 
countries
The effect o f  IPR 
protection level on 
U.S. firm’s FDI and 
the role o f  IPRs 
protection in 
chemical industry
1 .Survey for IPRs
protection
perception
2 .0 L S  regression
3. Tobit model for 
the chemical 
industry
Surveying weaknesses in IPR protection perceived 
by 94 US firms and developing two regression 
models to  find the influence o f  IPRs protection level 
on overall US FDI and levels o f  technology transfer 
in the chemical industry. For OLS o f  overall US 
FDI, independent variables are: weakness o f  IPR, 
size o f  m arket w ith control for firm specific and 
country specific factors, IPR index, dummy for 
Mexico, FDI in the previous year, degree o f  
industrialization, and openness and time dummy 
variables. For a Tobit model from 14 US chemical 
industries, the independent variables are: the 
percentage o f  firms that perceived weaknesses in 
IPR protection, and GDP and dummy variables for 
firms, while the dependent variable is percentage o f  
firms that will invest in  facilities to sell and 
distribute.
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No A u th o rs P erio d Setting O bjectives M ethod V ariables
2 M askus
(1998)
1989-
1992
US FDI in  46 
countries
The effect o f  patent 
protection on U.S. 
patent applications 
filed in host country, 
total sales o f  foreign 
affiliates o f  U.S. 
parents, U.S. exports 
shipped to  affiliates 
and total assets, 
foreign affiliates o f 
U.S. parents
Seemingly
Unrelated
Regression
corrected for
heteroskedasticity
and
autocorrelations
Estimating a simultaneous set o f  equations to 
capture these jo in t impacts, controlling for market 
size, tariff protection, the level o f  local R&D by 
affiliates, distance from the US, and investment 
incentives (proportion o f  affiliates that received tax 
concessions in  host country and in any o f  the 
countries) and disincentives (proportion o f  affiliates 
that employ a  minimum amount o f  localpersonnel in  
host country and in any o f  the countries).
3 Nunnenk 
amp and 
Spatz 
(2004)
1995 and 
2000
US FDI and 
US FDI at 
theindustrial 
level in  166 
countries
The relationship 
betw een IPR 
protection and 
overall FDI and by 
industry
Gravity model 
regression
FDI determinants by a regression o f  FDI on GDP 
per capita, population, distance to  U.S., the cost o f  
living abroad, average years o f  schooling and IPRs 
index, using Ginarteand Park for the year 1995 and 
W orld Econom ic Freedom (WEF) index for the year 
2000. Testing the industry characteristics by adding 
industry dum m ies in the previous independent 
variable set.
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No A u th o rs P e rio d Setting O bjectives M ethod V ariables
4 A n et.al. 
(2008)
1995 (for 
FDI or 
licensing 
) and 
1994 (for 
exportin 
g)
U .S .F D I in 52 
manufacturing
industries 
invested in 62 
host countries
Exam ine the effect o f  
strengthening IPR 
protection on the 
m ode o f  technology 
transfer: exporting, 
FDI or licensing
A  multinomial logit 
m odel o f  three 
m ode o f  entry 
choices
The explanatory variables covering national 
characteristics, GDP, absorptive capacity (share o f  
national exports from high-technology industries 
and the proportion o f  the labor force with tertiary 
education), distance, cultural distance (English and 
index developed by authors), FDI fixed costs 
(economic freedom index), market capitalisation 
and investment cost index, IPR index from Ginarte 
and Park 1990. The industry characteristics 
variables are industry R&D intensity and capital 
intensity (the ratio o f  total real capital stock to total 
industry sales).
176
No A u th o rs P eriod Setting O bjectives M ethod V ariables
5 Awokuse
and
W.G.
Gu(2010
)
1994-
2006
53 countries, 
including 
developed and 
developing 
countries
how the interaction 
betw een IPR 
protection and 
imitative abilities o f  
host countries 
im pacts exports or 
FDI from the U.S.
A  Gaussian 
M ixture Model
Independent variables are IPR index from W EF and 
Ginarte and Park.IPR index and control for distance, 
exchange rate, openness to trade and investment, 
foreign tax rate and imitative ability (a composite 
index developed by  the authors, using data o f  
government education expenditure, education 
enrolment, num ber o f  R&D researchers, patent 
applications, patents in force, railways traffic 
passengers and freight, literacy rates aged 15-24, 
prim ary education completion rate, telephone lines 
and cellular subscribers per 100 population, internet 
users per 100 population and personal computers 
per 100 population). Dependent variables are export 
and FDI.
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No A u th o rs P erio d Setting O bjectives M ethod V ariables
6 Javorcik
(2004)
1995 1,405 global 
firms invested 
in Eastern 
European 
countries
The impact o f 
intellectual property 
protection on the 
volume o f  FDI
Survey and Probit 
model
A  questionnaire on decision to enter and mode o f  
entry was developed. Tobit regression o f  the 
decision and m ode o f  entry on GDP per capita, 
population, corporate tax rate, legal effectiveness, 
corruption, privatization, openness, the overall 
progress in reform, effectiveness o f  the legal 
system, corruption level, privatization policies and 
openness to trade. For testing the mode o f  entry, the 
author included firm specific variables such as firm 
sales, R&D outlays as a percentage o f  net sales, 
selling, general & administrative expenses as a 
percentage o f  net sales, the number o f  four-digit SIC 
codes describing a firm’s activities and a dummy 
variable o f  investor’s regional experience with the 
region before 1989.
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7 D u et al. 
(2008)
1993-
2001
6288 US firms 
invested in 
various 
China’s 
regions
The im pacts o f  four 
economic institution 
variables, including 
property rights 
protection, the 
degree o f  
government 
intervention in 
business operations, 
the degree o f  
governm ent 
corruption and 
contract
enforcement, on the 
location choice o f  
FDI
Discrete choice 
model
A survey o f  private enterprise in China to create 
three indices which are the degree o f  government 
intervention in  business operations, the degree o f  
government corruption and contract enforcement. 
The other concerned variables are the 
agglomeration, dummy for the presence o f  US 
Embassies or Consulates and dum my for 
government promotion policies, wages, 
infrastructures (length o f highway per square 
kilometre in a  region) and education (percent o f  
higher education student in  the region). IPR index is 
the logarithm  o f  the patent per capita approved 
number.
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8 Kawai
(2009)
1998-
2006
1839 Japanese 
m anufacturing
firms investing 
in China
The determinants o f  
Japanese
m anufacturing firms’ 
location decisions in 
China
A  conditional logit 
model
The empirical models are developed and tested. The 
dependent variable is choice o f  investment (1= Yes, 
0= No). The independent variables are the natural 
logarithm o f  the number o f  Special Economic 
Zones, IPRs index, the natural logarithm o f  the 
share o f  total investment in  fixed assets by state- 
owned units in relation to total investment, GDP, 
labour costs, road infrastructure and the natural 
logarithm o f  the number o f  Japanese manufacturing. 
All explanatory variables are lagged by one year.
9 Awokuse 
and Yin 
(2010)
1992-
2005
A  panel data 
for 38 
countries 
including 24 
high-income 
countries and 
14 low-income 
countries that 
have invested 
to China
The im pact o f  
China’s IPR laws, 
amended in  1992 to 
com ply with W TO’s 
TRIPS agreement, on 
its ability to attract 
FDI from  1992-2005
A gravity model, 
random-effect
IPR indices employed are: (1) Annual foreign patent 
applications as a measure o f  the strength o f  IPR 
protection in China and (2) IPR index developed by 
Ginarte and Park (1997). The gravity model consists 
o f  IPR protection, GDP, distance to China, average 
trade cost and investment cost in China, regional 
dummy o f  Asia and a ratio o f  industrial value-added 
to GDP (proxy for the level o f  industrialization) 
were analysed in  a gravity model.
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No A u th o rs P erio d Setting O bjectives M ethod V ariables
10
j
Lesser
(2002)
1998 FDI in  44
developing
countries
The effects o f  
stronger IPR 
protection in the 
areas o f  imports and 
Foreign
Direct Investment 
(FDI)
M ultiple regression The variables includes income per capita, past FDI, 
exchange rates, tariffs, the proportion o f  previous 
year FDI to  G NP o f  pervious year and the degree o f  
industrialization. A  new index was developed that 
uses membership in  international treaties to m easure 
the scope and efficiency o f  IPR.
11 Adam  S. 
(2010)
1985-
2003
75 developing 
countries
The im pact o f  
intellectual property 
rights (IPR) 
protection on FDI. 
The im pact o f  TRIPs 
Agreem ent on FDI 
inflows
The Seemingly 
Unrelated 
Regressions (SUR)
Using the Ginarte and Park index as a measure for 
IPR protection and controlling for real GDP, real 
GDP per capita, inflation, openness, population, 
mainline telephone per 100 people, return on 
investment and a composite index o f  the risk 
variable including political, financial and economic 
risk.
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The inconclusive results
There are four studies, as shown in Table 6.3, with regression analyses that yielded 
inconclusive results. Park and Ginarte (1997) created their own patent protection 
index, as mentioned, for a panel o f  60 countries from 1960-1990 and estimated a 
system o f  equations to identify the effect o f  patent protection and other national 
characteristics on economic growth, such as R&D activity, investment, and 
education. The result showed that the benefit o f  patent protection with respect to 
investment and R&D occurred only in the top 30 economies (Park and Ginarte 
1997).
Athukorala and Kohpaiboon (2006) examined US M NEs decision patterns 
concerning the location o f  investment in R&D activities. The authors regressed the 
ratio o f  R&D expenditure to total sales, along with country and firm specific 
variables. IPR was found to have a positive impact on R&D investment, significant 
at the 10% level, yet a negative impact for a developing countries subgroup 
(Athukorala and Kohpaiboon 2006).
However, the converse results were shown by Blyde and Acea (2003). They 
explored the determinants o f the decisions o f OECD investors to invest in developed 
and developing countries in 1985, 1990 and 1995. The authors employed a gravity 
model and controlled for macroeconomic situations, the IPR protection index from 
Ginarte and Park, and infrastructure level. The results suggest the positive impact o f  
national patent laws in developing countries but their negative impact in developed 
countries (Blyde and Acea 2003).
Qian (2010) investigated the impact o f  national patent law reform on inward FDI in 
26 countries that established national pharmaceutical patent laws during the period 
1978-2002. After controlling for a list o f  country- and industry-level variables that 
are likely to affect innovative potentials and technology transfer, there is no 
statistically significant relationship between national pharmaceutical-patent 
protection and innovation or FDI. However, when combining national patent 
protection with economic freedom and higher education level, they are positively 
related to increases in US and Japanese M NC subsidiaries and British FDI (Qian 
2010).
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T ab le  6.3 Sum m ary o f  literature reviews by m ethods and variables employed: Inconclusive relationship
No A utho rs P eriod Setting O bjectives M ethod V ariables
1 Park and
Ginarte
(1997)
1960-
1990
60 countries 
from
developed to 
least
developed
countries
The im pact o f IPR 
protection on 
economic growth 
(GDP growth)
Regression Created an IPR  index and estimated a 
system o f  equations to identify the effect 
o f  IPR protection and other national 
characteristics on economic growth such 
as R&D activity, investment, and 
education.
2 Athukorala
and
Kohpaiboon
(2006)
1990-
2001
(three-
year
intervals)
168 US-based 
M NEs that 
have invested 
internationally 
(42 countries)
The determinants o f  
the international 
location o f  R&D 
activity by foreign 
affiliates o f  US- 
based MNEs
Regression
analysis
Included control variables are real GDP, 
distance, percentage o f  domestic sales in 
total affiliate sale turnover, technology 
intensity index, R&D personnel per 
million population, wages o f  technical 
personnel, tax incentives for firm-level 
R&D activities, Intellectual property right 
index (from  W orld Economic Forum, 
Global Competitiveness Report), capital 
stock o f  US firms, an index o f  R&D 
potential o f  output mix, dummy variable 
for developing countries other than NICs, 
newly industrialized countries in East 
Asia, financial crisis dummy, and a vector 
o f  tim e dum m y variables
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No A u th o rs P eriod Setting O bjectives M ethod V ariables
3 Blyde and
Acea
(2003)
1985, 
1990 and 
1995
The sources o f 
FDI are 19 
OECD 
countries and 
40 countries as 
the recipients 
o f  FDI, 8 o f  
which are 
from Latin 
America.
The inflows o f FDI 
to Latin America and 
developing countries 
after TRIPS
The gravity model The independent variables are GDP per 
capita, population, dummy o f  common 
language, past colonial links and region, 
distance betw een country, Ginarte and 
Park IPR index
4 Qian (2010) 1978-
2002
26 Countries 
that
established 
national 
pharmaceutical 
patent laws 
during that 
period
Patent reform on 
inward FDI
Regression The formal regression model is estimated 
on the two groups o f  matched pairs (Set 1: 
non-patent and new patent pairs; and Set 
2: always-patent and new-patent pairs) 
separately. The included variables are 
GDP, freedom, education, IPR score, 
price control, economic freedom, 
innovative potential, labor, 
pharmaceutical exports to the US, dummy 
variables for time periods
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In conclusion, there are a number o f  empirical investigations pointing to an uncertain 
relationship between IPR protection and FDI distributions, which depend upon the 
country samples included, FDI sources, data from opinion surveys or secondary data, 
and the approach used tocalculate the level o f  IPRs or patent protection scales. The 
answer o f  how important IPR protection is for FDI is still unsettled. Some evidence 
indicates that there is a positive impact o f  patent law on FDI overall, and in the 
phamaceutical industry more specifically, while some indicates that weak patent 
protection on pharmaceuticals was a main factor in making the country a 
manufacturing base for these pharmaceutical companies. However, it is worth 
noting, for the context o f  this thesis, that Bird and Cahoy (2008) illustrated that 
developing countries who issue CL would face a d d i t i o n a l  risks in attracting global 
capital or could trigger the loss o f significant FDI (Bird and Cahoy 2008). As both 
country-specific and regional factors influence the effect o f  IPRs on FDI, more 
regional and country-specific studies should be done to validate the findings o f this 
study. As noted by Lesser (2002), the effectof IPR on FDI may only be possible on a 
country-by-country basis.
6.3. FDI history and policy in Thailand
Thailand transformed from an absolute monarchy to a constitutional monarchy in 
1932. It has undergone a dynamic political situation with a long series o f  military 
coups d ’état, rebellions and unstable political situations (Dhiravegin 2010). Since the 
1960s, when the political scene became relatively more stable, the Thai government 
focussed more attention toward international trade (Chritensen, Dollar et al. 1993). 
The Board o f  Investment (BOI) was established in 1966 to transition the country 
from trade policies that were focused on import substitution, to become one o f the 
world’s leading export-dedicated economies (Board o f  Investment 2006). The BOI 
was given a mandate to attract and stimulate foreign investment in the country by 
image building and investment services which help relationship building and 
providing consulting related to doing business in Thailand. Over the past four 
decades, the Thai Government has been actively promoting the country as an 
investment location by means o f  liberalizing laws and regulations for the admission 
and establishment o f  foreign investment projects. Figure 6.2 shows the amount o f  
inward and outward FDI Flows in Thailand from 1970 to 2008.
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Figure 6.2 Inflation ad justed  value o f FDI inflow, FDI outflow, net FDI and FDI 
inflows as a percentage o f GDP o f to ta l industries from  1970-2008 (million USD 
at 2005 price)
The value of FDI inflow had more or less stabilised at an annual average ofUS$ 114 
million during the 1970s. As a percentage of GDP, the flow of FDI in Thailand was 
relatively small and fluctuated throughout this decade, due to the world financial 
crisis in 1973 and the political unrest in Thailand. As a result, a major policy shift 
towards import substitution took place to promote local industrial development and 
attract investment through a high protection rate and a set of incentives provided by 
BOI (Shujiro Urata and Kazuhiko Yokota 1994).
The year 1985 was an important turning point for Thai inward FDI. Having 
maintained policies of economic liberalization since the start of the 1980s, falling oil 
prices and the dramatic appreciation of the yen in the mid-1980s (Linda Lim and 
Fong 1991), together with recovering industrialized country economies investing in 
FDI in the Asian region of Japan and the Asian Newly Industrialised Economies 
(NIEs) (Shujiro Urata and Kazuhiko Yokota 1994), FDI inflows into Thailand
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increased considerably from US$ 160 million in  1985 to US$ 2,542 in 1990 (from 
0.2% o f GDP to 2.3% o f GDP).
After the financial crisis in 1997, the Thai Baht was devalued. FDI inflows recovered 
to steady from a low o f  US$ 3.2 billion in 1997 to US$ 3.9 billion in 2000, and 
during this period FDI inward flow as a percentage o f  GDP increased from 1.5% in 
1995 back to 2.5%  in 2000. As the economy began to improve, Thailand experienced 
strong economic growth during the 2000s (Sally 2007). Despite political unrest from 
demonstrations against Prime M inister Thaksin Shinnawattra, followed by a military 
takeover in 2006, it remains an attractive investment. FDI inflows during this decade 
increased dramatically compared with the previous decade. The escalating FDI 
started from US$4billion, 3.8% o f  GDP, in 2000 and headed to above US$ 9.5 
billion, 4.1% o f  GDP, in 2008. The growth o f  FDI in the post-crisis period was 
characterized by a dramatic increase in mergers and acquisitions as foreign firms 
took over Thai companies that faced severe debt and liquidity problems (Peter 
Brimble 2002).
Patent policy relating to FDI in the phamaceutical industry
The first Thailand Patent Act B.E.2522 (1979) included only process patents for 
pharmaceuticals, a weak system which provided the opportunity for rival firms to 
arrive at the same product with a different process. In 1986 a “W hite Paper” 
illustrating how US pharmaceutical companies in Thailand were being harmed by 
the inadequate Thai patent system was submitted to International Trade Association, 
US Chamber o f  Commerce. Moreover, the Pharmaceutical Research and 
Manufacturers o f  America (PhRMA) filed a petition with the US Government to 
withdraw benefits under the GSP to Thailand in 1987 (Markandya 2001). Although 
the Thai government stressed that providing patent protection at the same level as 
developed countries would not be possible for the level o f  social, economic and 
industrial development o f  Thailand, the Office o f  USTR determined that the 
Government o f  Thailand's protection o f  patents was unreasonable and that action 
was appropriate (Kuanpoth 2007). As a result, to avoid trade sanctions, the new Thai 
Patent Act came into force in September 1992. It, however, included a provision 
intended to protect the public from the impact o f  high prices by establishing a 
Committee on Pharmaceutical Patent to monitor and compare medicine prices. This
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committee was given powers to acquire cost and pricing information and issue CL 
on the grounds that a product is priced excessively in the Thai market.
The USTR published its annual National Trade Estimates report in 1996. The 
comment on Thailand included: "the [ n e w  p a t e n t ]  la w  d i d  n o t  p r o v i d e  p r o te c t io n  f o r  
p r o d u c t s  p a t e n t e d  in  o th e r  c o u n tr ie s  th a t  h a d  n o t  y e t  b e e n  m a r k e te d  in  T h a i la n d  
(" p ip e lin e  p r o te c t io n " ) ,  a n d  i t  c o n ta in e d  e x t r e m e ly  b r o a d  a u th o r i ty  to  is s u e  
c o m p u ls o r y  l ic e n s e s  in  c a s e s  w h e r e  p a te n te d  g o o d s  a r e  n o t  y e t  p r o d u c e d  in  
T h a ila n d . T h e  le g is la t io n  a l s o  c r e a te d  a  p h a r m a c e u t ic a l  p a t e n t  r e v ie w  b o a r d  w ith  
u n iq u e  a n d  e x t r a o r d in a r y  p o w e r s  to  r e q u ir e  s e n s i t iv e  c o s t  a n d  p r i c i n g  in fo r m a tio n .  
T h e s e  p r o v i s io n s  a r e  a  s ig n if ic a n t  d is in c e n t iv e  to  o b ta in  p r o d u c t  p a t e n t  p r o te c t io n  
f o r  p h a r m a c e u t ic a l s  in  T h a i la n d  a n d  s e r io u s ly  r e d u c e  th e  b e n e f i t s  o f  th e  p a t e n t  
p r o te c t io n  p r o v i d e d  in th e  1 9 9 2  law ."  (USTR 1996). Again, to avoid trade sanctions, 
Thai patent law was revised again in 1999. The major changes were the dismantling 
o f  the Committee on Pharmaceutical Patent, and amendments to allow for a six year 
protection o f  petty patents which are simple inventions with industrial applicability, 
but which are not necessarily o f a ground-breaking nature. It is said that the intuition 
behind these amendments in 1992 and 1999 was that it would offer a key incentive 
to promote foreign investment needed for technology and knowledge transfers 
(Markandya 2001).
Figure 6.3 shows the inward and outward FDI o f  the chemical industry, which 
includes the pharmaceutical industry. The pattern o f  FDI flows in and out o f  the 
chemical industry is similar to the movement o f  FDI in every industry. The FDI 
inflows in the chemical industry started to accelerate in 1985 to reach US$ 370 
million in 1990. In 1993 and 1998 the inflows nearly reached US$ 400 million, and 
peaked at US$ 650million in 2000, and then levelled o ff  to an average US$ 600 
million per annum. It is interesting to see that the value o f  FDI inflow has never 
reached US$700 million, which is the level often suggested to represent the research 
and development cost for one medicine (DiMasi, Hansen et al. 2003). Outward FDI 
has increased but its absolute value is, on average, three times less than inward FDI. 
However, in 2007 there was more outward than inward FDI, when outward FDI 
reached a peak o f  approximately US$700million. After the revisions to patent law in 
1992 and 1999, the value o f  both inward and outward FDI rose considerably.
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Figure 6.3 Inflation ad justed  value o f FDI inflow, FDI outflow , net FDI and  FDI 
inflows as a percentage o f GDP of chem ical industry  from  1970-2008 (million 
USD a t 2005 price)
0//o
Source: Bank of Thailand
From Figures 6.2 and 6.3, it can be seen that FDI inflows have been increasing 
steadily. Strengthening the patent law in 1992 may have contributed, but the 
dramatic changes in the Thai political and economic climate during the 1980s arc 
perhaps themost important factorsincreasing the attractiveness of Thailand for 
countries to invest.
It is important however to know more precisely whether the strengthening of patent 
protection benefitted FDI, operated as a channel of technology transfer, or not, in 
order to understand the converse -  whether weakening patent protection, such as 
using CL, discourages foreign investment. This information is increasingly 
important, given that the era of bilateral trade agreements (TRIPS-Plus) is upon us. 
Having this information can help build evidence to support decision making in terms 
of these negotiations.
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In conclusion, the review here poses four main questions:
-Did the amendment to the patent law in 1992, to comply with the TRIPS 
Agreement, lead to a change in FDI, both overall and for chemicals 
specifically?
-To what extent does patent protection determine FDI when compared to 
other factors?
-To what extent does CL implementation affect FDI?
-In Thailand, has patent protection met its objective in terms o f  innovation 
and R&D stimulation?
This chapter examines aspects o f  the effects o f  either strengthening and weakening 
patent protection in  the areas o f  FDI and technology diffusion. The study is 
conducted four partsto directly address each o f  these four questions. The next section 
describes the methods.
6.4. Methodology
6.4.1 Testing the impact of the structural change of patent policy in 1992
To test i f  there is a structural break as a result o f  the patent law change in 1992, the 
Chow test was used to determine whether a single regression o f  a series o f  FDI 
inflows from 1970-2008, case 1 in Figure 6.4, is more efficient than two separate 
regressions involving splitting the data into two sub-samples as presented in case 2 
as shown in Figure 6.4. This is illustrated in Figure 6.4, where in the first case it has 
only a single regression line to fit the data points from 1970-2008. In the second 
case, where there is a structural break in 1992, two separate models are developed 
for the periods 1970 to 1991 and 1992 to 2008.
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Figure 6.4 Illustration of the Chow test applied for testing the s tru c tu ra l b reak  
in 1992
Case 1 Case 2
The test statistic is calculated from three sum square of residuals from each 
regression equation, expressed as:
RSS^-iRSS^RSSJ/k  
RSS, + R S S J n - 2 k
Where:
RSSC is the sum square of residuals regressed by using all the data, before 
and after the structural break
RSSi and RSS2 arc sum square of residuals from two separate regressions on 
the data before and after the structural break
n is the number of observations
k is the total number of coefficients including the constant.
The Chow test tests whether the single regression line or the two separate regression 
lines fit the data best. However, it is possible that the breakdate might happen before 
or after the policy implementation. Therefore, the Chow test can be misleading, as 
the candidate breakdatc is endogenous. This requires testing for structural change of 
unknown timing. The sequence of Chow statistics as a function of candidate 
breakdates, 1972 to 2007, was therefore constructed. If there is a structural break, 
then the subsample estimates will vary systematically across candidate breakdates.
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To test whether the structural break happened in 1992, the Chow test value will be 
compared with the critical values with F-test statistics. In order to test for parameter 
instability and the structural change with unknown change point, the critical values 
developed by Andrews (1993) will be used as the benchmark (Andrews 1993). 
Andrews-Quandt sup-F statistic is the asymptotic distribution o f  the test 
statisticswhich is themaximum o f  a sequence o f  traditional Chow-style chi-square 
tests for structural change, each basedon a different potential breakpoint. This test 
statistic was originally introduced by Quandt(1960) and its asymptotic distribution 
was derived by Andrews (Andrews 1993).
6.4.2 FDI determinants in Thailand
There is considerable literature focusing on the determinants o f  investment, variables 
c a p tu r in g  the influence o f  macroeconomic fa c to r s ,  o p e r a tio n a l risk, wage costs, trade 
barriers, industrial structures, taxes, infrastructure, and other incentives or 
disincentives to investment (Kindlegerger 1969; Caves 1971; Hymer 1976). This 
part o f  the study will incorporate IPRs into this empirical work to examine whether 
Thailand’s implementation o f  stronger patent protection played a significant role in 
stimulating FDI, while controlling for related (political or economic) factors. This 
section will provide a framework o f  study and outline the model and the hypotheses 
to be tested.
6.4.2.1 Framework
The connection between the investment promotion policy o f  a host country and a 
firm’s decision to undertake FDI is highlighted by Dunning in a paradigm known as 
Ownership, Localization and Internalization (OLI) (Dunning 2001). Multinational 
companies hold ownership advantages over domestic firms in a given area, which 
can be a superior technology or improved marketing systems. W ith sufficient 
vocational advantages from quality and cost o f  material, lower transportation costs, 
and host government policies, foreign investors would establish production locally 
rather than choose to export. The last advantage, internalization, is the advantage for 
foreign firms to retain full control over the production process instead o f  licensing its 
intangible assets to local firms. A  host country’s government can influence the
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presence o f  location-specific advantages directly, especially the liberalization o f 
policies and business facilitation measures.
Based on Dining’s OLI paradigm, this section outlines reasons for a firm to invest 
abroad: the search for resources, for markets, for efficiency, and for new strategic 
assets. Host country governments can influence location-specific advantages 
directly, including through trade liberalization policy and business facilitation 
measures. Table 6.4 shows the set o f  host country determinants o f  FDI developed by 
UNCTAD (1998) (UNCTAD 1998).
Table 6.4 The UNCTAD's classification of FDI determinants
D eterm ining variab les Exam ples
Policy framework for -Economic and political stability
FDI
-Rules regarding entry and operations 
-Privatization, trade and tax policy
Economic determinants -Market size and capital income 
-Market growth
-Cost o f  doing business i.e. materials, transportation and 
labour cost, labour productivity
Business facilitation -Investment promotion (image building or investment- 
generation activities)
-Social amenities (bilingual schools, quality o f  life, etc.) 
-after investment services
Source: UNCTAD (1998)
6.4.2.2 Selected variables and data sources
Typically, there are many host country factors involved in deciding where an FDI 
project should be located and it is often difficult to pinpoint the most decisive factor. 
This section describes specific variables representing each classification o f  the
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UNCTAD framework and explains the rationale and sources o f  the variables 
selected, as shown in Table 6.5. For the value o f  FDI inflows, the dependent 
variable, data were retrieved from the Bank o f  Thailand (BOT) for the period 
available o f  1970-2008.
❖  Policy fram ew ork
Governments typically can improve FDI potential through policies dealing with the 
rules and regulations governing the entry and operation o f  foreign investors, the 
standards o f  treatment accorded to them, and the functioning o f  the markets within 
which they operate (UNCTAD 1996). These policies vary from outright prohibition 
o r restrictive policy o f  FDI entry to open policy, FDI liberalization, and non­
discrimination in the treatment o f  foreign and domestic firms or preferential 
management o f  foreign firms.
E xchange-rate policy (EXC) is related to stability and may influence FDI decisions 
by affecting the prices o f  host country assets, the value o f  transferred p r o f i t s ,  and the 
competitiveness o f  foreign affiliate exports. It can also be seen as affecting 
profitability, as fluctuation in the exchange rate can turn a business from profit to 
loss. There is a  widely held view that countries can attract FDI by devaluing their 
currency (Calderon-Rossell 1985). However, the devaluation could decrease the net 
remittances o f  profits and dividends back to the parent company which actually 
discourages the foreign investor (de M ello 1997).The average annual exchange rate 
with the US dollar obtained from the Bank o f  Thailand (BOT) was used in the 
model.
Political stability is also one o f  the key factors attracting foreign investors. 
Numerous studies demonstrate that M NEs are less likely to invest in countries with 
risks o f  expropriation, ineffective legal systems, and terrorism and violence 
(Schneider and Frey 1985; Loree and Guisinger 1995; Femandez-Arias and 
Hausmann 2000; Asiedu 2002). This study selected a situation o f  coup d ’état and 
political unrest to represent political instab ility  (POL). The binary variable will be 
identified as 0 if  there are no coups d ’état and no political unrest in that year, and as 
1 when there is. The data for POL is taken from  Teerevakin (2010), a Thai political 
history book (Teeravekin 2010).
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Patent protection policy (PATENT) is the key independent variable representing 
protection o f  ownership, and is based on the changing o f  the patent law in 1992. In 
this study, dummy variable is created with 0 for 1970-1991 and 1 for the years after 
1992.
♦> Economic determinants
M arket attractiveness can be represented by the size o f  population or Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) (Schneider and Frey 1985; Loree and Guisinger 1995; 
Fernandez-Arias and Hausmann 2000; Asiedu 2002; Ramirez 2006). Foreign 
investment is positively influenced by the size o f  the host economy, as a large 
market generates a large volume o f business and, hence, influences market-seeking 
FDI. For this study, GDP is selected as an explanatory variable since the size o f  the 
Thai population has been relatively constant during the study period. The value o f 
GDP is from the W orld Development Indicator (WDI).
High wages in the manufacturing industry would negatively affect resource-seeking 
FDI (Schneider and Frey 1985). The relative US to T h a i wage (USTWAGE) in 
manufacturing industry will be employed. Average wage in manufacturing was 
obtained from the International Labour Organization (ILO) from 1989-2008. The 
monthly wage before 1989 is based on information reported by Attayuth (2010) 
which provides the minimum labour wage in Thailand from 1973 (Leeyawanich 
2010).
•> Business facilitation
Multinational firms engaged in export-oriented investments may prefer to locate in 
countries m ore open to international trade (Asiedu 2002). Since there is no 
systematic numerical value o f  image building, investment-generation activities and 
trade restrictions, the volume o f  international trade is always used to symbolize 
business facilitation. Countries that are open to international trade, less trade 
restrictive and provide a good platform for global business operations, are found to 
have more capital inflows. A higher level o f  export value (EXP) could represent a 
lower transaction cost associated with exporting that occurs from trade restriction or 
the openness ratio (OPEN), total value o f  imports and exports to total GDP, could 
represent the openness o f  an economy (Edwards 1990).
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Although many studies have employed an openness ratio in their models (Edwards 
1990; Gastanaga V, Nugent J et al. 1998; Fernandez-Arias and Hausmann 2000; 
Fedderke and A.T. 2006), this part o f  study will use export value to represent 
business facilitation. This is because, as mentioned previously in section 6.3, 
covering the FDI history and policy in Thailand, a policy o f  export promotion took 
place in  the 1980s and this policy was implemented to attract export-oriented foreign 
investors. Moreover, investing in Thailand as a location to export was one o f  the 
main reasons for the surge o f  foreign investment in Thailand in 1987 (Eur 2003). It 
is also the case that the high correlation between EXP and OPEN variables (r=0.955) 
means that these two variables would produce virtually the same result. As a result, 
the volume o f  exports represents business facilitation, with the WDI databases 
providing the source data.
6.4.2.3 Model Specification and hypotheses tests
This section outlines the variables and model used to empirically test the level o f 
influence o f  the aforementioned variables on FDI. The FDI inward data was obtained 
from the Bank o f  Thailand (BOT).
D ependent variab le
This study developed two models to analyse the FDI determinants o f  overall foreign 
investment inflows to all industry and the pharmaceutical industry specifically. For 
the first model, the dependent variable is the aggregate value o f  FDI inflows in all 
industries, accounting for 53% o f  FDI inflow to Thailand (Decharuk, Leelapomchai 
et al. 2009). Although this study intends to study the role o f  patents in 
pharmaceutical industry FDI, since the data concerning the flow o f  inward FDI to the 
pharmaceutical sector is not available, the flow o f  inward FDI to the chemical 
industry was chosen to be the dependent variable for the second model (as the 
pharmaceutical industry is a subset o f  the chemical industry this is the closest 
proxy). Table 6.5 shows the trend o f  FDI inward to Thailand by sector.
This study developed two models to analyse the FDI determinants o f overall foreign 
investment inflows to all industry and the pharmaceutical industry specifically. For 
the first model, the dependent variable is the aggregate value o f  FDI inflows in all 
industries, accounting for 53% o f  FDI inflow to Thailand (Decharuk, Leelapomchai
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et al. 2009). Although this study intends to study the role o f  patents in 
pharmaceutical industry FDI, since the data concerning the flow o f  inward FDI to the 
pharmaceutical sector is not available, the flow o f inward FDI to the chemical 
industry was chosen to be the dependent variable for the second model (as the 
pharmaceutical industry is a subset o f  the chemical industry this is the closest 
proxy). Table 6.5 shows the trend o f  FDI inward to Thailand by sector.
Table 6.5 Net FDI inward to Thailand classified by sector (average % share to 
total)
Sector 1980-
1986
1987-
1996
1997-
1998
1999-
2007
Industry 31.4 39.4 46.5 53
o f  which: Electrical appliances 9.7 13.4 10.9 13.5
M achinery and Transport
equipment 2.4 3.3 11.9 16.7
Chemicals 5.1 6.4 4.5 5.3
Financial institutions -2 6.3 9.7 7.1
Trade 19.1 17.1 24.5 12.3
Construction 18.8 8.7 4.1 0
Services 8.5 4.1 6.7 10.1
Real estate 4.3 21.5 1.8 2.8
Others 20 2.9 6.6 14.8
Total 100 100 100 100
Sources: Bank o f  Thailand
Independen t variab les
As shown in Table 6.6, the model includes standard arguments such as GDP, exports 
(EXP), exchange rate (EXC), and the monthly wage in Thailand (WAGE). All 
variables were adjusted with the consumer price index to be at 2005 price levels. 
Dummy variables to explain variations in political stability (POL) and to capture the 
patent law change effect (PATENT) were used. et is a normally distributed error 
term.
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Table 6.6 Summary variable description
Variable Definition
Dependent variable
LnFDI Natural log o f  inflation adjusted FDI inflows in all industry (USD: at
2005 price)
LnFDIC Natural log o f  inflation adjusted FDI inflows in chemical industry 
(USD: at 2005 price)
Independent variable
LnGDP Natural log o f  GDP (USD: at 2005 price)
LnEXP Natural log o f  real export value (USD: at 2005 price)
LnEXC Natural log o f  real exchange rate (Thai Baht: at 2005 price)
LnW AGE Natural log o f  wage (USD: at 2005 price)
PATENT Changing patent law (from 1992 = 1, before 1992 = 0)
POL Year that had coup d ’état or political turmoil (1 if  happened, 0 =no
coup d’état)
GDP, EXP, WAGE and PATENT are expected to have a positive effect on FDI 
while POL is expected to have a negative effect. For the exchange rate variable 
(EXC), the important link between economic policy and international 
competitiveness, as explained in the section above, means that the relationship 
cannot be predicted, as depreciation may induce FDI because it can decrease costs 
and increase profits, but it could also reduce the value o f currency transferred as 
remittances and thus could decrease FDI. This study therefore estimated an FDI 
function o f  the following general form:
L n F D I t
=  <x +  f t G D P t + p 2 E X P t  + p 3 E X C t + f a L n W A G E t + (3 s P A T E N T t + f tP 0 L t + e t
(2)
The specification in Equation (2) will be analysed with the Error Correction Model 
(ECM). Empirical studies have shown that the ECM is best suited for model 
estimation when economic variables that are individually non-stationary are
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cointegrated, i.e. when there is a meaningful long-run relationship between them 
(Fedderke and A.T. 2006; Ramirez 2006). Moreover, the ECM is able to induce 
flexibility by combining the short-run dynamic and long-run equilibrium models in a 
unified system, allowing us to describe the long run relationships and the short run 
relationships o f  non-stationary variables (Johansen 1995; Lutkepohl 2005). Ramirez 
(2006) also employed the ECM to understand the role o f  economics and policy on 
inward FDI into Chile during 1960-2001 (Ramirez 2006)
The ECM model was incorporated using the Engle and Granger framework (Engle 
and Granger 1987). All variables were tested for the existence o f  unit root to comply 
with the condition, required to employ ECM, that series are non-stationary. The first 
stage in  the Engle-Granger framework is to test whether the variables are 
cointegrated. This is accomplished by testing the residuals o f  the equation for a unit 
root or stationarity. The economic interpretation o f  cointegration is that if  two or 
more series are linked to form an equilibrium relationship spanning the long run, 
then even though the series themselves may be non-stationary, they will move 
closely together over time and their d i f f e r e n c e  will therefore be stationary. The unit 
root was tested using the Augmented Dickey Fuller tests on the residuals (as 
advocated by Engle and Granger).
The second stage requires estimating the short run ECM itself from the residuals o f 
the regression o f  the first stage. That is, obtaining ECTt_1( =  Yt_x -  b Y ^ ,  as shown 
inequation (3), to determine the dynamic structure o f  the system. This equation is to 
test for a long-run relationship between FDI and policy, economic and business 
facilitation represented by the variables shown in table 2.
A L n F D l t —
a  +  P i A  G D P t + p 2 A E X P t  + p 3A E X C t + p 4 A L n W A G E t + (3 5A P A T E N T t + p 6 A P 0 L t +  
SECTf-i + £(
(3)
The same model will be re-estimated using the FDI inflows in the chemical industry 
(LnFDIC) more specifically as a dependent variable.
A L n F D I C t  =
a  +  p xA G D P t + p 2A E X P t + p 3& E X C t + P 4 A L n W A G E t + p 5A P A T E N T t + p e A P O L t +
199
6ECTt- i  + Et
(4)
6.4.3 Testing o f weakening pa ten t protection by com pulsory  licensing
Since Thailand implemented CL during 2006-2008, the available data to analyse any 
impact after this policy implementation is too small; only two data points. It was 
therefore decided to extend this analysis to include other countries that had 
implemented CL for pharmaceuticals during the period 2000-2008. Those countries 
that initiated a CL but ended up with voluntary license or discounting, such as South 
Africa or Taiwan, are excluded.
6.4.3.1 Selected sam ples
A group o f  nine countries was selected from the Beall and Kuhn (2012), study which 
assembled a database o f  all incidents in  which a CL was publically initiated or 
implemented (Beall and Kuhn 2012). Most countries that had implemented CL had 
done so for HIV/AIDS. Thailand began with HIV/AIDS medicines, but is the only 
country to then issue CLs for heart disease and cancer medicines. Egypt issued a CL 
on the male erectile dysfunction medicine sildenafil (Viagra). The details are 
presented in table 6.7.
Table 6.7 C L  series by coun try  and  year
No. Y ear C ountry Diseases N ational Incom e group
1 2001 Brazil HIV/AIDS Upper-middle-income
country
2 2002 Egypt Erectile
dysfunction
Lower-middl e-income 
country
3 2003-2004 Malaysia HIV/AIDS Upper-middl e-income 
country
4 2003 Zimbabwe HIV/AIDS Low-income country
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5 2004 Mozambique HIV/AIDS Low-income country
6 2004 Zambia HIV/AIDS Lower-middl e-income
country
7 2005 Ghana HIV/AIDS Lower-middle-income
country
8 2005 Indonesia HIV/AIDS Lower-middle-income
country
9 2006-2008 Thailand HIV/AIDS, 
Heart disease, 
Anti-cancer
Upper-middle-income
country
Source: Beall R. and Korbel J. (2012)
6.4.3.2 V ariables and  data  sources
Variables were selected to represent the set o f  host country determinants o f  FDI 
developed by UNCTAD(1998) (UNCTAD 1998). FDI data were obtained from the 
WDI database. The data on FDI inflows were the net inflows o f  the amount o f  
investment by foreign investors into affiliates where they own at least 10% o f paid 
up capital. This is the sum o f  equity capital, reinvestment o f  earnings, other long­
term capital, and short-term capital as shown in the balance o f  payments. The 
selected variables representing the policy framework are Political Stability and  
Absence o f Violence (PV), exchange ra te  and lending in terest ra te  (LEND). 
G ross D om estic P ro d u c t (GDP) and num ber o f population (POP) were selected to 
explain economic determinants. W ith respect to business facilitation, the degree o f 
country openness to trade (OPEN), the proportion o f  import and export value o f 
national GDP, is represented.
These data come from three databases. First, the W orld Development Indicator 
(WDI), the primary World Bank database compiled from officially-recognized 
international sources, presents global development data available including social, 
economic, financial, natural resources and environmental indicators covering the
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period from 1960 onwards. The second source is the WGI, the source for the 
aggregate indicators drawn from a diverse variety o f  survey institutes, non­
governmental organizations, and international organizations. PV is selected from the 
WGI database to measure the likelihood that the government will be destabilized or 
overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, including domestic violence and 
terrorism. It is combined from the views o f  a large number o f  enterprises, citizens 
and expert survey respondents in developed and developing countries. Third, IMF 
International Financial Statistics is the source o f  time series o f  all aspects o f  
international and domestic finance. The series o f  exchange rate, lending interest rate, 
and the total value o f  exports are retrieved from this source.
C L  is a dummy variable, taking the value one for a period after policy 
implementation.FDI and other variables, as shown in the Table 6.8 were collected 
from 1995 to 2009 and adjusted to 2005 price.
Table 6.8 Sum m ary  variab le  description
Variable name Variable description Source
LnGDP Natural log o f  GDP WDI
LnEXP Natural log o f  value o f exports IMF
LnPOP Natural log o f  number o f  population WDI
PV Political stability and violence index WGI
CL Dummy variable o f  compulsory licensing Beall R. and Kuhn 
R. (2012)
EXC Exchange index (2005=100) IMF
OPEN Openness o f  country measured by the 
proportion o f  import and export value and 
total GDP
WDI
LEND Lending interest rate, Lending interest rate is 
the rate charged by banks on loans to prime 
customers.
IMF
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6.4.3.2 Model specification
The econometric analysis is based on a panel data set o f ten countries from 1995- 
2009. The equation estimated is specified as follows:
L n F D lu  =  P 0 +  fa L n G D P u  + p 2L nE X P it +  fo L n P O P «  + f a P V lt + p s CLit +  p b EXCit
+ P 7O P E N it + p e lN F ic +  P^ILENDk + P ^ o T lM E i t (5)
where, i signifies a country in year t; Po is the constant term; PjS are the coefficients 
to be estimated; p, represents the country-specific effect which is assumed to be time 
invariant, and eu is the error component. In addition to the variables explained 
earlier, the time variable (Time) is included to capture any relationship between time 
trend and FDI. Since country specific effects are included in the regressions, a 
decision was required concerning whether they are treated as random or fixed. The 
Hausman test was applied to check whether the fixed effects model is more efficient 
than the random effects model. This will be true i f  the null hypothesis o f  no 
correlation between the individual effects and the regressors is rejected.
6.4.4 Impact on innovation
This analysis is to assess the impact that strengthening patent protection has on 
innovation activities resulting from local inventors who benefit from technology 
transfer or spillover effects from foreign patents filed in  Thailand, as well as their 
role in stimulating the R&D or innovation atmosphere. The descriptive statistics o f 
patent applications filed in  Thailand, as well as R&D expenditure, are analysed to 
see the trend o f  innovation activities is related to the patent protection atmosphere.
The number o f  patent applications made was obtained from the Department o f 
Intellectual Property website (www.ipthailand.go.th). All types o f  patent application 
were obtained, and those specifically in the A61K industrial class referred to 
pharmaceutical compositions in the IPC (International Patent Classification) was 
isolated as a sub-group, over the period 1970-2008. Data on R&D expenditure was 
obtained from the Office o f  the National Research Council o f  Thailand, M inistry o f 
Science and Technology.
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The results from all four analyses outlined above were consolidated to build a 
holistic picture o f  the likely implications o f  the patent amendment in 1992 on Thai 
FDI and innovation.
6.5. Results
6.5.1 Testing the structural change of patent policy in 1992
From a yearly time series o f  FDI inflows to all industries from 1970 to 2008 
(yielding 39 observations), a Chow statistic, using 1992 as the breakdate, o f  0.40 was 
obtained. The five percent critical value o f  F-test is 4.17, so there is no evidence o f  a 
structural break. A similar result is found from the structural test in the chemical 
industry only (Chow statistic o f  2.28).
Figure 6.5 presents the results o f  treating the breakdate as unknown, plotting the 
sequence o f Chow statistics as a function o f candidate breakdates. The candidate 
breakdates are along the x-axis; the value o f the Chow statistics on the y-axis. It can 
be seen that there is considerable variation in the Chow test sequence before the 
policy implementation but it is relatively stable after 1992. The Chow statistic 
reaches a peak at 45.7 in 1988 for all industries and at 20.14 in 1987 for chemical 
industry only. Testing for an unknown breakdate, the Andrews 5 percent critical 
value is 12.9, just over three times the F-test critical value. The Andrews critical 
value is sketched in Figure 6.5 as well.
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Figure 6.5 Testing for s truc tu ra l change o f unknow n tim ing of FDI inflows in 
all industry  and chemical industry
50
1988
There is therefore no evidence of structural changes in the trend of FDI inflows into 
all industries in Thailand, or in to the chemical industry particularly, after the patent 
law change in 1992. However, there are significant structural breaks in 1987 and 
1988, the shifting point of FDI inflows as the point of growing political and 
economic stability. The issue of inadequate patent protection for pharmaceuticals 
had been raised in the US Chamber of Commerce in 1986. The PhRMA filed a 
petition with the US Government to withdraw benefits under the GSP to Thailand 
and a series of meetings between the US and Thai governments took place in 1987 
(Markandya 2001). As a result, it could be possible that the situation around 1987 
was the more critical in affecting foreign investors (especially from the US) to feel 
more confident about investing in Thailand, and thus the 1992 policy change impact 
was effectively foreshadowed five years earlier and, perhaps peculiarly, thus had a 
‘retrospective’ effect and the law itself was a formality to the action that had 
occurred a few years before. Thus, more qualitatively, it is perhaps likely that the 
‘process’ leading to strengthening of patent law in 1992 did generate a significant 
structural break. This demonstrates the importance of looking for impact in the years 
around an event, rather than just at the event itself.
205
6 .5 .2  T h e  d e te r m in a n ts  o f  F D I in  T h a ila n d
Unit root tests were undertaken for the variables in question given that it is well 
known that macro time-series data tend to exhibit a trend that renders them no 
stationary; that is, the variables have means, variances, and covariance’s that are not 
time invariant. Table 6.9 presents the results of running an augmented Dickey-Fuller 
test (one lag; Dickey and Fuller 1979) for the variables in both level and differenced 
form. The results indicate that in level form all variables are no stationary. In the 
case of first differences, however, the null hypothesis of nonstationarity can be 
rejected for the relevant variables, at least at the 5% level.
Table 6.9 Testing fo r unit root a t lag 1
V ariables Levels/
1(0)
F irst
Difference/
......... ..»(1)
1%
C ritical 
Value a
5%
C ritical 
Value *
LnFDI -0.679 -5.062** -3.668 -2.966
LnFDIC -1.061 -7.180** -3.668 -2.966
LnGDP -1.518 -3.818* -3.668 -2.966
LnEXP -1.151 -3.341* -3.668 -2.966
LnEXC -0.440 -4.526**b -3.668 -2.966
LnWAGE -1.792 -4.016**b -3.668 -2.966
a Mackinnon critical values for rejection of null hypothesis of a unit root 
b at second difference/1(2)
♦Denotes significance at the 5% level 
♦♦Denotes significance at the 1% level
In view of this, it is necessary to determine whether there is at least one linear 
combination of these nonstationary variables (in level form). The Johansen and 
Juselius (1990) method was used to determine whether there is a stable long-run 
relationship among the relevant variables in logarithmic form. Testing for a 
cointegrated relationship among the interested variables, using the Engel and 
Granger (1987) test, shows, in Table 6.10, that the null hypothesis of no 
cointegrating relationship can be rejected at both the 5% and 1% levels, thereby
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suggesting that there is more than one linear combination o f  these non-stationary 
variables (in level form) that is stationary.
Table 6.10 Cointegration Tests
No R esiduals of equations ADF
statistics
5%
C ritical
Value*
1%
C ritical
Value*
1 InFDIt, InGDPt, InEXC,, lnWAGEt, PATENT, 
POL
-3.247* -2.964 -3.662
2 InFDI,, InEXPt, InEXC,, InWAGE,, PATENT, 
POL
-4.924** -2.964 -3.662
3 InFDIC,, InGDP,, InEXC,, InWAGE,, 
PATENT, POL
-5.125** -2.964 -3.662
4 InFDIC,, InEXP,, InEXC,, InWAGE,, PATENT, 
POL
-6.757** -2.964 -3.662
a Mackinnon critical values for rejection o f  null hypothesis o f  a unit root 
♦Denotes significance at the 5% level 
♦♦Denotes significance at the 1% level
Table 6.11 shows the results o f  the ECM  models. The coefficients o f  the variables 
represent short-run growth rates, whereas the coefficient o f  the lagged ECT term 
obtained from the cointegrating equation in level form denotes the speed o f  
adjustment back to the long-run situation in which the variables grow at the same 
constant rate. Two ECM  specifications o f  overall industry FDI are reported in 
models 1 and 2, while models 3 and 4 are FDI specifically in the chemical industry. 
Overall, the ECM  estimation on FDI inflows to the chemical industry is identical to ' 
the estimation o f  FDI inflows to all industries.
The ECM  estimators suggest that a percentage change in  real GDP and export value 
have a positive and statistically significant effect on FDI inflows. For example, the 
estimates in  models 1 and 2 suggest that a 1% increase in the percentage growth rate 
o f  real GDP and export growth generates a 1.8% and 1.1 % growth in FDI inflows to 
all industries respectively. For the chemical industry results are similar; a 1%
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increase in the percentage growth rates o f  real GDP and export growth generates a 
2.4% and 1.6% growth in FDI inflows respectively. As anticipated, the real wage has 
a negative and statistically significant effect on FDI inflows. A 1% increase in wage 
generates around 1.6%-1.9% decrease in FDI flows to all industries, and a 2.5%- 
3.3% decrease in FDI flows to the chemical industry.
The exchange rate has an insignificant impact on FDI, both overall and for the 
chemical industry. In addition, all models show that political turmoil has a negative 
but not statistically significant effect on FDI inflows, except model 3 which shows 
political instability reducing FDI growth in the chemical industry by 0.4%. The 
dummy variable controlling for patent law change is also not significant, although 
direction suggests that after patent law amendment FDI inflows decreased by 0.07%  
overall and 0.15% in the chemical industry. The relative fit and efficiency o f  the 
ECM is acceptable, and as the theory predicts the lagged residual terms in all 
equations are negative and statistically significant; for example, the lagged error 
correction term in model 1 o f FDI inflows to all industry suggests that a 1 percent 
deviation during the current year from long run FDI flows to all industry is corrected 
by approximately 0.35% in the next year on average. The relative fit and efficiency 
o f  the model is acceptable, but not as good a fit as the first model. As theory predicts, 
the lagged residual terms are negative and statistically significant.
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Table 6.11 E r ro r  C orrec tion  and  OLS regression models o f FDI determ inants 
in all industries (dependent variab le  = ALnFDI) and  in the  chem ical industry  
(dependent variabie=A LnFD IC)
M odel ALnFDI ALnFDIC
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ALnGDP 1.821** - 2.427** -
(0.823) (1.103)
ALnEXP - 1.111** - 1.652**
(0.426) (0.631)
ALnEXC -0.004 -0.005 -0.039 0.021
(0.105) (0.077) (1.342) (0.111)
ALnWAGE -1.870** -1.567*** -3.315*** -2.517***
(0.808) (0.504) (1.084) (0.741)
PA TEN T -0.076 -0.070 -0.159 -0.068
(0.131) (0.100) (0.173) (0.148)
POL -0.186 -0.164 -0.392* -0.291
(0.157) (0.121) (0.214) (0.183)
ECT,.i -0.352*** -0.852*** -0.839*** -1.137***
(0.134) (0.167) (0.173) (0.16)
Constant -0.152 0.118 0.215 0.096
(0.104) (0.087) (0.139) (0.129)
F-stat 2.15* 7.20*** 5.90*** 10.14***
R2 0.294 0.582 0.533 0.663
Adjusted R2 0.157 0.501 0.443 0.597
Notes: Terms in  parentheses are standard errors, *Denotes significance at the 10% 
level, **Denotes significance at the 5% level, ***Denotes significance at the 1% 
level
6.5.3 The im pact o f com pulsory licensing on FD I
Figure 6.6 illustrates the trend in FDI before and after the implementation o f  CL in 
nine countries. It can be seen that the FDI value for Brazil, Malaysia, M ozambique
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and Zambia is stable, while Egypt, Ghana, Indonesia and Zimbabwe show an 
increasing trend. Only Thailand shows a decreasing trend.
Figure 6.6 FDI inflows in log of million USD at 2005 prices
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The time effect was tested and was found to be insignificant; there is no time effect 
needed on this sample (see appendix 10 for the results). Since there is a high 
correlation within three variables, GDP, export value and number of population, they 
are subject to three separate specifications. The first model. Model A, tests for GDP 
impact and lending interest rate and inflation rate. The second model. Model B, 
removes GDP and tests for export variable, and the number of population was tested 
in Model C.
Table 6.12 shows that the control variables arc of the expected sign. GDP, exports 
and the number of population have a positive and significant effect on FDI. The most 
highly significant and robust variable is political stability. The higher the score of 
political stability the higher the FDI inflows. CL policy shows a positive but not 
statistically significant impact on FDI. The most unstable coefficient is the exchange 
rate. It shows that depreciating the currency by 1% would increase FDI by 0.5% in 
model A but shows a different sign in the other models. Openness of the economy
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conforms to  theoretical priors that increased international trade raises FDI. The 
implied elasticity is around 2%. Lending interest rate shows a negative impact on 
FDI by 0.5-0.6%, which is significant in model C.
T able  6.12 D eterm inants o f FD I in nine countries
D ependent variab le3 In FDI
________________ (A) (B) iC)
InGDP 0.933*** —.... . ■ ' \ w /
(0.137)
lnEXP 0.822**
(0.394)
InPOP 1.776***
(0.334)
PV 0.623** 0.668** 0.802***
(0.262) (0.303) (0.280)
CL 0.253 0.124 0.236
(0.224) (0.271) (0.228)
Exchange rate 0.005 -0.013** -0.005
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
OPEN 0.006 0.028*** 0.017***
(0.004) (0.008) (0.005)
Lending interest 
rate
-0.005 -0.005 -0.006*
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
_cons -2.625 0.764 -10.814*
(3.400) (8.982) (5.879)
N 77 76 77
0.261^(w ith in ) 0.271 0.369
U 0.663 2.153 0.897
e 0.793 0.467 0.823
Hausman-test 8.99 37.86 4.76
Model Type
(P=0.174) (P=0.000) (P=0.575)
REMREM FEM
Notes: ***, **, and 
respectively
* represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% leve ls ,"
Figures in parentheses indicate standard deviation.
I  J j i U ,  ±  x a v u  v i i v v i  111UUV1
REM: Random effect model
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Figure 6.7 shows the number of patent applications classified by type and nation. 
This figure illustrates the number of patents filed has been increasing steadily from 
47 applications in 1979 to 9,730 applications in 2009 and reached a peak in 2005 at 
10,885 applications. Approximately 60% of patents filed in Thailand are from 
foreigners. After patent law amendment in 1992, although the Thai patent rate has 
increased at an accelerating rate, the invention patent application rate, which reilccts 
innovative activity, has levelled off at around 800-1000 applications per year since 
1999. Approximately 70% of Thai patent applications are design patents, a patent 
that protects only the ornamental appearance of an invention, not its utilitarian 
features.
6 .5 .4  T h e  r o le  o f  p a te n t in  s t im u la t in g  lo ca l in n o v a tio n  a n d  R & D  in v e s tm e n t
6 .5 .4 .1  In n o v a tiv e  a c tiv it ie s  in g e n e r a l
Figure 6.7 N um ber of patent applications by type and coun try  in T hailand  from  
1979-2009
12.000
10,000
8.000
4,000
2,000
Foreigner design patent 
l Foreigner invention patent 
i Thai design patent 
I Thai invention patent
Source: Department of Intellectual Property, Thailand
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Specifically focusing on pharmaceutical patents, Figure 6.8 shows that US 
pharmaceutical firms are the largest patent owners, totalling 1,504 applications, 
while Dutch pharmaceutical firms are the second, totalling 489 applications. During 
1989-2007 Thai firms filed patents for just 96 applications.
Figure 6.8 N um ber of paten t filing in classification category A61K, 
pharm aceutical patent, by paten t ow ner country
6 .5 .4 .2  In n o v a tiv e  a c t iv it ie s  in p h a r m a c e u t ic a l  in d u str y
Source: Department of Intellectual Property, Thailand
6.5.4.3 Research and developm ent budget
Information on R&D was not collected in Thailand until 1995. R&D expenditure in 
Thailand is available from 1987 to 2007, in non-consecutive years. R&D expenditure 
by the public sector has fluctuated from US$ 48-100 million annually. Private sector 
R&D has been steady, with a drop in 1997-1999 during the Asian economic 
recession. As shown in Table 6.13, it can be seen that R&D from the private sector 
began to increase in 2001, becoming higher than public sector R&D investment in 
2003 and by 2005 private sector R&D was twice that of the public sector. Though 
the overall trend of R&D expenditure has increased over time, as a proportion of 
GDP it has stabilized since 2001 at around 2.5%.
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Table 6.13 Value (USD) and  source o f  R& D expenditure and  percen tage o f 
GDP
Year Total R&D
expenditure
(USD)
R&D Sources R&D
Public Private Education 
and not for 
profit
organization
expenditure/ 
GDP (%)
1987 103,511,606 n/a n/a n/a
1989 113,012,750 n/a n/a n/a 0.15
1991 153,920,546 n/a n/a n/a 0.16
1993 176,675,035 n/a n/a n/a 0.14
1995 206,969,428 100,986,607 15,019,403 105,817,841 0.13
1996 221,125,378 108,320,371 23,843,811 112,624,177 0.12
1997 155,201,086 86,025,037 6,465,499 69,027,118 0.10
1999 132,151,684 48,244,229 9,882,849 83,789,325 0.11
2001 245,888,857 111,547,030 85,161,258 134,229,864 0.22
2003 369,028,600 83,163,249 141,131,513 285,726,795 0.26
2005 416,669,492 71,480,831 166,969,417 345,015,751 0.23
Source: Office o f  the National Research Council o f  Thailand, Ministry o f Science 
and T echnology
6.6. Conclusion and discussion
This study analysed patent policy reform issues that arise with the global 
strengthening o f  protection for intellectual property. Thailand is an interesting case 
study given its role as a major developing country, which has the two extreme 
policies o f  strengthening and weakening patent law: complying with the TRIPS 
Agreement 13 years before it was required to and then implementing CL in seven 
medicines within two years. This chapter examined the contribution o f  strengthening 
and weakening patent protection to Thailand’s inward flow o f  FDI and technology 
transfer. This chapter has generated four sets o f  results.
First, using a series o f  FDI inflows from 1970 to 2008, the empirical estimation 
suggests that there is no significant change in  FDI inflows after the patent law
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amendment in 1992.That is, patent law  does not appear to have increased FD1; 
although the process leading up to, and culminating in this law, may have done.
Second, GDP, exchange rate and export growth have a positive and significant effect 
in attracting FDI. Amendment to the patent law in 1992 has a negative impact on 
FDI inflows to Thailand, but this is not significant and thus not robust.
Third, weakening pharmaceutical patent protection using CL does not necessarily 
keep away foreign investors. Market attractiveness, both size and quality in terms o f  
GDP, population number, and international trade are significant factors in attracting 
foreign investors. In addition, political stability is an important factor affecting 
foreign investment.
Fourth, strengthening patent protection does not appear to lead to a positive jum p in 
innovation activities as estimated by the number o f  inventive patent filed. Though 
the number o f patent applications from local firms has increased, it is far smaller 
than those being filed from aboard.
Overall then, the results suggest that strengthening patent protection may have had 
an impact on increasing FDI in Thailand, but that there is a very weak level o f  
evidence for this, and none for patent protection increasing innovation. Similarly, 
there is little evidence that weakening protection through CL has led to significant 
decreases in  FDI. Though the Chow test revealed structural change in  1988, this 
coincided with when the Thai economy changed dramatically. Thus, although 
pressure on patent law amendment from trade negotiation with the US was initiated 
in 1988, and thus could have affected FDI, the country's economy was also opening 
rapidly to international trade. After correcting for time trend, neither amendment 
1988 or 1992 have a significant effect on FDI inflows. This contrasts with the study 
o f  Kawai (2006). This may be because that study employed the number o f  patent 
applications as an IPR index. Since the trend is for patent application numbers to 
also increase over time, this could lead to a positive relationship. The study 
presented in this chapter instead used a dummy variable that shows the difference 
between the two periods, b e f o r e  a n d  a f t e r  t h e  policy.
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This study has limitations. First, although this study tried to identify the channel o f 
technology transfer or knowledge diffusion which is claimed as the aim o f  setting up 
the patent system, there are some channels that knowledge transfer could gain 
through imports o f  high-technology products, adoption o f  foreign technology and 
acquisition o f  human capital, licensing, and personnel movements, or from informal 
means through imitation, reverse engineering, and spillover (M askus 2004). 
Choosing activities to reveal patent impact on technology transfer is always difficult 
since it is hard to identify and measure. This study focuses on FDI as a main channel 
o f  knowledge transfer since it has been claimed as the most important channel for 
technology transfer (W ang and Blomstrom 1992; Borensztein, De Gregorio et al. 
1998).
The second limitation regarding FDI inflow employed in this study is that every 
industry was considered to be equally influenced by patent protection. Although 
around 70% o f  FDI inward to industry sector was accounted for by electrical 
appliances, machinery and transport equipment and chemicals which could be 
considered as IPR sensitive, the limitation o f this study is that the importance o f  IPR 
protection varies between industries (Mansfield 1994; Javorcik 2004). IPR 
protection may play a more prominent role in capital- or skill-intensive investment, 
such as R&D facilities, than labour-intensive facilities. Therefore, this suggests 
future work to assess the patent impact on technology transfer through other means 
or to develop a model that allows for different IPR coefficients between sectors.
Third, this study failed to investigate the quality o f FDI since data at firm level 
cannot be obtained. There will be a range o f  influences on a foreign investor’s 
decision between setting up manufacturing facilities and establishing facilities that 
are solely based on marketing and distribution o f imported products. Javorick (2004) 
and A n et al. (2008) found that stronger IPR protection is associated with the 
decision to set up production facilities rather than setting up distribution facilities 
(Javorcik 2004; An, M askus et al. 2008). A n analysis using a firm-level data set 
would allow for examination in future i f  data are available.
(Mansfield 1994; Javorcik 2004)Therefore, this suggests future work to assess the 
patent impact on technology transfer through other means
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Fourth, since there is no data on FDI inflows specific to the pharmaceutical industry, 
the analysis in this study used the chemical industry instead, since the 
pharmaceutical industry is categorised in this industry. It is also not known how 
significant the pharmaceutical industry is, as a proportion o f  the chemical industry. 
In spite o f  patent protection not correlating with FDI inflows, it might have an effect 
on FDI inflows to the pharmaceutical industry if  separately analysed. This limitation 
also exists with analysis o f  FDI inflows to developing countries that have 
implemented CL.
W ith respect to the pharmaceutical industry, it was anticipated that CL could 
‘destroy’ FDI (Bird and Cahoy 2008). However, this analysis does not support this 
conclusion. This result is also supported by Correa (2000), who suggests that a weak 
system o f  patent protection on pharmaceuticals was the main factor in making a 
country a manufacturing base for these pharmaceutical companies (Correa 2000). 
Another study found that there was no uniform decline in the rate o f  medicine 
patenting and other measures o f  inventive activity by companies affected by CL 
(Colleen 2003). Interestingly, Weiburst and Scherer (1995) concluded that that the 
exclusion o f  pharmaceuticals from patent protection was a significant factor leading 
Italy to become a base for export-oriented production o f  generic medicines 
(Weisburst and Scherer 1995).
The potential for domestic product improvement or innovation is problematic, as 
local firms appear to be more interested in design patents. Qian (2010) pointed out 
that some developing countries have always had patent protection, yet, domestically, 
they do not have innovative potential and rely heavily on imports (Qian 2010). In the 
case o f  Thailand, the R&D budget is very small compared with neighbouring 
countries, i.e. M alaysia and Singapore. This m ay be the reason for the small 
application rate for invention patents by Thais compared with foreign firms. For the 
pharmaceutical industry specifically, there is little competence to produce complex 
medicines by local pharmaceutical companies in Thailand. Local drug companies 
invested less than 1% o f  total costs into R&D, and m ost active ingredients have to be 
imported from manufacturers overseas (Thailand Board o f  Investment 2011). 
Although some Thai researchers are capable o f  undertaking research and 
development (Vanichkom 2012), the lack o f  the recognition o f  the scientific
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community and clear potential career path, means that scientists are likely to work 
aboard rather than in Thailand leading to a shortage o f  scientists (Kuanpoth 2007). 
To create a positive impact o f  inward pharmaceutical R&D requires improvements 
in both the scientific community and R&D facilities.
The fundamental message from this chapter is that the role o f  stronger patent 
protection on stimulating innovation and knowledge transfer through FDI has not 
been met. Conversely, evidence from the experience o f  low- and middle-income 
countries suggests also that CL does not negatively impact FDI.
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C H A PTER  7 CO N CLU SIO N  AND RECO M M EN D A TIO N S
Before 1995, countries were able to set the level o f patent protection for the 
pharmaceutical industry that suited their level o f development. However, the 
initiation o f  the W TO-TRIPS Agreement set a minimum standard o f  patent 
protection for countries that are Members o f  the WTO. The main implication o f  this 
Agreement for health is that the monopoly rights from patents can make medicines 
more expensive, preventing the majority o f  people who are poor from affording 
them. Thailand, as a Member o f  the WTO, was not able to avoid this requirement. 
However, Thailand amended its patent law to comply with the TRIPS Agreement 
eight years ahead o f the deadline for developing countries, with the justification that 
stricter patent protection would provide confidence to foreign investors, especially 
pharmaceutical companies, to invest in R&D or to produce medicines in Thailand. 
Therefore, Thailand would benefit from technology transfers and the restricted 
patent law would enhance local innovative activities.
It has been almost two decades since the Thai patent law changed. A number o f  
articles and reports have been published suggesting the likely impact stricter patent 
legislation might have on limiting access to medicines. Surprisingly, empirical 
evidence is rare. The justification o f changing the Thai patent law, to enhance 
technology transfers, has also not been yet been proven. Another issue is the effect o f  
implementing measures under TRIPS flexibilities, such as CL. This measure 
provides the opportunity to purchase the generic equivalent version at a fraction o f 
the price o f  the patented medicine. However, adverse reactions from pharmaceutical 
companies and the governments o f  patent owners are significant. The issuance o f CL 
by the Thai government during 2006-2008 on seven medicines lead to controversy 
over whether Thailand was better o ff  with the licenses or not.
This final chapter responds to the overall research question “W hat are the 
implications o f  pharmaceutical patent policy in Thailand?” through drawing together 
the findings related to the four research sub-questions which were, (i) how much 
does patent determine price?; (ii) do prices impede access to medicines?; (iii) do 
patent policy and price affect the entry o f  new medicines into the Thai market?; and
219
(iv) does stricter patenting meet the objective o f  stimulating technology transfers and 
innovation activities?
The thesis has aimed to help guide pharmaceutical patent policy in Thailand, using 
econometric tools as a common methodology. Together the four sub-studies 
contribute to a more holistic recommendation than would normally be provided, 
balancing various aspects o f  the effect o f  patent strengthening and weakening. It 
therefore provides a more comprehensive set o f  recommendations for pursuing 
optimal pharmaceutical patent policy strategy in Thailand. Lessons here are also 
useful to other countries in similar situations.
Following this introduction, the next section summarises the results related to each 
research question. It then follows with the limitations o f  this thesis and 
recommendations for future work. The recommendations for policy makers are 
provided subsequently. The last section discusses the overall conclusion and current 
issues o f  patent protection in other developing countries.
7.1 Summary of findings to address the research questions
The overall conclusion relating to each o f these aspects is shown in Table 7.1. In 
conclusion, this study found that patent increases price which ultimately impedes 
access. However, strengthening patent protection increases the opportunity o f being 
able to access newly developed medicines in the future. Implementing CL can bring 
down the price and increase access to current medicines. However, patients in the 
future would have, as a consequence, less access to new medicines. W ith regard to 
FDI, in Thailand the patent protection level has no relationship with foreign investor 
decisions and local R&D activities. Although CL is not correlated with FDI, the 
effects on the local innovation rate and on R&D activities are unknown. More details 
on each dimension are then provided below.
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Table 7.1 Conclusion
Dim ension Aspects P a ten t protection 
S trengthening  W eakening
Note
Health Price
Current
access
Future access
\ 4I
______ !
Only oncology 
medicines
Economic FDI Overall and chemical 
industry
Local
innovation
rate
N/A Overall and
pharmaceutical
industry
Local R&D 
investment
1 N/A No data on R&D in
pharmaceutical
industry
Note:
f  Positive relationship; ^N egative relationship,^: not significant change from patent 
policy
N/A: N ot enough information
7.1.1 Patent information system
In estimating the impact o f patent legislation on price and access, the most 
fundamental information is the patent status o f the medicines concerned. It is 
somewhat surprising, therefore, that there is no updated patent information system 
linking patents with each active ingredient in Thailand, and that the patent search 
processes are complex and resource consuming. Chapter 2 outlined the processes by 
which patent status may be found in Thailand, following W HO guidelines.
This is not, however, just a practical issue for this chapter. The inaccessible or 
unavailable nature o f patent information affects two crucial decision-making 
processes. First, cheaper procurements can only be made if  the patent status o f each 
medicine is known (World Health Organization 2004). This chapter shows that 13 
monopoly medicines, accounting for 260 million Baht (US$7.9 million) in 2008, 
could have been procured from international providers without breaching patent 
legislation, potentially saving the Thai health system money. As stated in W HO’s 
Medicines Strategy. Framework for Action in Essential Drugs and Medicines Policy 
2000-2003, the average price o f  generic medicines can fall by as much as 30% o f  the
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original price, suggesting that approximately 78 million Baht (US$2.4 million) could 
have been saved.
Second, patent information is required to ensure that domestic generic medicine 
manufacturers are able to make use o f patent information for reverse engineering or 
bio-equivalent preparation o f medicines to  prepare for registration once the original 
version’s patent is expired (Milani and Oh 2011). Therefore the first 
recommendation is for the Thai authorities to strengthen systems for gathering, 
validating and disseminating patent information for pharmaceuticals.
7.1.2 The role of patent on price
It is important to note that access to medicines is not only determined by price: as the 
W orld Health Organization (WHO) indicates, there are five main determinants and 
affordable pricing is only one o f  these. However, price is usually the focus o f 
attention in debates concerning access to medicines. Patents are seen as a cause o f  
high prices, and thus as a barrier to access.
Chapter 3 confirmed that patents play a substantial role in determining the price o f  
pharmaceuticals. This effect is relatively high compared to other studies, which 
could be because there is no direct price control policy in  Thailand, allowing the 
product owner to set the price. O f course this should not be a surprise, and indeed is 
expected, as the purpose o f patenting is to ensure that the price is higher than the 
marginal cost o f  production in order to recoup and incentivise R&D; the questions 
relate more to whether that price is set to  do this, or set a t a  higher level in  order to  
generate ‘super-normal profits’.
This study investigates the effect o f  patents, along with other market characteristics 
and medicine characteristics, on the retail prices o f  oncology medicines available in 
Thailand in  the year 2008. Although m arket characteristics, i.e. a  larger sales volume 
and a more competitive market also affect price, their effect on price is minimal, i.e. 
around 3-30%, and much less than the effect o f  patents, which is around 200%. 
Therefore, patent policy could be  an effective option to bring down the price. 
Incorporating TRIPS-flexibilities such as CL, parallel importation or other 
exceptions to patentability into the Thai patent policy may help to achieve the 
desired price decreases.
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7.1.3 The role o f patented price on access
Clearly, the impact o f  patent on price is only a proxy for eventual impact on access, 
with the argument that patent increases price (by design) and that price is a key 
barrier to access, and hence that patents reduce access. By using the status o f  a 
medicine as being on the NLEM  as a proxy o f  full access to Thai patients (or rather, 
zero price), Chapter 4 found that higher prices decrease the probability o f  a medicine 
being on thence, but that this was not statistically significant. That is, price is 
important, but not the most important factor driving the listing o f  the medicine on the 
NLEM. It is somewhat more surprising that a medicine being patented itself 
decreases the probability o f  being on the list significantly. It is likely, in this case, 
that patented medicines are new to the market, and the NLEM committee are perhaps 
less sure o f  their safety or the benefits gained from them, when compared with the 
cost incurred.
This is important, as whether a medicine listed on the NLEM  is also influenced by 
cost-effectiveness analysis. The benchmark to be included on the NLEM has been 
set at 100,000 Thai baht (approximately US$ 3,300) per QALY gained (Kingkaew, 
M aleewong et al. 2012). Given this threshold, new medicines are likely to be seen as 
cost-ineffective in the Thai setting since they will have greater risk but also, o f  
course, a greater cost, and leading most to be rejected. Also, as QALYs gained from 
oncology medicines are often very small, and again this biases against their being 
listed in the NLEM. These are possible confounding factors that may be being 
proxied for the patent variable in analysis.
Nonetheless, it appears that being patented will mean that a medicine is less 
accessible to the Thai population, but that, ironically, this is not the case with a 
higher price. With respect to non-NLEM medicines that are patented, they are clearly 
unaffordable for Thai workers based on the level o f  the daily wage required to buy 
them. Although price does limit access, the size o f  this effect might not be as high as 
expected, as the price elasticity is -0.4. Therefore, NLEM  medicine selection should 
be considered regardless o f  patent status. Special measures such as financial support 
from the government or pharmaceutical companies, or using TRIPS-flexibilities, i f  
needed, should be implemented to help poor patients get access to  non-NLEM
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medicines. However, the size o f  the effect should be considered seriously since it 
determines the appropriate measures to be implemented.
7.1.4 The role of patents on the speed of the product launch
Following from the above discussion, there are two critical factors determining 
access: affordability and availability. W hile affordability has been the main concern 
in many national and international debates, less attention has been paid to the 
availability o f  the medicine, and how patent legislation may impact on market entry 
strategies. In Chapter 5, it was found that policy variables, as well as market-driven 
factors, have a strong and significant impact on rapid entry. Stringent patent 
protection, by changing the patent law to protect product patents affects the launch 
lag significantly. In contrast, product-driven factors are weakly significant and have 
a minimal impact on the rapidity o f  launches.
Chapter 5 concluded that patent protection did indeed have a positive and significant 
relationship with how soon a medicine is launched; stronger patent protection 
facilitates more rapid entry. Conversely o f course, weakening the patent system 
through measures such as CL discourages companies from launching new products, 
or launching them so soon, and thus reduces accessibility and hence ‘future access’.
M ost importantly from the perspective o f this thesis, CL implementation could delay 
access for patients to new medicines available in other countries. Public health and 
social welfare would be affected, since removing patenting to gain increased access 
now would result in patients foregoing the opportunity to get new medicine in the 
future, as it would be less likely to be launched.This is a significant ‘cost’ o f  CL that 
does not get discussed, but clearly it is critical for policy makers to consider when 
looking at overall strategies to provide access. It is therefore vital for future research 
to establish in comparable metrics (e.g., in monetary or QALY terms) the gain from 
a CL medicine for a period o f  time versus the benefits forgone from delayed 
introduction o f  another new medicine.
7.1.5 The role of patents on the diffusion of technology
The main objective o f  patent law is to stimulate technology and knowledge transfers. 
Investment carried out by multinational corporations (MNCs) is believed to be one
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o f the m ost important vehicles for the international diffusion o f  technology. 
Unfortunately, as shown in Chapter 6, there is not enough evidence to  conclude that 
strengthened patent law  in Thailand has promoted FDI in the overall economy or in 
the chemical industry. Moreover, it has not been found that innovation activities in 
the chemical industry changed significantly as a result o f  changes in the patent law. 
In addition, this study found that although patent law has been weakened by CL, FDI 
appears, in aggregate, to not be significantly affected by this patent policy.
Empirical evidence from this study concerning the implications o f  patent law  for the 
diffusion o f  knowledge contradicts the claim o f  TRIPS advocates that the adverse 
effect o f  TRIPS on the price o f  patented medicines would be adequately 
compensated for by the benefits gained from increased technology transfer and 
domestic R&D (Abrol 2004). This is confirmed by the study o f  Grainville and 
Leonado (2003) which pointed out that neither trade liberalisation nor TRIPS are 
likely to suppress the spread o f  research and innovation and o f  generics production 
(Grainville and C.S 2003).
Recent national and international changes in patent legislative frameworks are likely 
to have profound effects on the ways in  which health and pharmaceutical innovations 
reach the poor and on how public and private research and development institutions 
pursue their work. Whereas patent rights are sometimes viewed as creating barriers 
to access to innovations in  health, it is not intellectual property, per se, that raises 
barriers, but rather how intellectual property is used and managed, particularly by  
public sector institutions. Intellectual property is only one o f  a number o f  important 
components o f  innovation such as the availability o f  skilled labour or education and 
training (M ahoney and Krattiger 2007).
7.2 Limitations to the current study and recommendations for future research
Limitations o f  this thesis can be categorised into three g ro u p s:  study scope, data 
availability, and estimator bias.
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7.2.1 Study scope
The estimations presented here looked at price, access, market entry and knowledge
transferred. Thus, given time limitations, a number o f areas have been neglected that 
may be o f  relevance.
First, although the strength o f  the study is that it is in-depth and more comprehensive 
than previous studies, the weakness o f  this study is that, since it is focused on the 
Thai experience, especially the implications o f  patent on price and access, the 
analysis may need to be repeated for other countries due to differences in their health 
systems and market regulations . However, the most obvious lesson is the need for 
balance between current and future access which may be quite generalisable.
Second, this study did not cover the impact o f  patent on future access, in  term s o f  
new m edicine development. Since the fundamental reason for patent protection is to 
provide an incentive for firms to invent new chemical entities, it is interesting to see 
how and to what extent patent influences the discovery o f new medicine. Future 
research can potentially address this issue by observing the dynamic o f  patented 
medicines in  the market before and after strengthened patent law. The level o f  
therapeutic advancement should also be accounted for since some new patented 
medicines do not have higher efficacy than medicines already on the market.
Third, this study has focused on only one disease area, cancer, as a result o f  data 
limitations. This has compromised the generalizability o f  the conclusions draw n 
since each disease has different characteristics o f  price setting and access patterns. 
Future research can be done to  strengthen this study by  extending this scope to 
include other areas o f  treatment for major health problems in Thailand. The same 
models o f  the implications o f  patents on both price and access undertaken in  this 
thesis could be replicated. Using the current patent information system it is difficult 
to identify patented medicines; this study suggests that US patent information could 
be used as a proxy o f  patent status in Thailand as a starting point. Then model 
development could follow that used in this thesis. These models should be validated 
or reanalyzed when the Thai pharmaceutical patent database is available.
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Finally, there are limits related to the estimation o f  knowledge transferred from 
foreign investment. This study employed the value o f  FDI inflows as a proxy o f  
knowledge transferred, which in reality might not be an accurate measure since 
technology transfers can be obtained either through formal means, through the 
import o f  high-technology products, adoption o f  foreign technology and acquisition 
o f  human capital, licensing, and personnel movements, or through informal means 
through imitation, reverse engineering, and spillover (Maskus 2004). However, 
previous studies suggested that choosing activity to reveal the impact o f  patents on 
technology transfers is always difficult; therefore, inward FDI has been identified as 
the most important channel for technology transfer (W ang and Blomstrom 1992; 
Borensztein, De Gregorio et al. 1998). Future work should try using other proxies o f  
FDI, since FDI inflow as employed in this study was that every industry was 
considered to be equally influenced by patent protection
Since the sensitivity to  IPR protection differs between industries, a weakness o f  this 
study is that it assumes that IPR protection equally affects every industry, and then 
only focuses on the chemical industry. IPR protection may play a more prominent 
role in  capital- or skill-intensive investment, such as R&D facilities, than labour- 
intensive facilities. This suggests that future work to assess patent implications on 
technology transfer through other means, or to develop a model that allows for 
different IPR coefficient between sectors, would be useful.
Another limitation is that FDI is measured in absolute monetary terms, it also 
includes the capital invested in low-technology industries, to access low cost raw- 
materials and unskilled labour. Further study should be done, not only using gross 
FDI as representative o f  technology diffusion, but also o f  the quality o f  FDI inflows, 
setting manufacturing facilities or distribution facilities.
7.2.2 Data limitations
There are three key methodological limitations to this study. First, the sample size is 
relatively small, for both health and trade implications analysis, since this thesis 
focused only on one disease and one country. For instance, there were only 88 active 
ingredients with QALY data available for only 24 active ingredients. The FDI inflow 
data has information for around 40 years, leading to only 40 observations, some
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models haveless than 30 observations for analysis, suggesting that it  will be difficult 
to find significant relationships from the data and the model is not robust. As 
statistical tests normally require a larger sample size to ensure a representative 
distribution o f  the population, and to  be considered representative o f  the groups o f  
people to whom results will be generalized or transferred, the number o f  units o f  
analysis used is dictated by  the type o f  research problem investigated. Unless more 
QALY data becomes available in the future, future studies should investigate how 
different QALYs gained may determine the price o f  medicine, since it is a measure 
o f  the benefit o f  that treatment.
Second, there is lack o f  clarity in  some items o f  data. W ith respect to the study o f  
patents as determinants o f  price, within a country the same medicine may have 
different prices, depending on whether it is sold in its originator brand or generic 
form, in public charitable agencies or private pharmacies, o r in urban or rural areas, 
and so it is hard to determine what the definitive ‘price’ is. This study employed 
price data from IMS, which reflect the price that companies aim  to sell to hospitals, 
wholesaler’s price. Yet, companies always offer promotions, so even the estimated 
price in  hospitals is likely to  be inaccurate, leading to the results o f  this study being 
possibly overestimated.
In  term s o f  the role o f  patents on access, since the number o f  patients who ought to 
be treated by a patented medicine is unknown, this study cannot estimate the number 
o f  cancer patients affected by patent protection. Two areas o f  future work should be  
continued in  order to extend this study, and to get clearer results o f  the impact o f 
patents on  access. First, future work should take the physician’s decision into 
account. This is because, in  general, cancer patients get medicines in a hospital, and 
the choice o f  which treatment they receive depends on the policies o f  the hospital 
and preferences o f  the doctor. Patients may also be unaware o f  medicine prices 
because they are paid for by the government, as NLEM  medicines are, bu t 
physicians are becoming more aware o f  relative medicine prices, especially i f  they 
operate under a fixed budget system (Hellerstein JK. 1998). Future work could 
estimate the change in treatment selection from a non-patent regime to a patent 
regime. Second, this study assumes that the medicine will be available i f  listed on 
the NLEM  which might not be true in  rural hospitals. N ot only is the focus on
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affordability, but future studies should account for supply chain variables to extend 
the determinants on the availability area.
7.2.3 E stim ation  bias
The limitations here have been discussed in each empirical chapter, which this 
section summarises. Estimated models in  this study could have undesirable 
properties, including biasness, inefficiency and inconsistency. Some models were 
constructed from very small sample sizes, with consequence inefficient coefficients,
i.e. the estimators have high standard errors and the expected value is not the true 
value o f  the parameter. In addition, to avoid omitted variable bias, data employed in 
the econometric approaches in this thesis were selected to represent the theory which 
raises the possibility o f  bias in the data selection leading to inclusion o f redundant 
variables. Therefore, regression analyses that are restricted to proxy variables is 
likely to return coefficient estimates that are inconsistent with their true population 
values.
A  final limitation is from the interaction between variables. Although perfect 
multicollinearity has not been observed, it is expected that there are some 
interactions among explanatory variables. Thus, some variables may appear to be 
statistically insignificant while they should besignificant. The results therefore need 
to be interpreted with some caution.
7.3 Policy recommendations
This section offers some practical recommendations to improve policies related to 
access to medicines in Thailand. Seven recommendations are proposed to help guide 
policy makers, government authorities and related stakeholders towards the most 
effective use o f  the patent system whilst safeguarding public health.
1. A national database related to pharmaceutical patents should be established. This 
information is fundamental knowledge necessary to monitor the effect o f  patenting. 
Data would be useful for research and development, technology transfers, and price- 
negotiation. This would also open the door to researchers being able to provide even 
more empirical evidence to support policy makers. As presented in Chapter 2, it 
reveals that under Thai FDA authorities, the new m edicine registration division and
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the NLEM  committee are able to identify patent information o f each medicine, 
although it is a cooperation basis rather than command by law basis. In the short run, 
data submitted to the NLEM  committee and market registration should be actively 
monitored and checked with the patent office for completeness and correction. For 
the long run, regulation to mandate patent information submission should be 
developed.
2. A permanent and authorized organization to monitor the price o f  patented 
medicines should be established. The experience in Canada has shown the benefit o f  
the Patented Medicines Prices Review Board (PMPRB). The PMPRB uses the term 
'excessive' to characterize either a high introductory price o f  a new medication, or a 
substantial increase in the price o f  an existing medication (Anis and W en 1998). 
W hen it was established, Canadian prices for patented drugs were 23% above the 
median o f  foreign prices; today, they are 10% lower than that median. Relative to 
foreign prices, there has been a 30% decline in Canadian prices for patented 
medicines since 1987 (Gray C. 1998). Given that patent is the most significant 
determinant on price, policies affecting patent status such as parallel import, 
voluntary licensing and compulsory licensing are still useful measures to negotiate 
with pharmaceutical companies when the problem o f  access is mainly due to price. 
In  addition, the mechanism o f  reference pricing that compares the price o f  patented 
medicine at national and international level should be freely available for local 
hospitals in order to improve procurement efficiently.
3. W hile the debate over patents and access is on-going and unavoidable, this study 
shows that most patented medicines are unaffordable by the majority o f  the Thai 
population. Although CL has shown itself to be an effective policy to increase access 
to medicines, it takes considerable time to implement and also creates strong 
reactions and likely impedements to access to medicines in the future. Thus, 
alternative health financing should be implemented through co-payment. An 
example would be tiered pricing, where different prices are charged determined by 
income level, rather than all medicines being free to all people on the NLEM.
4. Trade agreements between Thailand and developed countries tend now towards a 
higher patent protection system, TRIPS-Plus. It is necessary to establish an 
infrastructure providing economic evaluation to support decision making in  order to
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have a list o f  essential medicines that are freely accessible by the Thai population. 
Cost-effectiveness is widely used to provide economic appraisal to inform health 
policies in developed countries. Compared with developed countries, capacity to 
conduct cost-effectiveness analysis o f  health interventions in  developing countries is 
limited. In Thailand, the Health Economics W orking Group was established in 2007 
by the Subcommittee for the Development o f  NLEM (Subcommittee for National 
List o f  Essential Medicine Development 2008).
Economic evaluation to support this working group is mainly carried out by Health 
Intervention and Technology Assessment Program (HITAP) (Tantivess, 
Teerawattananon et al. 2009). For capacity building, HITAP developed economic 
evaluation guidelines and conducts economic evaluation training to academics, 
government officers and pharmaceutical companies (Panpiemras, Suriyawongpaisal 
et al. 2009). HTA is now expanding to be used for informing coverage decisions o f  
health technology in the development o f  the Thai Universal Coverage health benefit 
package (Mohara, Youngkong et al. 2012). A system to support the environment o f 
evidence based policy should be established. Health professionals and government 
officers at the regulatory level should be able to conduct or understand the 
importance o f  CEA o f  health products.
5. Stronger patents will encourage new medicines to be made available in the Thai 
market more quickly, but will reduce the ability o f  the Thai government to place 
them on the NLEM and thus provide them at zero cost to the Thai population, and 
weaker patents, such as through the use o f  CL, will do the opposite. This is a 
straightforward conclusion, but with profound implications for temporal equity. It is 
therefore vital that work is conducted to ensure that the benefits from increased 
current access from CL and long-term benefits from products being launched in a 
market more quickly are measured in  commensurate terms -  m onetary and/or 
QALYs or DALYS for instance -  in order that a thorough cost: benefit analysis can 
be undertaken which incorporates the most relevant information.
6. There is no rationale for accepting stronger patent protection than the TRIPS 
Agreement requires (i.e. TRIPS-Plus should be rejected). As shown in this study, 
Thailand has not experienced notable changes in FDI since its patent law amendment
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in 1992. Although there are specific instances o f  retaliation, these are m inor when 
seen at the national macro-economic level.
7. Since Thailand has had a product patent system for two decades, the knowledge 
from those patents needs to be transferred to local inventors. Patents are not intended 
to protect new knowledge, but rather its embodiment in new products or industrial 
processes. Stimulating invention patents is important to the technology development 
in the future. As a result, pharmaceutical patents filed in the Thai patent database 
should be explored and knowledge o f how to develop the active ingredient extracted. 
This can be initiated by GPO and eventually disseminated to the local 
pharmaceutical industry.
7.4 O verall conclusion
M any low -  and middle-income countries are in the midst o f  negotiating bilateral 
trade and investment agreements with the EU or the USA, such as the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership Agreement (TPPA) (Saunders 2012). TPPA is currently being negotiated 
between the US and several countries on the Pacific Rim- Australia, Brunei, Chile, 
M alaysia, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore and Vietnam. It is expected that these 
market-opening negotiations could vastly expand trade between these countries in 
goods, services, and investments. However, a proposed requirement o f  the agreement 
is tighter IPR regimes that could bind countries to stronger protections than the 
W TO ’s TRIPS Agreement requires (TRIPS-plus) (Morin 2009). Therefore, these 
trade negotiations could have profound impacts on crucial public policy issues, 
especially access to essential medicines.
Among developing and least-developed countries that are negotiating bilateral trade 
agreements, India is an interesting case. The implications o f  this case are not just 
relevant for India itself, but will significantly impact access to medicines across the 
developing world, since Indian generic manufacturers are the m ain supplier o f 
inexpensive medicines globally (Waning, Diedrichsen et al. 2010). As in other 
bilateral trade agreements, the Indian government has been requested to institute 
TRIPS-Plus provisions, including patent term  extensions, data exclusivity laws and 
stronger enforcement measures (Chatteijee 2011). Greater restrictive measures are 
also the subject o f  negotiations. First, border measures, in which international trade
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in generic medicines can be blocked by allowing customs authorities to seize any 
medicines suspected o f infringing patents in the countries through which they transit 
(Seuba 2010). Second, the EU wants India to agree to include IPR within the 
definition o f  ‘investment’. I f  it did so MNCs would be able to file cases against the 
use o f  TRIPS-flexibilities (such as CL) since they affect the investment. India would 
then have to pay compensation to these companies, or refrain from adopting 
measures to protect public health (Third World Network 2012).
Governments o f  developing countries are subjected to pressure by the US 
government to  accept TRIPS-Plus proposals (COHEN-KOHLER, FORMAN et al. 
2008). Empirical evidence o f  the benefits and costs o f  strengthening and weakening 
patent law is needed to support decision making. The results o f this thesis, specific to 
the Thai experience, could support the negotiations process. W hile whether Thailand 
is better o ff  strengthening or weakening its patent laws seems to be a simple 
question, there is a complex spectrum o f  answers depending on how one interprets 
the question. This thesis has laid out the evidence concerning strengthening and 
weakening that has been gathered in  this study.
For Thailand, evidence from this thesis suggests that stronger patent legislation
increases the price o f  medicines and plays an important role in reducing access to
medicines through reducing the probability o f  their being listed on the NLEM. 
*
However, stronger patent legislation does mean that new products are launched 
several years earlier. W eakening patent laws through CL reduces the price o f 
medicine and increases the number o f  patented medicines on the NLEM , but will 
delay new medicine entry. Although it is said that the adverse effect on price and 
access from stronger patent protection would be compensated for by the benefits o f  
technology transfers and domestic R&D, the experience in Thailand can reveal that 
the benefits in  term  o f  local innovation and technology transference has not been 
seen. Moreover, strengthening and weakening patent law cause only insignificant 
changes in the level o f  FDI.
W hether patent protection can make a country a better place is still subject to debate 
since estimating future effects is complex and requires many assumptions. The 
patent system is a public policy tool: patents are contracts between their owners and 
society. The trade-off between patent protection and access to medicines is still
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subject to debate, since empirical studies are relatively scarce, especially in 
developing countries. This underlines the urgent need to prioritise health research 
resources to assess the implications o f  patent protection and create other mechanisms 
to mitigate the adverse impact on access to medicines.
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A ppendix  1: The list o f  com panies which sell pa ten ted  m edicines (from  O range 
Book) o r  m onopoly m edicines in T hailand
1. American Taiwan Biopharm Co.,Ltd.
Active Ingredient Proprietary Name Strength
1. Altretamine Hexalen®[cap] 50mgx 100's
2. Arsenic trioxide Asadin® (The Thai Working 
Group on Burden of Disease 
and Injuries)
1 mg/1 mL x 10 mL
3. Doxorubicin Lipo-Dox® [vial] 40mg/2 mL x l ’s, 100 
mg/5 mL x l ’s
4. Irinotecan Irino® [vial] 40 mg/2 mL x l ’s 
100 mg/5 mLx Fs
5. Oxaliplatin Oxalip® [vial] 50 mg x l ’s 
100 mg x Fs
6. Rituximab UFUR® [cap] 7x  10's
7. Calciumfolinate Folina® (Vaughan) 15 mgx 10 x I0's
2. Astellas Pharma (Thailand) Co., Ltd,V -  *
Active Ingredient Proprietary Name Strength
1. Ramosetron 
hydrochloride
Nasea® [amp] 0.3mg x 2mL x 5’s
Nasea® (Vaughan) 0.1 mgx 10’s
3. AstraZeneca (Thailand) Ltd.J ,  5 U  A t A i n - v «  |  —
Active Ingredient Proprietary Name Strength
1. Anastrozole Arimidex® (Vaughan) lmgx 28’s
2. Bicalutamide Casodex® [ 150film-coated 
tab!
50mg x 28's
3. Gefitinib Iressa® [film-coated tab] 250mgx 3x 10's
4. Mitomycin Mitoxantrone Asta medica® 
[vial]
10mg/ 5mL x Fs 
20mg/ lOmL x 1's
5. Goserelin Acetate Zoladex® [SafeSystem 
depot inj]
3.6mgx Fs
6. Tamoxifen Nolvadex® (Vaughan) 10 mg x 30’s, 20 mg x 30’s
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4. B L  Hua Co.,Ltd.
Active Ingredient Proprietaiy Name Strength
1. Dacarbazine Dacarbazine Medac® [vial] 100mg X l's 
200 mg X l's
5. Baxter Healthcare (Thailand) Co.,Ltd
Active Ingredient Proprietary Name Strength
1. Cyclop hospha mide Endoxan® [coated tabj 50mg X 200's 
50mg X 500's 
50m g X 314's
Endoxan® [vial] 500mg X l's 
lOOOmg X l's
2. Idarubicin Holoxan® [vial] 500mgx I’s 
lOOOmgX l's
3. Mitomycin Mitoxantrone Baxter® 
fviall
10mg/5mLx l's 
20mg/ lOmL x l's
4. vinorelbine tartrate Navelbine® [vial] 10 mg/1 mL x 1 ’s
6. Bayer Thai Co., Ltd. (Bayer Schering Pharma)
Active Ingredient Proprietary Name Strength
1 Cyprote rone Androcur® (Vaughan) 50mg x 50's
2 Ibritumomab tiuxetan Zevalin® (Wignaraja, 
Olfindo et al.)
1.6 mg/1 mL x 2 mL x 
l ’s
3 Rituximab Nexavar® [film-coated 
tab]
200 m g x 6 x  10's
4 Tamoxifen Tuosomin® (Vaughan) 10 g x 100's 
20 g x 100's
5 Alemtuzumab MabCampath® [vial] 30 mg/1 mL x 1 x 3’s
6 fludarabine phosphate Fludara® [film-coated 
tabl
10 mg x 20's
Fludara® [vial] 50 mg x 5's
7. Berii Jucker Public CoM Ltd.
Active Ingredient Proprietary Name Strength
1. Interferon alfa-2b Bioferon® [vial] 3 MIU x l ’s 
5 MIU x l's
2. Epoetin alfa Hemax® [vial] 1000 iu/1 mL x l's 
2000 iu/2 mL x l's 
3000 iu/2 m Lx l's 
4000 iu/2 mL x l's 
10000 iu/1 mL x l's
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3. Carmustine Gliadel® [wafer] 7.7 mg X 8's
4. Hist re lin acetate Vantas® [implant] 50 mg X l's
8. Bristol-Myers Squibb Pharma (Thailand ) Ltd.
Active Ingredient Proprietary Name Strength
1. Carboplatin Paraplatin® [vial] 50 mg/5 mL x l's 
150mg/15mLx l's 
450mg/45 m L x l ’s
2. Carmustine Bicnu® [vial] 100 mg x l's
3. Cisplatin Platinol® [vial] 10 mg/20 mL x l ’s 
50 mg/lOOmLx l's
4. Dasatinib Sprycel® [film-coated tab] 20 mg x 60's
5. Etoposide Vepesid® [cap] 50mg x 20's 
100mg/5mLx l ’s
6. Hydroxycarbamide Hydrea® [cap] 500 mg x 100's
7. Lomustine Ceenu® [cap] 40 mg x 1 's
8. Megestrol Megace® [susp] 40 mg/1 mL x 240 mL
9. Megestrol Megace® (Vaughan) 160 mg x 100's 
160m gx 100's 
4 0 mgx  100's
10. Paclitaxel Taxol® [multidose vial] 30 mg/5 mL x l's 
100 mg/16.7 m Lx l's 
300 mg/50 mL x l's
9. Eli Lilly Asia Inc.-Thailand Branch
Active Ingredient Proprietary Name Strength
1. Gemcitabine Gemzar® [vial] 200 mg x l's 
1 g x  l's
2. Pemetrexed Alimta® [vial] 500mg x l's
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10. GlaxoSmithKline (Thailand) Ltd.
Active Ingredient Proprietary Name Strength
1. Busulfan Myleran® (Vaughan) 2 mg x 100's
2. Chlorambucil Leukeran® (Vaughan) 2 mg x 25's
3. Lapatinib Tykerb® [film-coated tab] 250 mg x 70's
4. Lomustine Puri-Nethol® (Vaughan) 50 mg x 25's
5. Melphalan Alkeran Injection® [vial] 50m gx l's
Alkeran® (Vaughan) 2 mg x 25's
6, Ondansetron Zofran® (Vaughan) 4 m gx 10's
Zofran® [amp] 4 mg/2 mL x 5's
Zofran® [Zydis tab] 4 mg x 10's
7. Thioguanine Lanvis® (Vaughan) 40 mg x 25's
8. Topotecan Hycamtin® [vial] 4 m gx l's
11. Great Eastern Drug Co.,Ltd.
Active Ingredient Proprietary Name Strength
1. Epoetin alpha Renogen® [vial] 1 mL x l's
12. IDS Marketing (Thailand) Ltd.
Active Ingredient Proprietary Name Strength
1, Epoetin alpha Hemapo® [pre-filled syringe] 30 g / l  mL x 1 x 3's
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13. Janssen-Cilag Ltd.
Active Ingredient Proprietary Name Strength
1. Bortezomib Velcade® [IV vial] 3.5 m gx l's 
1.0 mg x 1 's
2. Cladribine Leustatin® [vial] 10 mg/10 mL x l's
3. Decitabine Dacogen® [vial] 5 0 m gx 20 mL x l's
4. Epoetin alpha Eprex® [pre-filled syringe] 1000 iu/0.5 m L x l's  
2000 iu/0.5 m L x l's  
3000 iu/0.3 mL x 1 's 
4000 iu/0.4 mL x l's 
5000 iu/0.5 mL x l's 
6000 iu/0.6 mL x l's 
8000 iu/0.8 m L x l's  
10000 iu/1.0 mL x 1 's 
20000 iu/0.5 mL x l's 
40000 iu /1 .0 m L x l’s
14. Kyowa Hakko (Thailand) Co Ltd.
Active Ingredient Proprietary Name Strength
1. L-ASPARAGINASE Leunase® [vial] 10,000 K U x l’s
2. Mitomycin Mitomycin-C Kyowa® 
[vial]
2 m gx l's 
10m gx l ’s 
20 mg x l's
Mitomycin-C Kyowa® 
(Vaughan)
1 mg x l's
15. MSD (Thailand) Ltd.
Active Ingredient Proprietary Name Strength
1. Aprepitant Emend® [cap] 8 0 mgx l's, 125x l ’s
16. M erck Ltd., Thailand
Active Ingredient Proprietary Name Strength
1. Cetuximab Erbitux® [vial] 2 mg/1 mL x 50 mL
2. Tegafur+ Uraci UFT® [cap] 6 x 10's
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17. Schering-Plough Ltd.
Active Ingredient Proprietary Name Strength
1. Amifostine Ethyol® [vial] 500 mg X 10 mL x 1 's
2. Doxorubicin Caelyx® [vial] 2 mg/1 mL x 10 mL x l's
3. Interferon alfa-2b Intron-A® [Multi-Dose pen] Pen 18 MIU/1.2 ml x l ’s
4. Letrozole Fugerel® (Vaughan) 250 mg x 100's
5. Metenolone Primobolan® (Vaughan) 5 mg x 500's
6. Temozolomide Temodal® [cap] 20 mg x 5's 
lOOmgx 5's 
250 mg x 5's
7. Toremifene Fareston® (Vaughan) 60 mg x 30's
18. Novartis (Thailand) Ltd.
Active Ingredient Proprietary Name Strength
1. Imatinib Glivec® [film-coated tab] 100m gx60’s 
100 mg x 120's 
400 mg x 30's
2. Letrozole Femara® [film-coated tab] 2.5 mg x 30's
3. Nilotinib Tasigna® [Hard cap] 200 mg x 28's
4. Tropisetron Navoban® (Vaughan) 5 mg x 5's
Navoban® [amp] 5 mg/5 mL x 1 's
5. Gemcitabine Gratnagen® [vial] 200 m gx l's 
1 gx  l's
6. Irinotecan irenax® [infusion] 40 mg/2 mL x l's 
100 mg/5 mL x 1 's
7. Tamoxifen Tamoxifen Sandoz® [film- 
coated tab]
20 mg x 30's
19. Pfizer (Thailand) Ltd.
Active Ingredient Proprietary Name Strength
1. Carboplatin Carboplatin injection® [vial] 50 mg/5 mL x l's 
150 mg/15 m Lx l's 
450 mg/45 mL x l's
2. Cisplatin Cisplatin injection® [vial] 1 mg/1 mL x 10 ml 
1 mg/1 mL x 50 ml
3. Cytarabine Cytosar CS® [vial] 100 mg/5 mL x l's 
500mg/25 m Lx l's 
2,000 mg/20 mL x 1 's
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Active Ingredient Proprietary Name Strength
100m gx l's 
500 mg x 1 ’s
4. Doxorubicin Adriblastina R.D.® [vial] lOm gx l ’s 
50m gx l ’s
Doxorubin Hydrochloride® 
Tvial]
2 mg/1 m L  x  5 m L  x l's  
2  mg/1 mL x 25 mL x l ’s
5. Epirubicin Pharmorubicin CS® [vial] 10 mg/5 mL x l ’s 
50 mg/25 mL x I's 
200 mg/100 mLx 1 ’s
Farmorubicin® [vial] 10 mg x 1 ’s 
50 mg x 1 ’s
6. Exemestane Aromasin® [sugar-coated tab] 25 mg x 30’s
7. Idarubicin Zavedos® [cap] 5 mgx l ’s 
10mgx l ’s
Zavedos® [vial] 5 m gx l's 
10mg x l's
8. Irinotecan Campto® [infusion] 40 mg/2 mL x l's 
100 mg/5 mL x l's
9. Medroxyprogester 
one
Farlutal® (Vaughan) 500 mg x 30's
10. Methotrexate Methotrexate® [vial] 5 0 mg/2 m Lx l's
11. Sunitinib malate Sutent® [cap] 12.5 mg x 28's
12. Vincristine sulfate Vincristine sulfate inj® [vial] 2 mg/2 mL x l's
20. Siam Pharmaceutical Co Ltd.
Active Ingredient Proprietary Name Strength
1. Azacitidine Vidaza® [vial] 100m gx l's
2. Lenograstim Granocyte® [vial] 100 meg x 10's
3. Thalidomide Thalidomide Pharmion® [cap] 50 mg x 2 x 14's
21. Pacific Healthcare (Thailand) Co., Ltd.
Active Ingredient Proprietary Name Strength
1. Triptorelin Decapeptyl® (The Thai 
Working Group on Burden of 
Disease and Injuries)
3.75 m gx l's
Diphereline P.R.® [vial] 3.75 mgx l's
11.25m gx l ’s
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22. PL Asia Pacific (Thailand) Ltd.19
Active Ingredient Proprietary Name Strength
1. Busulfan Busulfex® [vial] 6 mg/1 mL x 10 mL x 8's
2. Dactinomycin Lyovac Cosmegen® [via l] 0.5 m gx l's
3. Filgrastim Gran® [Pre-filled syringe] 300mcg/0.5 m Lx l's
4. Pegfilgrastim Peglasta® [pre-filled syringe] 5m gx0 .6m L x l ’s
23. Roche Thailand Ltd.
Active Ingredient Proprietary Name Strength
1. Bevacizumab Avastin® [vial] 100 mg/4 mL x l ’s
200 m g /16 mL x 1 ’s______
2. Capecitabine Xeloda® [film-coated tab] 150 mg x 60's 
500 mg x 120's
3. Epoetin beta Recormon® [pre-filled 
syringe]
500 iu/0.3 mL x l's
Recormon® [vial] 2000 iu/1 mL x l's
Mircera® [pre-filled syringe] 5 0 mcg/0.3 mL x l ’s 
75 mcg/0.3 mL x l's 
100mcg/0.3 m Lx l's 
150mcg/0.3 m Lx l's 
200 mcg/0.3 mL x l's
4. Granisetron HCL Kytril® [amp] 3 mg/3 mL x 5's 
1 mg/1 mL x 5's
Kytril® [film-coated tab] 1 mg x 10's
5. Eriotinib HC1 Tarceva® [film-coated tab] 100 m gx 30's 
150 mg x 30's
6. Filgrastim Neupogen® [pre-filled 
syringe]
30 MU/0.5 mL x l's 
48 MU/0.5 mL x 1 's
7. Fluorouracil Fluoro-uracil® [vial] 500mg/10 mL x l's
8. I band ro nie acid Bondronat® [vial] 1 mg/1 m Lx l's
Bondronat® (Vaughan) 50 mg x 28's
9. Pegfilgrastim Neulastim® [type I glass pre­
filled syringe]
6m g/0.6m Lx l's
10. Procarbazine Natulan® [cap] 5 0 m gx l's
11. Rituximab MabThera® [vial] 100 mg/10 m L x2 's 
500 mg/50 mL x l's
19 Not found from PReMA member company list 
(http://www.prema.or.th/member_profile.php?menu=2&key=p)
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Active Ingredient Proprietary Name Strength
12. Trastuzumab Herceptin® [vial] 150 mgx l's 
440mgx l's
13. Tretinoin Vesanoid® [cap] 10 m gx 100's
24. Sanofl-aventis (Thailand) Ltd.
Active Ingredient Proprietary Name Strength
1. Bacillus Calmette- 
Guerin
Immucyst® [vial] 81 mg (dry wt) x l's
2. Buserelin Suprefact® [Depot inj] 6.6 m gx 1 implant 1.575 
mg/gm x 10 gm x 2's 
1 mg/1 mL x 5.5 ml x l's
Suprefact nasal spray® [bot] 0.1 mg/1 spray x 10 g (84 
spray) x 4's
3. Docetaxel Taxotere® [single-dose vial] 20 mg/0.5 m L x l's  
80 mg/2 mL x 1 's
4. Oxaliplatin Eloxatin® [cone] 5 0 m gx l's 
100m gx l's 
50 mg/10 mL x l's 
200 mg/40 mL x 1 's
5. Rasburicase Fasturtec® [vial] 1 mg x l's
25. Takeda (Thailand) Ltd.
Active Ingredient Proprietary Name Strength
1. Leuprorelin acetate Enantone L.P.® [vial] I. 88 mg x l's 
3.75 mg x l's
I I . 25 g x l 's
26. Thai Meiji Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd.
Active Ingredient Proprietary Name Strength
1. Pirarubicin Therarubicin® [vial] 10 mg x l's 
20 mg x 1 's
27. Wyeth (Thailand) Ltd. (Consumer Healthcare )
Active Ingredient Proprietary Name Strength
1. Methotrexate Methotrexate® (Vaughan) 2.5 mg x 100's
2. Mitomycin Novantrone® [vial] 10 mg/5 mL x l's 
20 mg/10 mL x l's
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Appendix 2: Patent survey to PReMA translated from Thai version
Brief proposal: Survey on cancer drug patents in Thailand
1. Introduction
Survey on cancer drug patents is a part o f  a research project entitled " Implications o f 
patent on access and foreign direct investment in Thailand: a case study o f  anticancer 
medicines". This part o f  the project will develop a model to study the medicine price 
sensitivity o f  the patent compared to the supply and demand variables with a 
hypothesis that patenting has no effect on the price o f  medicine. Anti-cancer 
medicines are selected as a case study due to the fact that cancer is the highest cause 
o f  death o f  the Thai people and these medicines are subject to numerous patents and 
are expensive. Moreover, the implementation o f  government use licenses for four 
anti-cancer medicines in 2008 leads to the wider debate. The suitable measure is 
therefore important to develop to promote sustainable access to patented medicines 
rather than the implementation o f government use o f  patents.
Despite long-standing concerns over the implications o f  patent protection on access 
to medicines, there is still considerable uncertainty regarding the existence o f  patents 
on particular medicines. Patent information on pharmaceutical products is often not 
easily accessible in an easily understood or transparent format. M ost patent databases 
always indicate that the information is not developed directly from the 
pharmaceutical companies. They tend to suggest contacting patent owners to verify 
the patent status again.
Patent information is necessary for the proposed research project that aims to 
increase access to anti-cancer medicines. However, patent information often has 
problems about accuracy and completeness. Most patent databases always indicate 
that the information may not be complete. They suggest contacting patent owners to 
verify the patent status again. Patent information o f  each anti-cancer medicine has 
been searched for in the Department o f  Intellectual Property database 
(http://patentsearch.moc.go.th). By using the generic name as a keyword in the 
searching strategy, there are only four medicines, out o f  47, which appear to have
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patents. This may be because the database does not collect the generic form o f  the 
name, but collect the name o f  the chemical instead.
For the reasons mentioned above, a survey o f  patent information from patent owners 
would be a directly effective way to get correct information. Health and procurement 
authorities now incorporate issues o f  intellectual property protection o f  medicines in 
their decision-making process. The question o f whether or not a medicine is under 
patent protection is a crucial factor in decisions about medicine procurement (or 
local production), and will determine the options available to national authorities. 
This project aims to identify a pragmatic and cost-effective means o f  investigating 
and analyzing the extent to which specified essential medicines are protected by 
patents, and how long patent coverage will last in Thailand.
Action p lan
1. Listing the name o f  companies selling suspected patented medicine (from Orange 
Book and or from the monopoly medicine status) (see Appendix 1).
2. Developing a patent survey questionnaire (example shown in appendix 2). The 
survey o f  medicine patent information includes the following.
• Application number
• Types o f  patents (Product, Process, or Petty patent)
• Date o f  the application
• Patent status (Filing, examination, advertisement or granted)
•  Patent expiry date
3. Contacting the Association o f  Pharmaceutical Research & Manufacturers 
(PReMA) for cooperation and instructions on how to distribute questionnaires 
effectively and efficiently.
4. Meeting with members o f  the PReM A in the second week o f  January 2011. 
Tim eline
This project timeline is 14 weeks (The first week is the week o f  October 18-22 2010 
and the 14th week is the week o f  January 17-21 2011). The activities o f  this project 
and time to finish are shown in the table.
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A ctivities/W eek 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
1 .Contact PReMA Y ■/
2.Questionnaire 
distribution
✓  v"
evissergorP.3
gnirotinom
Y ✓  ✓  ✓
4. Meeting (To be 
confirmed, 13-17 
January 2010)
✓
5. Conclusion ✓
R esearch  con tribu tion
A  vital aspect o f  this decision-making process is the availability o f  accurate and up- 
to-date information about the patent status o f  essential medicines. The empirical 
evidence o f  the magnitude o f patents as a component o f  pharmaceutical prices while 
controlling for other related factors is needed to support decision. Such information 
will help the government determine their options for procurement o f  medicines; 
including the option o f  procuring generic medicines.
C orrespondence persons
P rim ary  Investigator: Ms. Inthira Yamabhai, inthira.y@hitap.net.
A ssistant researcher: Ms. Jarapom  Siriviraroj, Tel.02-590-4549 or ja rap o ras  @ 
hitap.net
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‘Vision: Appropriate Health Interventions and Technologies for Thai society" H.TflP
Patent medicine survey: an ti-cancer m edicines
Objectives
To know the patented anti-cancer medicines. This information will be a main 
input to study the relationship between patent and price of medicine. The result 
of model will be presented in May 2011
Instruction
Please fill in the form of the questionnaire. The questionnaire consists of three parts.
P art I survey of the completeness of anti-cancer medicines sold in Thailand by your 
company. Only the medicines registered with the T hai FDA from  1983 to 2008 
Part II survey of patents under a particular medicine
P art III survey of patent information i.e. patent application number, type of patent 
and expiry date
C ontact person
Name.............................................................. Title.........................................
Email..........................................
Tel.........................................................................
Fax......................................................................
^ ^ F o r  m ore inform ation
If you have any additional thoughts, questions, or comments, please feel free to 
contact
In th ira  Y am abhai o r Ja ra p o rn  Siriviroj
Health Intervention and Technology Assessment Program (H1TAP)
6th Floor, 6th Building, Department of Health 
Ministry of Public Health, Tiwanon Rd. Nonthaburi 11000 
Tel. 02-590-4549, Fax.02-590-4369 
Email: inthira.v@hitap.net
¿ -R e tu rn in g
Please return this survey by J a n u a ry  10th via email at inthira.y@hitap.net or by fax 
on 02 590 4369
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P a r ti :  Survey o f the com pleteness o f an ti-cancer medicines sold in T hailand  by 
your com pany. O nly the  medicines registered with the Thai FDA from  1983 to 
D ecem ber 2008
1. Data from Monthly Index of Medical Specialties (MIMS) and the Thai FDA 
show that Astellas P harm a (Thailand) Co., L td. has one product selling in anti­
cancer therapeutic group as shown in table below. Please check the completeness of 
the list in the table and put 
Vin □  of your company
Active Ingredient P roprie tary  Name Strength
1. R am osetron 
hvdrochloride
Nasea® [amp] 0.3mg x 2mL x 5's
Nasea® (Vaughan) 0.1 mg x 10's
From verifying
□  1. Our company is selling medicines as shown in above table
□  2. We have other anti-cancer medicines as shown in the table below Please 
contact researcher to send part II and III or it can be copied as appropriate.
Active Ingredient P roprie tary  Name Strength
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
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P a rt 2: Paten t
Active Ingredient. P roprie tary  Name
Ramosetron hydrochloride Nasea® famnl
Is anti-cancer medicine identified above a patented medicine? If yes, how many 
patents under this medicine?
□  2.1 Yes, there are patents under this medicine -► Please answer part 3
□2.2 No-*- Finish survey, please return the questionnaire back follows by 
instruction on cover page
P a rt 3: Paten t inform ation
Please fill the information of each patent in the table below respectively. The table 
can be if appropriate.
No.l
1. Application 
number
2. Patent type □Product patent 
□Process patent 
□  Petty patent
3. Date of apply
4. Patent status □Examination 
□Advertisement 
□Patent granted
□  Other (Please
specify)...........................................................
5. Patent expiry date
No.2
1. Application 
number
2. Patent type □Product patent 
□Process patent 
□Petty patent
3. Date of apply
4. Patent status □Examination 
□Advertisement 
□Patent granted
No..................................................................
□  Other (Please
specify)...........................................................
5. Patent expiry date
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No.3
1. Application 
number
2. Patent type □Product patent 
□Process patent 
□Petty patent
3. Date of apply
4. Patent status □Examination 
□Advertisement 
□Patent granted
□  Other (Please
specify)...........................................................
5. Patent expiry date
No.4
1. Application 
number
2. Patent type □Product patent 
□Process patent 
□Petty patent
3. Date of apply
4. Patent status □Examination 
□Advertisement 
□Patent granted
□  Other (Please
specify)..........................................................
5. Patent expiry date
No. 5
1. Application 
number
2. Patent type □Product patent 
□Process patent 
□Petty patent
3. Date of apply
4. Patent status □Examination 
□Advertisement 
□Patent granted
No..................................................................
□  Other (Please
specify)...........................................................
5. Patent expiry date
T h an k  you for your cooperation
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A ppendix 3: L ist o f unknow n pa ten t sta tus and  non-patented medicines
Table 1 List o f  Drugs found to have patents in US or Canadian drug patent database
but not enough information to conclude
No. Active ingredient No. Active ingredient
1 Alemtuzumab 5 Megestrol*
2 bacillus Calmette-Guerin 6 pemetrexed
3 Cyproterone 7 sunitinib malate
4 leuprorelin acetate 8 thalidomide
* Likely to have no patent since registered before 1992 and is not a monopoly
medicine
Table 2 List o f  non-patented medicines
No. Active ingredient No. Active ingredient
1 Altretamine 28 hydroxycarbamide
2 amifostine* 29 idarubicin
3 Anagrelide 30 ifosfamide
4 Anastrozole* 31 interferon alfa-2b*
5 arsenic trioxide* 32 lenograstim
6 Asparaginase 33 medroxyprogesterone
7 Azacitidine 34 melphalan
8 Bicalutamide 35 mercaptopurine
9 Bleomycin 36 mesna
10 Buserelin 37 methotrexate
11 Busulfan 38 mitomycin
12 calcium folinate 39 mitoxantrone
13 Carboplatin 40 ondansetron
14 Carmustine 41 paclitaxel
15 Chlorambucil 42 Pegfilgrastim*
16 Cisplatin 43 ramosetron hydrochloride
17 Cladribine 44 tamoxifen
18 cyclophosphamide 45 tegafur + uracil
19 Cytarabine 46 Temozolomide*
20 Dacarbazine 47 tetrachlorodecaoxide
21 Dactinomycin 48 thioguanine
22 Epirubicin 49 Topotecan*
23 epoetin alfa 50 Toremifene*
24 exemestane* 51 Triptorelin*
25 filgrastim* 52 Vinblastine sulfate
26 fluorouracil* 53 vincristine sulfate
27 Flutamide 54 vinorelbine tartrate
* patent data from pharmaceutical companies
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Appendix 4: Search terms and strategy o f Chapter 3
No. Searches Results
1 (('intellectual property rights' or patent) and TRIPS).af. 507
2
(intellectual property rights, patent, TRIPS or patent or 
TRIPS).af.
97,705
3 (health or pharmaceutical or medicine or drug).af. 18,050,431
4 2 and 3 36,592
5 (price or affordability).af. 162,722
6 8 and 9 632
7 limit 10 to english language [Limit not valid in Econlit; 605/
records were retained]
8 limit 11 to yr="1990 -Current" 581
9 remove duplicates from 12 417
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Appendix 5: List o f medicines that are on NLEM and not on NLEM
NLEM medicines Not on NLEM medicines
No Generic name no Generic name
1 alemtuzumab i asparaginase
2 altretamine 2 bacillus calmette-guerin
3 amifostine 3 bleomycin
4 anagrelide 4 busulfan
5 anastrozole 5 calcium folinate
6 aprepitant 6 capecitabine
7 arsenic trioxide 7 carboplatin
8 azacitidine 8 chlorambucil
9 bevacizumab 9 cisplatin
10 bicalutamide 10 cyclophosphamide
11 bortezomib 11 cytarabine
12 buserelin 12 dactinomycin
13 carmustine 13 docetaxel
14 cetuximab 14 doxorubicin
15 cyproterone 15 epoetin alfa
16 dasatinib 16 epoetin beta
17 epirubicin 17 etoposide
18 erlotinib hcl 18 filgrastim
19 exemestane 19 fluorouracil
20 fludarabine phosphate 20 flutamide
21 gefitinib 21 gemcitabine
22 goserelin 22 hydroxycarbamide hydroxyeurea
23 granisetron 23 idarubicin
24 ibandronic acid 24 ifosfamide
25 ibritumomab tiuxetan 25 imatinib
26 interferon alfa-2b 26 lenograstim
27 irinotecan 27 letrozole
28 lapatinib 28 medroxyprogesterone
29 leuprorelide acetate 29 megestrol
30 nilotinib 30 melphalan
31 oxaliplatin 31 mercaptopurine
32 pegfilgrastim 32 mesna
33 pemetrexed 33 methotrexate
34 ramosetron hydrochloride 34 mitoxantrone
35 rituximab 35 Ondansetron
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NLEM medicines Not on NLEM medicines
No Generic name No Generic name
36 sorafenib 36 sorafenib
37 sunitinib malate 37 sunitinib malate
38 tetrachl orodecaoxide 38 tetrachl orodecaoxide
39 thalidomide 39 thalidomide
40 topotecan 40 topotecan
41 toremifene 41 toremifene
42 trastuzumab 42 trastuzumab
43 tretinoin 43 tretinoin
44 triptorelin 44 triptorelin
45 vinorelbine tartrate 45 vinorelbine tartrate
273
Appendix 6: Search term and strategy o f Chapter 4
No. Searches Results
1 (patent or TRIPS or price).af 218,127
2 (medicine or drug or pharmaceutical).af 8,556,851
3 (access or afford or utilization).af 877,218
4 1 and 2 and 3 3,147
5 limit 4 to english language 1,410
6 limit 5 to human 975
7 limit 6 to yr="1990 -Current" 959
8 remove duplicates from 7 744
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Appendix 7: Estimates by logit model
Variable _________ Model (1)___________________M odel (2)___________________Model (3)___________________Model (4)
Coefficient M arginal
effect
Coefficient Marginal
effect
Coefficient Marginal
effect
Coefficient Marginal
effect
Patent -1.469* -0.351* -6.598 -0.811***
(0.836) (0.182) (4.107) (0.276)
Cost o f  treatment -0.250 -0.062 -0.227 -0.057 -1.673 -0.162 -1.767** -0.274**
(0.217) (0.053) (0.189) (0.047) (1.213) (0.149) (0.900) (0.122)
Log o f  No. o f  patients 0.096 0.024 0.254 0.063 -1.968* -0.191 -1.021 -0.158
(0.192) (0.047) (0.174) (0.043) (1.145) (0.170) (0.637) (0.101)
Log o f  sales value 0.950*** 0.234*** 0.720*** 0.180*** 3.605 0.349 1.634* 0.253**
(0.274) (0.069) (0.230) (0.057) (2.201) (0.267) (0.934) (0.114)
Product age 0.312*** 0.077*** 0.322*** 0.081***
(0.082) (0.020) (0.074) (0.018)
Q A LYs gained 0.157 0.015 -0.049 -0.008
(0.191) (0.017) (0.095) (0.015)
-6.598 -0.811*** -1.767** -0.274**
N 85 85 93 93 22 22 24 24
pseudo F c 0.546 0.546 0.507 0.507 0.686 0.686 0.479 0.479
Log likelihood -26.621 -26.621 -31.754 -31.754 -4.534 -4.534 -7.966 -7.966
Chi-squared 64.015 64.015 65.320 65.320 19.772 19.772 14.620 14.620
Notes: Standard errors in  parentheses. Significant at ( * )  1 0 % ,  (**) 5 %  or (***) 1%
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Appendix 8: Search term and strategy o f Chapter 5
No. Search term s Results
1 (patent* or intellectual property).af. 112,050
2 (Public health or health or drug or drugs or 
Pharmaceutical* or Medicine).af.
18,332,912
3 #1 and #2 43,534
4 (availabilit* or entry or launch).af. 510,590
5 #3 and #4 1,346
6 Limit #5 to english language, human 1,124
7 limit #6 to year=" 1990-2011" 938
8 remove duplicates 689
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Appendix 9: Correlation table
law92 alaw99 uc2002 CL Drug import Lpatient no prior total Log expected profit patent
law92
alaw99 0.69 1 | 111!
§ S ? - £
uc2002 0.58 0.84 1
CL 0.00 -0.01 0.06 1
Drug import 0.86 0.86 0.81 0.09
Log patient no 0.89 0.85 0.79 0.07
prior 0.10 0.21 0.19 0.11
Total -0.09 -0.05 -0.02 0.09
Log expected profit 0.18 0.14 0.09 0.02
patent 0.23 0.15 0.13 0.00
1
0.19
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Appendix 10: Search term and strategy o f Chapter 5
No. Search term s Results
1 (patent* or intellectual property).af. 112,050
2 (Public health or health or drug or drugs or 
Pharmaceutical* or Medicine).af.
18,332,912
3 #1 and #2
43,534
4 (foreign direct investment or FDI or technology 
transfer or technology diffusion).af. or compulsory 
licens* or government use licens*
19432
5 #3 and #4 516
6 Limit #5 to english language, human 344
7 limit #6 to year=" 1990 -2011" 333
8 remove duplicates 261
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Appendix 11: Testing for time variable
To see i f  time fixed effects are needed when running a FE model use the command 
testparm. It is a joint test to see if  the dummies for all years are equal to 0, if  they are 
then no time fixed effects are needed.
. x1:xtreg lnfd1200S I.Year, fe1.Year _IYear_1995-2009 (naturally coded! _IYear_1995 omitted)
Fixed-effects (within) regression Number of obs - 125Group vari able: c1d Number of groups ■ 9
R-sq: within - 0.1849 Obs per group: min ■ 10between ■ 0.3154 avg - 13.9overall • 0.0544 max ■ IS
F(14,102) 1.65corr(u_1f Xb) - 0.0411 Prob > F a 0.0777
Infdi 2005 Coef a Std. Err. t p>iti [95* Conf. Interval]
_lYear 1996 .2573916 .5616603 0.46 0.64B -.8566589 1.371442_IYear 1997 .3565334 .5616603 0.63 0.S27 -.7575171 1.470564_IYear_1998 .928647 .5800603 1.60 0.112 -.2218998 2.079194_IYear_1999 .5389198 .5800603 0.93 0.355 -.6116271 1.689467_lYear_2000 .1681035 .5800603 0.29 0.773 -.9824433 1.31865_lYear_2001 -.5275636 .5800603 -0.91 0.365 -1.67811 .6229832_IYear_2002 -.286696 .5616603 -0.51 0.611 -1.400746 .8273545_IYear_2003 -.0021531 .5800603 -0.00 0.997 -1.1527 1.148394_IYear_2004 .0523008 .5762315 0.09 0.928 -1.090652 1.195253_lYear_2005 .4413089 .5762315 0.77 0.446 -.7016435 1.584261_IYear_2006 .2151768 .5616603 0.38 0.702 -.8988737 1.329227_lYear_2007 1.285322 .5762315 2.23 0.028 .1423698 2.428275_ivear_2008 1.345679 .5762315 2.34 0.021 .2027267 2.4B8631_IYear_2009 .2611469 .5616603 0.46 0.643 -.8529036 1.375197-cons 19.08979 .4089335 46.68 0.000 18.27867 19.9009
s1gma_u 2.40880661.1524629rho .81373437 (fraction of variance due to u_1)
F test that all u_1-0: F(8, 102) - 57.48 Prob > F- 0.0000
. testp.rm _IYear*
( 1) _IYear_1996 » 0 ( 2) _IYear_1997 - 0 ( 3) _lYear_1998 - 0 ( 4) _IYear_1999 - 0 ( 5) _IYear_2000 - 0 ( 6) _lYear_2001 - 0 ( 7) _XYear_2002 m 0 ( 8) _IYear_2003 - 0 ( 9) _IYear_2004 - 0(10) _IYear_2005 - 0(11) _lYear_2006 - 0(12) _IYear_2007 - 0(13) _lYear_2008 - 0(14) _IYear_2009 - 0
F( 14, 102) - 1.65Prob » F - 0.0777
This shows that it is failed to reject the null that all years’ coefficients are jointly 
equal to zero therefore no time fixed-effects are needed.
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